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ABSTRACT
Representation and Policymaking:
Women Participating in the U.S. House
Lauren M. Santoro
Past research has established the link between descriptive and substantive
representation (Swers 2002a) and has overwhelmingly focused on agenda setting
behaviors and roll call voting (e.g., Swain 1993; Thomas 1994; Swers 2013). The
first part of this dissertation focuses instead on deliberations within committee
hearings, quite proximate to the law-making process, where legislators exhibit
representational behavior. Do women participate in committee proceedings more so
than men when they consciously seek to represent so-called “women’s interests”?
This chapter aims to explore this question by gathering data on House hearings
considering the Family and Medical Leave Act and a bill considering the
advancement of women in STEM fields. The second part of this dissertation
examines how female members of Congress conduct oversight on women’s issues.
Does the number of women serving on a committee affect the amount of oversight
hearings conducted pertaining to women’s issues? If so, then electing women makes
a clear difference in House deliberations and oversight. Finally, the purpose of the
third part of the dissertation is to tease out whether gender acts as an independent
“fundamental characteristic” (Swers 2013) or if it is conditioned by district
characteristics specifically related to the female reelection constituency. Perhaps
congresswomen who are elected from certain districts with particular female
reelection constituencies are more apt to introduce bills related to women's issues
than are congresswomen and congressmen from other districts. However, I expect
that voters’ perceptions of congresswomen allow congresswomen to work on public
policies related directly to women’s needs and repay them with supportive votes,
more so than congressmen. If this dissertation as a whole shows that the gender of a
member significantly contributes to their behavior, then I have bolstered the
literature that connects descriptive representation with substantive representation.
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Chapter 1:
Do Congresswomen have an impact on policy concerning women's issues?
Academics, commentators, and private citizens who are concerned with gender equality
are concerned that gender disparities continue in government. We have yet to see a woman elected
president and the percentage of women serving in Congress is 19.4% (CAWP) out of 535 seats.
Figure 1.1 displays the number of women serving in the House and Senate over time by party
identification. More women are elected from the Democratic party than from the Republican party,
so not only are women as a whole underrepresented, but partisan differences contribute to a
stronger underrepresentation of conservative women. There is an outcry to fix such gender
inequality, but why do we assume that electing more women will make a positive difference?
Perhaps due to the historical marginalization of women, or maybe just because we tend to think
that equality means fairness, we assume that electing more women to Congress would be good for
the country. In Congress, the implication is that more women would be a good thing for
representation and public policy. People also tend to assume that descriptive representation (being
a woman) and substantive representation (being a proponent of women’s interests) are connected
(e.g., Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Pitkin 1967; Sapiro 1981). This means that beyond women
simply making a difference because they are elected to an institution that is majority male, women
will also better represent women than their male counterparts.
Does descriptive representation enhance substantive representation? In political science
scholarship, we have much evidence to support that it does. Not only do women actively seek to
represent the needs of female citizens (Carroll 2002; Reingold 1992, 2000; Rosenthal 1998;
Thomas 1994, 1997), but women in both the House and Senate support women’s issue legislation
through bill sponsorship, co-sponsorship, and roll call voting (e.g., Swers 2002a & 2013).
Similarly, female representatives at the state level also prioritize women’s issues (e.g., Berkman
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and O'Connor 1993; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Dolan and Ford 1995; Saint-Germain 1989;
Thomas 1994). From this briefest of overviews, it is clear that in order to represent the needs of
women in America more women have to be elected to all forms of public office, including state
legislatures and Congress.
This dissertation focuses on exploring, and thus adding to knowledge on, the link between
descriptive and substantive representation. Each chapter focuses on a different question about
women’s actions in Congress. But the overarching question to the dissertation is: does electing
women to Congress make a difference in the actions that occur on the policies specifically related
to women’s issues? I investigate behaviors that are proximate to the policymaking process in order
to appropriately determine whether congresswomen behave differently than their male colleagues.
If this dissertation shows that the gender of an individual legislator can significantly predict their
behavior, specifically how they participate in Congress, then I can bolster the link between
descriptive and substantive representation. In the remaining portion of this literature review
chapter, I will discuss both the current state of the gender and politics literature, as well as the
literature on both Congress and women participating in government that has brought me to the
research questions of each empirical chapter.
Women Participating in American Government
What motivates members of Congress to act? Can we answer that question without
considering the personal characteristics of the member? Of course, we can make generalizations
about members of Congress, and those generalizations are helpful, but when we start
contemplating how the actions of members of Congress affect their constituents due to their
primary role as representatives, we must consider all factors that may affect their motivations,
including their gender. Previous research has concluded that members of Congress are largely

3
motivated by reelection (Mayhew 1974) and the interest in creating good public policy (Arnold
1990; Fenno 1973; Hall 1996). By adding concerns about the role personal characteristics like
gender play to such findings, I ask: do the men and women of Congress differ when they participate
because of differences in motivation, such as how they view reelection and making good policy
because of their gendered identity?
The literature investigating the role of women in government has considered these
questions of motivation, and has done so by looking at women serving in Congress and women
serving in state legislatures. First, women serving in both state legislatures and Congress feel a
responsibility to specifically represent women. They think of women as a distinct constituency and
express commitment to representing women, whether in their district or not (Carroll 2002; Dodson
et al. 1995; Foerstel and Foerstel 1996; Gertzog 1995). For example, Senator Barbara Boxer (DCA) described how she felt:
There are still so few women in Congress…So you really do have to represent much
more than your own state although my state is huge…Women all over the country
really do follow what you do and rely on you to speak out for them on the issues of
women’s health care, reproductive choice, conditions of families, domestic
priorities, environment…equal pay for equal work…I even had that in the House
of Representatives, which was incredible because I just came from a small district.
So, it is a pretty big burden. And I remember when I came [to the Senate], Barbara
Mikulski said, “Oh, my god, thank god, someone I can share this with,” because
she carried the load for so long as the only Democratic woman in the Senate.1

No matter the party ideology, race, ethnicity, tenure in office, or institutional position,
women speak similarly of the responsibility to represent American women (Carroll 2002).
Findings such as these are very important for two reasons. First, it helps cement the link between
substantive and descriptive representation. This means that when we elect women to state
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Quoted from Carroll 2002.
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legislatures and Congress, women actively seek to represent the needs of women in their districts,
as well as women in general2. In other words, electing a female representative (descriptive) leads
to policies that favor women (substantive). Second, because female representatives act to best
represent the needs of women in the electorate, we can assume that female representatives not only
seek to make good public policy for women, but also seek the votes of women. In fact, women in
state legislatures are more likely than men to view women as a distinct part of their constituencies
(Reingold 1992; Thomas 1994, 1997). We can even say that this propensity to consciously
represent women is a part of a Congresswoman's home style (Fenno 1978).
We see the above-mentioned findings further exemplified in agenda setting behavior, such
as roll call voting3. In Congress, women sponsor and cosponsor more feminist bills4 and bills
related to women’s traditional role as caregiver5 than men (Swers 2000, 2002; Tamerius 1995;
Vega and Firestone 1995; Wolbrecht 2002). At the state level, female representatives prioritize
women’s issues, too. They pursue feminist initiatives and legislation, as well as legislation
concerning issues of traditional importance to women, such as education, health, and welfare
(Berkman and O'Connor 1993; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Dolan and Ford 1995; Saint-Germain
1989; Thomas 1994). Importantly, women also seem to be more effective than their male
colleagues. At the state level, female representatives are more likely to see their legislation that
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Both symbolic and surrogate representation are terms sometimes used to describe such a scenario, where
the member of Congress feels the need to represent people who live outside of their district, but who share
important personal characteristics with them, such as race, ethnicity, sexuality, or gender (Mansbridge
2003).
3
Agenda setting behavior indicates a legislator’s interest in legislation more so than position taking
behavior because agenda setting takes up valuable resources, such as time spent researching and preparing
a bill to introduce. Sponsorship and co-sponsorship also indicate the legislator’s interest in arguing to pass
the bill, again indicating their willingness to spend time doing things like testifying for the bill in committee
hearings or persuading other legislators to vote for the bill.
4
Examples: reproductive rights, protecting victims of domestic violence, increasing funding for women’s
health research, establishing gender equality programs in education, etc.
5
Examples: health care, education, poverty assistance
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advances women’s interest passed into law compared to men6 (Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas
1994).
Gender also seems to make a difference in position-taking behaviors, such as roll call
voting and floor debate. When considering ideology, women in state legislatures tend to hold more
liberal policy attitudes than men. In Congress, however, there have been mixed findings about
whether women are more liberal than their male counterparts (Burrell 1994; Frankovic 1977;
Gehlen 1977; Leader 1977; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 1997; Welch 1985). Since we cannot
say with certainty that there is one generalizable finding about women’s ideology, I think we need
to consider both gender and ideology carefully in terms of participation in government, noting
when one is a stronger indicator of behavior than the other, and when they both seem to matter.
While ideology can be likened to a lens through which humans view the world, gender is a defining
characteristic that influences all social interactions (Lorber 1994). Therefore, it is important to
further explore how these two factors motivate members of Congress. For example, when the
policy directly concerns gender, like abortion (Tatolovich and Schier 1993) or a set of women’s
issues (Burrell 1994; Dolan 1997; Swers 1998), female representatives tend to vote similarly,
somewhat disregarding ideology and partisanship.
Furthermore, during floor debates, women exhibit a higher rate of participation than their
male counterparts on women’s issues (Cramer Walsh 2002; Swers 2000; Tamerius 1995), as well
as speaking with a distinctive voice on such issues (Cramer Walsh 2002; Dodson et al. 1995; Levy,
Tien, and Aved 2001; Swers 2000). For example, Levy, Tien, and Aved (2001) show that women
have been successful in reframing the debate on abortion in terms of women’s health, moving the
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There are also interesting findings at the national level that show that minority party women in the House
are more effective (getting a sponsored bill through the stages of the legislative life cycle), in general, than
majority party women and all male colleagues (Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2013).
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discussion of the Hyde Amendment7 away from a simple morality debate. When women frame
debates similarly to their male counterparts, they tend to speak on behalf of marginalized
constituencies more than men, as well as speak to their experiences in ways only women can, thus
effectively expanding the debate (Cramer Walsh 2002). Women also tend to have a distinctive
way of thinking about policy problems, as Kathlene (1995) shows in her study, which compares
the way women and men think about criminals and therefore crime policy, due to their socialized
gender differences.
When it comes to actively working on legislation in committees, women participate
differently than their male colleagues. At the state level, women in the Colorado legislature entered
the committee hearing debates later, spoke less often than their male colleagues did, and
interrupted witnesses less frequently than male legislators did (Kathlene 1994). The findings also
suggest that as the number of women serving in a legislative body increases, male members
become more verbally aggressive and controlling of hearings (Kathlene 1994). This obviously puts
women at a disadvantage in their goal of creating good public policy. However, other findings at
the state and national level show that female representatives are able to actively advocate for
female constituents by fighting to incorporate more women’s interests into committee legislation
(Dodson 1998, 2002; Dodson et al. 1995; Gertzog 1995; Norton 2002; Swers 2000, 2002). Also,
female committee chairs in state legislatures have reported a more integrative leadership style than
their male counterparts, by sharing power with others, collaborating with other chairs, and by
sharing strategic information with committee members (Rosenthal 1997, 1998, 2000). Plus,
women are less likely than men to say they care about achieving powerful positions; rather, they
want to move up the ladder, pull people together, build issue coalitions, and develop creative
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The Hyde Amendment prevents public funds from being used for abortion services.
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approaches to solving policy problems (Rosenthal 1997). This means that when we elect women,
we get different results---a different type of legislator---than when we elect men. However, we feel
about such results, we must also consider the effects that the characteristics of the institution have
on legislators.
At the state level, work on critical mass and the presence of a women’s caucus explores
what we are unable to with data from Congress, since so few women are elected. As women
increase their proportion in the legislatures, they are more willing to pursue policy preferences
based on gender (e.g., Kanter 1977). Also, differences in the policy priorities of the genders
intensified as the proportion of women reached a “critical mass” (Berkman and O'Connor 1993;
Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1994). As for the presence of a women’s caucus, they provide more
resources for female representatives, reducing the potential negative effects of tokenism (Thomas
1994 and Saint-Germain 1989).
Furthermore, acknowledging the part that institutional norms (who is in the
majority/minority; committee positions; leadership roles) play is important to understanding the
role of gender. Dodson (1995, 1998, 2002) demonstrates how Democratic and Republican women
in the 103rd Congress used their positions on key committees and within the party leadership to
make certain that legislation concerning violence against women, reproductive rights, and
women's health gained a place on the national agenda. Swers (2002) finds that being a member of
the majority or minority party affects congresswomen’s behavior. When she discusses her main
findings8, she adds some context as to why female Republicans behaved the way they did. When
they were a part of the minority party, they proposed more feminist bills, joining female
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In terms of roll call voting, male and female Democrats vote similarly, in favor of women’s issue bills and
female Republicans often join them. Also, when they can introduce bills on anything, moderate Republican
women and Democratic women introduce more bills on women’s issues and feminist issues than their male
colleagues.
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Democrats. When they were a part of the majority party, they continued to work on women’s
issues, but shifted their focus to social issues, avoiding rocking the boat. They wanted to curry
favor with their party and prevent being alienated. In a more recent work, Swers (2016a) again
finds that congresswomen (this time senators) cannot simply act as women who wish to represent
women; rather, women must act in terms of institutions, like the political party they are members
of (especially for Republican women), and the position that party holds in the current session of
Congress.
Discussing the state of the gender and politics literature has led me to think more about
testing the connection between substantive and descriptive representation. Furthermore, can I show
that electing women to Congress makes a difference in the actions that occur on the policies
specifically related to women’s issues? I believe that I can, and in the following section, I will
discuss how the literature leads to the various research questions I will answer in the dissertation.
Contribution to the Literature
The women and politics area of political science literature tends to focus on the connection
between descriptive and substantive representation. The area of literature examining this
connection and more general gender effects is extensive; however, it has not considered the
specific ideas I propose to study. The three substantive chapters of the dissertation, briefly detailed
in the following three paragraphs, will focus on the differences in participation and behavior
between the men and women of the U.S. House of Representatives. In the sections following this
brief discussion, I will expand on the three empirical chapters, noting my contributions to the
literature.
Chapter 2 studies how male and female members of Congress differ in their participation
levels during committee hearings considering two women’s issue bills: The Family and Medical
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Leave Act and the Commission on the Advancement of Women and Minorities in Science,
Engineering, and Technology Development Act (hereafter the FMLA and the SET commission).
The timeframe for the FMLA hearings spans from 1985 to 1993, and the SET commission from
1992 to 19989. This chapter allows me to make a new contribution to the literature by comparing
the participation of men and women of the Democratic and Republican parties, showing that men
and women participate at different levels. This chapter makes an important contribution to the field
by focusing on deliberations within committee hearings, where legislators exhibit representational
behavior. Since hearings are proximate to the policymaking process, it is important to investigate
the difference women make when they participate in such situations, especially when considering
women’s issues.
Chapter 3 focuses on oversight. I expect that if more women are members of a committee,
then that committee will spend more time on oversight of women’s issues than committees with
fewer female members. This chapter is a contribution to the field because while oversight is an
important legislative activity, it is again (as in the previous chapter) proximate to the policymaking
process. Scholars may expect women to act differently than men, but this dissertation chapter will
examine the critical yet understudied motivations for this difference of behavior among
committees with varying numbers of female members as well as committees conducting oversight
of women’s issues. Because this has not been done in previous literature, this chapter will
contribute to the development of a clearer understanding of how gender affects congressional
behavior and electoral representation.
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The House held nine total hearings on the FMLA: one in 1985, two in 1986, three in 1987, one in 1989,
one in 1991, and one in 1993. The House held three total hearings on the SET commission: one each in
1992, 1994, and 1998.
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Finally, Chapter 4 will explore how district characteristics might condition how gender
influences representation by examining bill introduction activity. I will do this by adding new
independent variables specifically related to women within the congressional district. If
congresswomen think of women as a specific reelection constituency, then I expect district
characteristics specifically related to women may play a role in the type of bills introduced by
female members. If partisan legislators are willing to "trespass" on the other party's issue
ownership due to voter preferences (Sides 2006), then perhaps if certain kinds of female voters are
present in a district, then both female Democrats and female Republicans will strategically
introduce women's issue legislation, even though such issues tend to be viewed by voters as
"owned" by Democrats. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to tease out whether gender acts
as an independent “fundamental characteristic” (Swers 2013) or if it is conditioned by district
characteristics specifically related to the female reelection constituency.

How does gender affect the participation of members of Congress in committee hearings?
In Chapter 2, I study committee hearings considering women’s interest legislation.
Reelection (Mayhew 1974; Arnold 1990) and genuine interest (Hall 1996) are the more general
and typical explanations given for the motivation of members of Congress. While I do not discount
these explanations, I also take into account the importance of gender. As previously mentioned,
many authors have contributed to the female representation literature by investigating Congress
and the gender differences within parties evidenced by voting behavior. There are mixed results
when comparing how liberal women and men tend to be. Vega and Firestone (1995) studied
behavior in the form of roll call voting and bill introduction between 1981 and 1992. They wanted
to know whether having women in Congress (descriptive representation) affects behavior and
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therefore affects substantive representation. Overall, women had slightly more liberal voting
patterns than their male colleagues, and Republican women were statistically significantly more
liberal than Republican men in nine of the twelve years examined. However, the gender gap within
parties is closing with time. Bill introduction data for the same period reveals that congresswomen
are introducing women-related legislation proportionate to their number and not disproportionately
more as might be expected. Vega and Firestone conclude that while their results are mixed, there
is a potential for women of both parties to continue to vote similarly and therefore increase the
connection between descriptive and substantive representation. Such findings are why I expect to
see a strong connection between descriptive and substantive representation when examining
FMLA and SET commission hearings. I expect women to participate more than men in order to
accomplish a policy goal that benefits female constituents.
Michele Swers is also concerned with determining the policy effects women have in
Congress (1998). She specifically investigates behavior concerning women’s issue votes. Her
reasoning is simply that the more an issue directly affects women, the more likely women will vote
together, disregarding party. She finds that gender exerts influence over voting behavior on
women’s issue bills, but ideology is a better predictor. Importantly, a pattern does emerge of
Republican women defecting from party and voting for women’s issues more than their male
Republican colleagues. Also, her evidence refutes the notion that gender differences can be entirely
explained by district characteristics. In fact, “districts with higher median household income are
more supportive of women's issues” (Swers 1998, 440; see also Palmer and Simon 2006).
Women’s issues affect all women, across social and class differences. Bills that most affect
women’s health and reproductive issues drive the gender differences. Ideology, partisanship, and
district factors take over when considering the bills that dealt with peripheral issues, like education.
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No matter the party, congresswomen are more willing to vote in favor of bills that directly affect
women.
In order to substantiate these important findings, Swers’ book (2002) examines five steps
in the policy process to fully investigate gender differences within the parties: bill sponsorship,
cosponsorship, amendments in committees, defending women’s issues on the floor, and roll call
voting. All five point to the conclusions drawn in her 1998 article: moderate Republican and most
Democratic women are more willing to work for women’s issues than men. Her most interesting
finding for the purposes here is that the largest gender gap occurs in the sponsorship step of the
process. This implies that when women are able to pursue any issue that interests them and their
constituents, they choose to introduce legislation related to gender and family, which also what
Thomas (1994) finds at the state level.
Although the findings on bill introductions is a strong indicator of the connection between
gender and behavior, Chapter 2 seeks to better understand bill construction and the committee
process. When considering amendments in committee, Swers (2002) admits her study “does not
capture any pre-markup activity in which members work to convince the chair to include their
proposals in the chairman’s mark, the bill that will be subject to amendment during the markup”
(78). My chapter specifically addresses this behavior within committees. Also, as Swers (2002)
mentions, members have to engage in persuasive behavior, which indicates their level of interest.
The more interested they are in constructing the bill, the more they are going to participate in
committee. In Norton’s (2002) article, she discusses the findings of Hall who “contends that
personal policy interests determine how actively members will participate on an issue once seated
on the appropriate committees” (318). I believe my analysis will show that gender predicts
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participation on women’s interest legislation because gender can somewhat account for personal
interest.
While the extant literature has established a link between descriptive and substantive
representation, it has overwhelmingly focused on agenda setting behaviors and roll call voting
(e.g., Swain 1993; Thomas 1994; Swers 2002a; 2013). In order to address the question of policy,
Volden and Wiseman (2009; 2014) show that women are more effective overall at passing
legislation through the process than men (based on Legislative Effectiveness Scores). In their 2013
article (with Wittmer), they show that minority party women drive this effect in every stage but
bill introductions, where majority party women are more effective. They conclude that because
women have consensus building traits, they are able to use those traits when they are in the
institutional position of minority. Focusing on legislative effectiveness, roll call voting, and agenda
setting behaviors simply does not allow us to assess whether women participate more when it
comes to behavior that affects the substance of policy.
While these previous studies of Congress have produced compelling results considering
behavior and overall legislative effectiveness, none have examined how gender can contribute to
participation of members in committee hearings. In fact, Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer (2013)
find that both minority and majority party women are not able to get bills considered in committee
at a statistically significant level, indicating they are no more effective than their male counterparts.
I argue that women may be effective in a different way at the committee stage by participating
more than their male colleagues. This participation is particularly important because participation
in committee hearings can affect the outcome of a bill’s content. The content of a bill is directly
affected by participation in committee hearings (Hall 1996). This participation is also particularly
close to the policymaking stage whereas past analyses showing gender effects are more removed
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from the policymaking stage. Because participation in committee can alter policy, it is highly
selective. Members will only spend their time participating when the policy area captures their
personal and/or constituency’s interest (Hall 1996). Therefore, in order to understand how and why
women are important to improving substantive representation of women's interests, we need to
understand whether there is a gender effect during legislative participation. Are women choosing
to spend their valuable time participating more on women’s issues than men? If they are, women
have more of a direct impact on the policymaking process than previously thought.
With particular inspiration from Hall (1996) and Swers (2002), Chapter 2 asks: Do women
participate more on women’s issue bills in order to get these bills passed than their male
colleagues? I structure part of my argument around Hall’s contention that if a member is interested
in a policy, they participate more in committee. “Participation in Congress, for the most part, is
not a matter of institutional design or authoritative delegation; for the most part, it is a matter of
individual choice (Hall 1996; 5). Similarly, King (1997) shows that in order to gain turf, members
spend time in committee hearings cultivating expertise. Members have to make a choice to
participate, and that choice is often made via personal interest. I will measure participation through
analysis of committee hearings. I also consider traceability’s effect on participation by comparing
a high-salience and low-salience bill: the FMLA and the SET commission, respectively. The
concept of traceability refers to whether an action is particularly salient, or able to be traced back
to the member, by their constituents (Arnold 1990). The FMLA was highly salient, so it might be
more likely that I observe an effect. Therefore, I also examine SET as a comparison. On a less
salient bill, members can feel free to act based on personal beliefs and, to a certain extent, disregard
constituent opinion.
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Overall, I predict that women will take more of an interest in passing these bills than their
male colleagues and therefore participate more in committee hearings, thus providing greater
substantive representation of women’s interests. Therefore, my contribution is to examine whether
gender improves representation while studying representational behavior that affects policy
outcomes—behavior that is closer to the decision point than prior studies of gender and
representation. Critically, whereas past research has observed a link between descriptive and
substantive representation with respect to bill sponsorship and other behaviors that are peripheral
to behavior that determines what the substance of law is, I examine how much work lawmakers
do when committees are making choices that determine the language that comprises the law. In
this way, I move the literature forward by exploring behavior that is particularly proximate to the
policymaking process---behavior that is important for testing the link between descriptive and
substantive representation. The next section discusses the literature related to Chapter 3. It extends
theory presented in this chapter about legislative hearings to oversight hearings considering
women’s issues.

How does gender affect oversight?
The theory behind Chapter 3 of the dissertation begins by focusing on much of the same
literature presented for Chapter 2 above. We know that congresswomen use their committee
positions to advocate for the incorporation of women's interests into committee legislation
(Dodson 1998, 2002; Dodson et al.1995; Gertzog 1995; Norton 2002; Swers 2002b). Therefore,
members of Congress will act according to personal interest (Hall 1996) and gender (e.g., Swers
2002a) when it comes to participating in hearings considering women’s issue bills. In this chapter,
I focus specifically on oversight hearings. While the total number of days spent on hearings and
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meetings in the House have declined over time, the number of oversight days has increased
(Aberbach 2002). Since oversight is such an important activity to the members of the House, and
because oversight is an activity where legislators are given the chance to participate in policy
change, I investigate whether the number of women on a committee causes that committee to
conduct more oversight of women’s issues than committees with fewer congresswomen. I predict
that the more women on a committee, the more likely that the committee will conduct oversight
of women’s issues, thus further illustrating the connection between descriptive and substantive
representation.
According to Darcy (1996), women have had their “fair share” of access to power through
committee chairmanships within state legislatures. This “fair share” of power has not been
achieved in the House of Representatives. For this reason, it is important to examine what female
chairs do when they are able to have power over the agenda of a committee in the House. Thus,
the second part of Chapter 3 investigates the agenda setting choices of the chairs of the Small
Business committee. This committee sees many women’s issue bills, so it is appropriate to research
more about the difference between male and female chairs and whether the committee has
considered more women’s issues under the leadership of women. Not only do I investigate the
regular agendas of the committee, but I also look at the oversight agendas set forth by the four
chairs in question. In order to make valid observations, I compare a female Republican to a female
Democrat, as well as compare the two women’s agendas to their male chair colleagues.
If women are more likely to prioritize and sponsor women’s issues (Saint-Germain 1989;
Swers 2002a; Thomas 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991) but they do not conduct hearings in the
same way as men (Kathlene 1994), we should be interested to see if agendas differ for male and
female chairs. Also, female chairs in state legislatures say they are more motivated by policy and
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people than by power (Rosenthal 1998). Therefore, I predict that women, because of their gender,
personal interest, and policy interest, will put women’s issues on their committee agendas at higher
rates than their male counterparts. If female legislators prioritize women’s issues and care more
about policy goals than power, I can expect women to use the opportunity as chair to place
women’s issues on their regular and oversight agendas. I also expect women to prioritize women’s
issues by introducing bills of such a nature. In the next section, I will discuss Chapter 4, where I
will examine whether certain district characteristics mediate the effect of gender when considering
bill introductions.

Is gender conditioned by district and voter characteristics?
“Clearly, there is a lot more to a district than measures of vote share, income, urbanization,
and demographics” (MacDonald and O’Brien; 474). This quote sums up the general inspiration
and purpose of this chapter. When considering modeling the relationship between members of
Congress and their bill introductions, I want to capture personal characteristics of the individual
members as well as district characteristics in order to fully specify the model. Previous authors
(Poggione 2004; Swers 2002a) took district into account by controlling for average household
income, the percentage unemployed in the district, the percentage of district residents who earned
a college degree, and urbanicity. What if the effects of gender are mediated by a district
characteristic? Or more importantly, what if gender is mediated by a district characteristic
specifically related to the women of the district?
Female legislators have expressed a sense of responsibility to represent the interests of
women and they are more likely than men to view women as a distinct part of their constituencies
(Carroll 2002; Dodson et al. 1995; Foerstel and Foerstel 1996; Gertzog 1995; Reingold 1992,
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2000; Rosenthal 1998; Thomas 1994, 1997). What if women act with their female constituency in
mind? What if, in the vein of Fenno (1978), women act with their female reelection constituency
in mind? We know from Fenno that there are different constituencies within a district, so women
might have advantages building these constituencies relative to a man. So, their gender has an
effect, but is it gender in conjunction with being in the right district? These are important questions
to address since the literature is not addressing them currently. In this chapter, I will address these
questions of gender interacting with district characteristics by examining bill introductions.
Swers calls gender a “fundamental identity that affects the way Senators look at policy
questions, the issues they prioritize, and the perspective they bring to develop solutions” (2013;
3). However, the fundamental identity is not enough to explain behavioral differences between
male and female members. She goes on to argue that senators develop political and electoral
strategies based on public expectations regarding gender roles and party reputations, which is
further expanded on in more recent work (see Swers 2016a & 2016b). If we take her findings into
account along with the previous discussion of Fenno, it is easy to see how important it is to account
for the member’s gender and the member’s district characteristics. Plus, we can expect certain
kinds of districts to elect Democratic and Republican women (Palmer and Simon 2006). Perhaps
female legislators keep the women of their district in mind for both personal interest, like Hall
would expect, and for reelection interests, like Fenno would expect.
When women are able to pursue any issue that interests them and their constituents, they
choose to introduce legislation related to gender and family (Swers 2002a). When examining state
legislatures, Bratton (2005) finds that women sponsor more women’s interest legislation than their
male counterparts, even when the legislature contains very few women. I expect being female to
have a positive relationship with bill introductions related to women’s issues based on these
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previous findings. I also expect that some of the interactions I include to condition the effects of
gender. Specifically, I expect being female to interact with district characteristics related to
women, such as the number of single moms or the number of women business owners in the
district. These are factors that have the potential to characterize the types of voters in the district
that would prioritize women’s issues, and thus characterize how they would expect their
representative to respond accordingly. Therefore, we might expect female representatives to
exploit gender through their “linked fate” (Dawson 1994) with female voters, but we also might
expect them to simply behave according to their own personal gendered identity.
It is important to consider both the extent to which gender motivates behavior on its own,
as a fundamental identity (Swers 2013), and in conjunction with reelection and district motivations.
Therefore, I think it is crucial to consider the constituents living within the district, especially the
women who are probably paying attention to whether their representative is voicing concerns that
are unique to them. Certain district characteristics, such as the types of women living within them,
will "activate" congresswomen to attend to women's issues, though the same district characteristics
should not activate congressmen in the same way. Rather, I am arguing that congresswomen will
be in the unique position to capitalize on representing women within their districts by introducing
women's issue legislation and hoping to reap the rewards of reelection. If gender turns out to be a
significant motivating factor in bill introduction behavior, even if it is conditioned by other
personal or political characteristics, then we can successfully connect descriptive and substantive
representation. This would also bolster Mansbridge’s (1999) claims that descriptive representation
enhances substantive representation through improving the quality of deliberation. In the case of
this dissertation, deliberation refers to congressional hearings, oversight hearings, and bill
introductions, all considering women’s issues.
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Conclusion
This literature review has drawn from work that has studied both the participation of
women in government and the more general literature considering the motivations and actions of
members of Congress. In the following chapters, I will investigate three different aspects of
lawmaking (participation in committee hearings considering women’s issue bills, conducting
oversight of women’s issue legislation, and the introduction of feminist and social welfare bills)
to determine if and how congresswomen participate differently than their male colleagues. Because
I expect that women are inherently different, this dissertation is an important contribution to the
academic discussion on the link between descriptive and substantive representation. If electing
women leads to different results, both in the kind of representation that they exhibit and the policies
they help produce, then this is an important implication for the functioning of our democracy.
Furthermore, if electing more women leads to policies that benefit the female citizenry in
particular, than it is important to elect more women.
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Chapter 1 Figure
Figure 1.1: Women in the House and Senate by Party (1917–2017)

Source: Center for American Women and Politics (Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers, The State
University of New Jersey), 2015.
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Chapter 2:
Participation of Members of Congress in Committee Hearings Considering
Women’s Issues
Research on Congressional behavior tends to focus on what motivates individual legislators
to act. There are two main camps in this area of literature: those that present a singular motivating
factor and those that present multiple motivating factors. In the first camp, Fiorina (1974) and
Mayhew (1974) tell us that all actions of members of Congress can be explained by their goal to
be reelected. This goal underpins all action, even if the action may seem, on the surface, removed
from campaigning. The second camp includes Arnold (1990), Hall (1996), and Fenno (1978) who
present a slightly more nuanced picture of motivation and behavior. These authors discuss both
personal and electoral interests as motivations for behavior and decision making. Each member
has come to serve because they want to engage in policy formulation. If they are active in
committee, it is very likely they are interested in the issue. Past research has also considered the
role of gender in congressional behavior (e.g., Swers 1998; 2002; 2013). This literature tends to
focus on whether there is a connection between descriptive and substantive representation10. The
kinds of bills women sponsor or cosponsor, their participation in floor debate, and the amendments
they offer are just some of the more recent areas of participation that have been examined by
political science. Some scholars have challenged the descriptive and substantive representation
connection, showing that party and ideology are stronger predictors of behavior. This chapter seeks
to reestablish the descriptive and substantive connection.
With particular inspiration from Hall (1996) and Swers (2002), the current chapter asks:
Do women participate more on women’s issue bills in order to get these bills passed than their

10

Descriptive representation is the extent to which a representative resembles those being represented,
while substantive representation is the actions taken on the behalf of or in the interest of constituents (Pitkin
1967).
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male colleagues? I structure part of my argument around Hall’s contention that if a member is
interested in a policy, they participate more in committee. I also borrow from Hall by using chairs
as a comparison to the rest of the committee members for the amount of individual participation.
From Hall (1996), we know chairs have more resources, so we may predict that they would be
more active in all instances during hearings. If other members, such as women, are more active
than the chairs (who in both bill cases happen to be all male), it shows the particular importance
of such participation despite a lack of resources.
From the congressional literature considering gender, I hope to show that party and gender
have separate effects and that gender effects participation more than party. I will measure
participation through analysis of committee hearings. I count the number of testimonies (or the
number of times each member speaks) per member per hearing, the total number of words per
member per hearing, and the total number of questions asked per member per hearing. I also
consider traceability’s effect on participation by comparing a high-salience and low-salience bill:
The Family and Medical Leave Act and the Commission on the Advancement of Women and
Minorities in Science, Engineering, and Technology Development Act (hereafter the FMLA and
the SET commission)11. We might expect to see gender have more of an effect in the SET
commission models because it is less salient to the members' constituents, and therefore less
traceable. Members can feel free to act based on personal beliefs and, to a certain extent, disregard
constituent opinion. However, because I chose two bills that are not controversial or cut-and-dry
partisan issues (like abortion or pay equity), I think women can express their personal, gendered
interest in the bills. Again, we might see more of an effect in the less salient, less traceable SET
commission hearings. Alternatively, since the FMLA was so salient, it may have been the case that
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Again, the timeframe spans 1985-1998 for both sets of hearings.
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female members paid more attention to it and participated more in order to take credit for doing
so. When we look at it this way, the less salient SET commission is a check on the FMLA. If
women participate at an equal level in both sets of hearings, then gender is the overarching
motivational factor rather than salience and voter perception.
Overall, I predict that women will take more of an interest in passing these bills than their
male colleagues and therefore participate more in committee hearings, thus providing greater
substantive representation of women’s interests. Therefore, my contribution is to examine whether
gender improves representation while studying representational behavior that affects policy
outcomes—that is closer to the decision point than prior studies of gender and representation. It is
important to consider both the extent to which gender motivates behavior on its own, as a
fundamental identity (Swers 2013), and in conjunction with partisanship, as well as voter opinions
and perceptions. I seek to account for all motivating factors in my analyses. By doing so, we can
accurately account for how important gender is, and if gender turns out to be a significant
motivating factor, then we can successfully connect descriptive and substantive representation.
This would also bolster Mansbridge’s (1999) claims that descriptive representation enhances
substantive representation through improving the quality of deliberation, in this case, in
congressional hearings.
How does gender effect the participation of members of Congress?
Welch made the first major contribution to the female representation literature by
investigating Congress and the gender differences within parties evidenced by voting behavior
(1985). Comparing the parties overall, Republican and Democratic men and women were about
the same distance apart on ideology scales. The largest gender difference occurred within the
Southern Democratic group followed by the Republicans, while Northern Democrats of both sexes
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were so liberal and so close that women barely eclipsed men on the ideological scale. The controls
closed the gaps in gender differences, but the differences remained significant. Vega and Firestone
(1995) studied behavior in the form of roll call voting and bill introduction between 1981 and
1992. They wanted to know whether having women in Congress (descriptive representation)
affects behavior and therefore affects substantive representation. Overall, women had slightly
more liberal voting patterns than their male colleagues, and Republican women were statistically
significantly more liberal than men in nine of the twelve years examined.
However, the gender gap within parties is closing with time. Bill introduction data for the
same period reveals that congressional women are introducing women-related legislation
proportionate to their number and not disproportionately more as might be expected. Vega and
Firestone conclude that while their results are mixed, there is a potential for women of both parties
to continue to vote similarly and therefore increase the connection between descriptive and
substantive representation. Such findings are why I expect to see a strong connection between
descriptive and substantive representation when examining FMLA and SET commission hearings.
I expect women to participate in order to accomplish a policy goal that benefits women
constituents.
Michele Swers is also concerned with determining the policy effects women have in
Congress (1998). She specifically investigates behavior concerning women’s issue votes. Her
reasoning is simply that the more an issue directly affects women, the more likely women will vote
together, disregarding party. She finds that gender exerts influence over voting behavior on
women’s issue bills, but ideology is a better predictor. Importantly, a pattern does emerge of
Republican women defecting from party and voting for women’s issues more than their male
Republican colleagues. Also, her evidence refutes the notion that gender differences can be entirely
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explained by district characteristics. In fact, “districts with higher median household income are
more supportive of women's issues” (Swers 1998, 440). Women’s issues affect all women, across
social and class differences. Bills that most effect women’s health and reproductive issues drive
the gender differences. Ideology, partisan, and district factors take over when considering the bills
that dealt with peripheral issues, like education. No matter the party, congresswomen are more
willing than congressmen to vote in favor of bills the purpose of which is to improve the wellbeing of women.
In order to substantiate these important findings, Swers (2002) examines five steps in the
policy process to fully investigate gender differences within the parties: bill sponsorship,
cosponsorship, amendments in committees, defending women’s issues on the floor, and roll call
voting. All five point to the conclusions drawn in her 1998 article: moderate Republican and most
Democratic women are more willing to work for women’s issues than men. Her most important
finding for our purposes here is that the largest gender gap occurs in the sponsorship step of the
process. This implies that when women are able to pursue any issue that interests them and their
constituents, they choose to introduce legislation related to gender and family.
Although her finding on bill introductions is a strong indicator of the connection between
gender and behavior, my current chapter seeks to better understand bill construction and the
committee process. When considering amendments in committee, Swers (2002) admits her study
“does not capture any pre-markup activity in which members work to convince the chair to include
their proposals in the chairman’s mark, the bill that will be subject to amendment during the
markup” (78). This project specifically addresses this yet to be examined phenomenon. Also, as
Swers (2002) mentions, members have to engage in persuasive behavior, which indicates their
level of interest. The more interested they are in constructing the bill, the more they are going to
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participate in committee. In Norton’s (2002) article, she discusses the findings of Hall who
“contends that personal policy interests determine how actively members will participate on an
issue once seated on the appropriate committees” (318). I believe my analysis will show that
gender predicts participation on women’s interest legislation.
Whereas the previously discussed literature examines gender as one of the various
motivating factors of the individual, while controlling for some district characteristics, the other
aspect of motivation I’m concerned with is the interaction of gender with campaigning. Do
members of Congress use their gender to win elections and how is this connected with their
behavior within the policymaking process? The idea of issue ownership, although somewhat
intertwined with salience, developed out of the literatures on campaigning, framing, and voter
decision-making. Politicians use their party’s and their individual ownership of certain issues to
“successfully frame the vote choice as a decision to be made in terms of problems facing the
country that he is better able to ‘handle’ than his opponent” (Petrocik 1996). Other literature points
to the positive response of voters to candidates running on their personal legislative record and to
candidates who avoid making bogus claims about said record (Sellers 1998).
Because I argue that interest should outweigh reelection concerns, I specifically test for the
differences in both gender and party. According to Petrocik (1996), a “personal characteristic can
convey ownership of an issue: gender can determine who is the more credible candidate on matters
of sex discrimination, a retired war hero is a particularly credible commentator on military security.
Issue handling competence is the key” (847). Therefore, we might expect women to exploit gender
through their “linked fate” with female voters, but we also might expect them to simply behave
according to their own personal gendered identity. Because Democrats in recent years have
successfully framed parts of the Republican policy agenda as a "war on women", I expect to see
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higher levels of participation from both male and female Democrats. Democrats now safely "own"
women's issues, so men and women should exhibit similar levels of behavior within this party.
However, considering personal policy interests, a kind of personal issue ownership, we should also
pay particular attention to the participation of female Democrats and Republicans12. Party can
provide a simple cognitive shortcut to the voter (Popkin 1991), but gender may contradict such
shortcuts. In other words, do female Republican candidates attempt to own women and family
issues just as much as female Democrats? I think the answer is “yes.” Female Republicans will
participate more than their male colleagues in order to pass the FMLA and the SET commission
bills. Again, traceability fits into this puzzle, however, so we may expect differences based on
salience and political calculations.
I have used the previous paragraphs to examine the differences in political behavior of men
and women of Congress and to discuss the interaction of gender with voter perceptions. The
following research design will explain how I plan to show that gender affects committee
participation.
HYPOTHESES
My primary hypothesis is that women will participate at a higher level than men, in both
parties, considering both of these bills. This means that women, both Democrats and Republicans
will speak out more (number of testimonies), ask more questions, and speak the most (number of
words) compared to their male colleagues. I expect positive and statistically significant
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Swers (2016A) notes evidence of party polarization in the 107th and 108th legislative sessions among
women, however varying on different policy areas. Her work in that article focuses on the Senate, which
means we cannot take the evidence as directly transferable to the House. Although Democrats and
Republicans differ on their approach to women's issues during the years presented in the current chapter,
we cannot strongly point to rhetoric akin to what we have experienced in the recent past with the "war on
women" frame employed by Democrats to delegitimize any claims Republicans may attempt to make on
women's issues.
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relationships between gender and all three dependent variables measuring participation. Also, I
anticipate a higher level of activity during the highly salient FMLA, as members will want to claim
credit, and less activity during the less salient SET commission. Procedurally, it may be expected
that chairs will speak the most often in a hearing. If women are observed to speak more than chairs,
thus expending more resources than chairs who have much more resources comparatively, then
women are only further proving their dedication to the bill's passage.
If the member has little to no interest, we can expect they will either not testify at all or
have only a very small statement to make, or have only one or two questions to ask. On the other
hand, if the member has been a primary supporter from the beginning, or has grown to accept the
bill based on compromises made in committee, s/he will testify a great deal, have much to say, and
ask many pointed questions in hopes of persuading the undecided members or compromising with
the opposition. The comparisons of the amount of behavior between committee members will
show who acts more in a hearing, displaying who has the most personal interest in the bill, and
thereby the most interest in getting the bill to the floor and subsequently passed. Women, no matter
their party, should have the most interest and therefore participate the most when working to get a
women’s issue bill to the floor. We must also pay attention to female Republicans, in particular,
because if they participate at a high level, they may be attempting to steal the ownership of
women’s issues from Democrats.
DATA AND KEY MEASURES
The ways previous scholars have identified gender differences in legislative behavior
include comparing the amount of roll call votes between the sexes on women’s issue bills, bill
introductions, amendments in committee, and ideology scores. Committee behavior, however, has
not been examined. This is a serious oversight considering committee hearings are where
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important negotiations occur and bills are created and marked up. Using the FMLA and the SET
commission hearings, I examine the transcripts to see who participated more on each bill. These
behaviors include testifying and asking questions or making statements. By measuring the amount
of behavior, I hope to capture how much effort each member put into participating during the
crafting of the legislation.
DATA AND VARIABLES13. The datasets consist of data that I have personally collected for
the dependent variables as well as demographic data from several sources. The dependent
variables, which are count variables, have been collected from congressional hearing transcripts.
From the transcripts, I also gathered two dummies: one for ranking member and one for chair.
Independent variables like party and ideology measurements are included (Carroll et al. 2009;
Poole and Rosenthal 200714) as well as personal characteristics of the members, such as gender
and race (ICPSR 7803; MacDonald and O'Brien 201015). The demographic data about the
members’ districts include the urban population, median family income, and African American
population (Adler 200216).
Transcripts for the hearings considering the FMLA and SET Commission were found using
ProQuest Congressional (formerly Lexis-Nexis Congressional) and were examined online via
HathiTrust digital library17. All of the models use gender and party identification as the
independent variables of interest and the three different dependent variables are (1) number of
times the legislator spoke, (2) the amount of words spoken, and (3) the number of questions asked
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Data sources, definitions, and descriptive statistics for Chapter 2 can be found in Table A2.1 of the
Appendix.
14
Data on partisanship and ideology was obtained from the DW-Nominate data that Keith Poole makes
available freely at www.voteview.com. I thank him for making these data available.
15
I thank Jason MacDonald and Erin O'Brien for sharing these variables with me, especially as they were
already formatted for use.
16
I thank E. Scott Adler for making data on congressional districts publicly available.
17
https://www.hathitrust.org/
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for each hearing. With the independent variables, I am explaining which personal characteristics
affect lawmakers’ participation. The dependent variables show the amount of behavior that occurs
when working on a bill in committee. The dependent variables are examined in three models per
bill. The number of testimonies, the number of questions, and the number of words are summed
separately for each member for each congressional hearing18. Of course, if multiple committees
examined a bill, each committee’s testimonies will be examined. Therefore, the unit of analysis is
the member-hearing pair, as members attended (or did not attend) multiple hearings.
Gender, my main independent variable, and party will be simply coded as dummy variables
(1 = female, 0 = male and 1 = Democrat, 0 = Republican). I also included variables to measure
seniority---a dummy variable to control for chairmanship (1 = chair, 0 = otherwise) and a count
variable for number of terms served by members. These variables attempt to explain the propensity
of established members to ask more questions. The chairmanship variable also controls for the
amount of times the chair needs to speak procedurally. Chairs are also important for comparison.
As previously mentioned, chairs have more resources, so we might expect them to participate more
in all instances. It is worth comparing the actions of all other members with the chairs for this
reason. The hearing dummy variables control for any effects that a particular hearing may have on
the models. There are nine hearings total, so “Hearing 0 (zero)” is the reference category. I also
controlled for the same variables that were mentioned in the literature, but specifically what Swers
(1998; 2002) controls for. She identifies personal variables (African American: 1 = African
American representative, 0 = otherwise; Southern: 1 = from a Southern state, 0 = otherwise) and
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To record the number of words, I counted the number of lines per page and then calculated the average
number of words per line (seven). This works because the size of the font and the style of the transcripts
are consistent in the online PDFs, so counting by number of lines is valid.
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district characteristics (population of the district that is urban, the median household income, and
the population of the district that is black).
RESULTS
FMLA
During the course of the FMLA hearings, I observe behavior from twelve Democratic
women, one hundred-fifteen Democratic men, eight Republican women, and seventy-two
Republican men. Table 2.1 displays the results of the three separate negative binomial regression
models. Here, we can see that gender has a positive and statistically significant effect in all three
models confirming all three hypotheses: being a woman makes the member more likely to
participate when compared to their male colleagues. Significance is reached at the p<0.001 level
for number of testimonies, and p<0.01 for number of words and number of questions. As
predicted, female members of Congress speak more often, in greater volume, and ask more
questions than their male counterparts, thus participating overall more than men. This is especially
important due to the fact that party is not a statistically significant predictor of behavior, nor are
the district characteristics. Considering that women are clearly a minority in the institution, as well
as within these committee hearings, the results are even more important. The African American
variable has a positive and statistically significant relationship to the number of testimonies and
the number of questions, indicating black members’ propensity to participate more19. This is
interesting, perhaps indicating that black members of Congress recognize the importance of
providing and protecting human rights, in this case, the right to have a family without being
penalized20. The Southern variable is statistically significant in the testimony model, indicating the
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For the FMLA, there were 29 observations of black members out of 207 total observations. Recall the
unit of analysis is member-hearing pair, so this doesn't mean there were 29 different black members.
20
The FMLA provides 12 weeks of unpaid leave in any 12-month period for qualified medical (pregnancy
is the primary concern) and family reasons. It also guarantees that individuals who take this leave will not
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Southern members speak out more during the hearings examined. Hearings 1 and 3 are also
statistically significant in the testimony model indicating that these hearings contribute a great deal
to the model. Lastly, median family income is positively and statistically significantly related to
number of testimonies and number of questions. This indicates that higher income within the
members’ districts is associated with more action during these hearings. This indicates that as
median family income increases within a district, so does the participation of that representative.
This makes sense because wealthy and educated people care more about women’s issues in public
opinion surveys (Lewis-Beck et al 2008).
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 expand the analysis to accommodate the possibility that gender and
party are working together in the model as motivating factors for members of Congress. Perhaps
being a female Democrat or female Republican is more explanatory, so separately modeling
gender and party presents a limitation. I have constructed two interaction models in order to
address this concern. In Table 2.2 (full estimates presented in Table A2.2 of Appendix), the
interaction is constructed as an interaction term that statistically measures both the effect of gender
and party identification in one variable. Here, the interaction term does not reach conventional
levels of significance, indicating that partisanship does not condition the association between
gender and participation. However, the base coefficient for gender is positively and significantly
associated with participation. For a comparison, Table 2.3 (full estimates presented in Table A2.3
of Appendix) introduces interaction terms constructed as dichotomous dummy variables: female
Democrats, female Republicans, and male Republicans, leaving out male Democrats as the
reference category. The only coefficient to reach conventional levels of significance is female
Democrat. Congresswomen of the Democratic party speak out about two more times than their

lose their job. In essence, the FMLA is a set of regulations providing leave and protection of the right to
have a family for those who work in private and public sector companies with 50 or more employees.
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male colleagues. This means that in a policy area that Democrats tend to “own” (i.e., Petrocik
1996), women of the party are still taking the lead in participation. Female Republicans also
outperform male Democrats at the p<.10 level (it is .007 on the test statistic from being at the p<.05
level), so it is confirmed that women in both parties are participating more than male Democrats.
We can see that male Republicans lag behind the women of their party, so within each party the
women are participating much more than their male colleagues. Coupled with the results from
Table 2.1, it is important to realize the overall findings: congresswomen are more active in
committee hearings considering the FMLA than are congressmen. Descriptive representation
enhances substantive representation.
The predicted probability analyses21 are very interesting in that we can visualize the
differences in behavior between men and women by party identification. The results are presented
in Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. Women are still much more active than men considering all three
behaviors, but here we see the effect that chairs have in the model22. In Figure 2.1, Democratic
women are predicted to speak 7 more times than Democratic men, while Republican women are
predicted to speak 6.7 more times than Republican men. Chairs speak 4.1 times less than
Democratic women and 3.6 less times than Republican women. Figure 2.2 deals with number of
words. Democratic women speak 10.2 times more than their male colleagues, while Republican
women speak 9.3 times more than their male colleagues. Note that in Figure 2.2, I removed the
chairs from the model because their results dwarfed the results of the other four categories. This is
expected due to the procedural role taken on by the chairs. They must speak to all of the witnesses
and run the hearing, calling on and engaging every other member that speaks. I included the graph
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I used CLARIFY to predict the behaviors of typical members. From Gary King’s website:
http://gking.harvard.edu/publications/clarify-software-interpreting-and-presenting-statistical-results
22
For the FMLA, all of the chairs were Democrats because during the congresses that considered the
FMLA in committee, Democrats were in the majority.
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with the chair category remaining as Figure 2.2a. Figure 2.3 considers the number of questions,
and again, female Democrats outperform their male colleagues by 3 questions and female
Republicans outperform their male colleagues by 1.8 questions. Overall, it is clear based on the
estimates that both female Democrats and female Republicans have the propensity to participate
more during markup of the FMLA. This is consistent with the predictions made about the salience
of the FMLA. Also, considering issue ownership, female Republicans may be attempting to
highlight their participation in these hearings based on reelection goals.

SET Commission
During the course of the SET commission hearings, I observe fourteen Democratic women,
fifty-nine Democratic men, seven Republican women, and fifty-four Republican men. In Table
2.4, I consider the results for the negative binomial regressions for the SET commission. Again,
the effect of gender is exhibited, this time in two out of three models. I can safely say that being
female has a positive and statistically significant relationship with participation. For the number
of testimonies model, significance occurs at the p<0.01 level, and for the number of words model,
significance occurs at the p<0.05 level. Also, consistent with the results for the FMLA, party does
not reach statistical significance, indicating that party does not affect participation as much as
gender. Remember, I predicted that the effect of being female might not hold for both the salient
FMLA and the less salient SET commission. However, I find in the less salient case that female
members have a greater propensity to participate as well, none of the control variables reach
significance in this model. Again, the importance of gender is impressive considering the small
number of women participating in the hearings. This means, as it did with the FMLA, that women
are dominating the conversation on women's issues. Congresswomen are asserting themselves in
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order to act on these bills, further showing they are willing to expend resources and represent the
needs of women constituents.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present results of the models considering interaction terms (full
estimates presented in Tables A2.4 and A2.5 of Appendix). Table 2.5 shows us, again, that
effectively controlling for the interaction term, coupling together a member's gender and party
identification, being a congresswoman still plays a statistically significant role. For the SET
commission hearings, both the number of times testifying and the volume of speech attain
statistical significance. This indicates that being a woman is a strong determining factor in
participation in these kinds of hearings. Table 2.6 confronts us with some particularly interesting
results. Not only do female Democrats (again, as we saw with the FMLA) speak out about 3 times
more often than do male Democrats at a statistically significant level, but female Republicans also
participate more. In fact, female Republicans speak more, in volume, and more often than their
male Democratic colleagues at the p<0.05 level. These are impressive results: Republican women
are out-participating Democratic men, even though this is an issue area where we would expect
high levels of participation from male Democrats. This again helps us further establish the link
between descriptive and substantive representation. Both Republican and Democratic
congresswomen are actively engaging in committee hearings considering the SET commission,
indicating to the observer that they truly wish to represent the unique needs of their female
constituency.
Again, the predicted probability analysis helps us visualize the results that I observed in
the negative binomial regression analysis. Figure 2.4 shows a marked difference between men and
women’s actions. Democratic women and Republican women speak more often than their male
colleagues. Democratic women speak 8.9 more times than Democratic men, and Republican
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women speak 8 more times than Republican men. I included Figure 2.4a, where you can see that
chairs23 clearly speak much more often, due to their role within committee proceedings. I excluded
the chairs from Figure 2.4 because the results dwarfed the results of the other four categories.
Figure 2.5 compares the actions of male and female Democrats and Republicans by number of
words. Again, we see that women participate at a much higher rate than their male colleagues.
Democratic women speak 14.4 more words than their male colleagues, while Republican women
speak 11.9 more words than their male colleagues. Also, in this case, chairs and Democratic
women are performing at similar levels. Finally, Figure 2.6 compares parties and gender for
number of questions. Again, gender matters and both Democratic and Republican women
outperform their male colleagues, with female Democrats asking 1.3 more questions than their
male colleagues and female Republicans asking 2.37 more questions than their male colleagues.
Chairs are not predicted to ask any questions. All three figures tell us something very important:
that during committee hearings considering the SET commission bill, gender significantly affects
behavior and women participate more. Also, despite what I expected, women participate more than
men during both the salient and traceable FMLA and the less salient and non-traceable SET
commission. This indicates that gender motivates participation more so than reelection, at least for
these two cases. Plus, Democrats participate at higher levels than Republicans, which is consistent
with their ownership of women’s issues. However, because female Republicans participate at
higher levels than their male colleagues, we might take this as evidence that female Republicans
are looking to highlight their legislative accomplishments on women’s issue bills, stealing
ownership away from Democrats.

23

During the congressional sessions that considered the SET commission in committee, both Democrats
and Republicans took turns being the majority party, so there is just a designation of chairs here rather than
Democratic chairs for the FMLA.
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LEGISLATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Before concluding, I pause to consider whether women may simply have the propensity to
participate more than men no matter the issue area. This is a valid critique of the analysis presented
above. What if congresswomen simply participate more than congressmen, in general? I think that
if women are more active in the legislative process, it is due to their entrepreneurial style. Research
on legislative effectiveness finds that congresswomen can be more effective than congressmen at
shepherding “agenda items through the legislative process and into law” (Volden, Wiseman, and
Wittmer 2013; 327). Legislative effectiveness and entrepreneurship are related: effectiveness is
in part a function of entrepreneurship. Members who are more entrepreneurial should be more
effective. Therefore, I will use entrepreneurship as a robustness check, ruling out the argument
that women simply participate more than men.
If I observe women being more entrepreneurial than men, I suppose it would be for the
same reasons they are more effective: they are more qualified and collaborative than their male
colleagues. I’d also like to address institutional effects, like whether being a member of the
majority or minority party affects women’s propensity to be entrepreneurial. Unfortunately, for
the entire span of the available entrepreneurship data, the majority and minority parties remained
constant. However, I account for the differences that may occur between minority and majority
party women with additional models that include variables that account for party identification and
gender.
LE Data and Methods
Legislative entrepreneurship scores are the dependent variables in all the OLS regression
models presented (Wawro 200024). Personal characteristics of House members come from various

24

I thank Greg Wawro for making the LE scores publicly available.
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sources25. My main independent variable of interest, female, is coded 1 if the member is a woman,
zero if the member is a man. Majority party is used to measure partisanship, and is coded 1 if the
member is a Democrat, which was the majority party for the entire time period being studied; 0 if
the member is a Republican. In one model, I also include four variables that account for both
gender and partisanship instead of using the female and majority party variables. Here I code
whether the members are female Democrats, female Republicans, male Democrats, or male
Republicans, where 1 indicates the member is one of those categories, 0 if they are not. In the
model, I leave out male Democrats as the reference category. For ideology, I use both DWNOMINATE first and second dimension scores because they are not correlated during this time
period26. Dimension 1 captures economic issues and the second dimension captures cultural and
lifestyle issues. From the DW-NOMINATE scores I created two additional measures of ideology:
distance from the majority party median and distance from the chamber median. These measures
help us tease out whether certain types of members, either more liberal or more conservative, have
the propensity to be entrepreneurial. I also note racial and ethnic characteristics, coding 1 if the
members are identified as African American or Latino, 0 if they are not. In order to measure
positions of authority and experience, I included the variables of committee chair, ranking
member, and seniority. Committee chair and ranking member are coded 1 if the member had such
as position, 0 if they did not. Seniority is the number of terms that a member served. Then, I
accounted for different committee assignments and coded whether members were members of
prestigious, constituency, or policy committees, based on Deering and Smith (1997). Prestigious
committees are Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways & Means. Constituency committees are
Agriculture, Armed Services, Interior, Merchant Marine, Public Works, Science, Space, &
25
26

See Table A2.1 for full list of data sources, definitions, and descriptive statistics.
Correlation = -0.0950
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Technology, Small Business, and Veterans Affairs. Policy committees are Banking, Education &
Labor, Energy & Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, and Government Operations.
There are two analyses: one to explain legislative entrepreneurship within each
congressional session, from the 94th – 103rd, and one that accounts for the entire time period.
Because the second analysis includes all of the data for the entire time period, I ran these four
models with congress-specific fixed effects, where each congressional session was accounted for
with a dummy variable and I left out the 103rd Congress as the reference category. In the following
section, I discuss the results of the various models and whether or not my predictions about women
being more entrepreneurial than men are supported.

LE Findings
Table 2.7 shows the four OLS regression models I ran in order to investigate hypothesis 3
(Full estimates are presented in Tables A2.6 and A2.7 in the Appendix). Prestigious and
distributive committees are somewhat correlated, so I left out the distributive dummy in these
models, as well as policy committees. In all four models, the coefficient for female is positive and
statistically significant. Women are more entrepreneurial than men.
Models 1 and 2 consider partisanship, while models 3 and 4 consider ideology. In model
1, there is a strong, positive, statistically significant coefficient for being a member of the majority
party, indicating that they are more likely to be entrepreneurial than members of the minority. This
is to be expected, since when you are in the position of majority, it should be easier to be effective
and therefore entrepreneurial. However, this statistical effect disappears when I swap distance
from the chamber median with distance from the majority party median. In model 2, the coefficient
for majority party remains positive, but loses significance, while the coefficient for the distance
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from the majority party is negative and strongly statistically significant. This indicates that the
farther an individual’s position from the majority party median, the less entrepreneurial they are.
Models 1 and 2 complement each other, then, because they both indicate that being a Democrat
indicates a higher level of entrepreneurship. Models 3 and 4 utilize DW-NOMINATE scores
instead of party identification. In both models and for both dimensions, the more liberal a member
is, the more entrepreneurial they are. These results are consistent with models 1 and 2, since
Democrats are more liberal than Republicans on average.
In all four models, race does not play a significant role. Measurements of seniority and
experience do play significant roles. Being the Speaker of the House or a ranking member is
negatively associated with entrepreneurship. Committee chairpersonship, however, appears to spur
entrepreneurial behavior. These findings on party leadership match the previous paragraph’s
discussion on being a member of the majority party versus the minority party. Seniority, or the
number of terms served, also plays a significant role. The more terms a member serves, the more
likely they are to be entrepreneurial. Finally, membership on prestigious committees
(Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means) enhances entrepreneurship.
In Table 2.8, I ran one model per congressional session, where the scaled entrepreneurship
score is the dependent variable. I chose to simply present the coefficients for being a
congresswoman, as the entire table is quite large and visually overwhelming. However, Table A2.8
in the Appendix presents the full estimates. Women are statistically significantly more
entrepreneurial than their male colleagues in the 98th, 99th, 102nd, and 103rd congresses. Women
are more entrepreneurial in later sessions, which is consistent with the steady increase of women
serving over time. However, the coefficients for female in the 100th and 101st congress fail to attain
statistical significance. One can view the coefficient for “female” as a random variable. In this
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way, even if congresswomen engage in higher levels of entrepreneurship when relatively high
levels of congresswomen populate the House, we will not always observe a positive statistically
significant coefficient. In four of the six later sessions, though, this coefficient attains conventional
levels of significance. In the other models, the coefficient is in the expected direction. On the
whole, these findings at least suggest that congresswomen became more entrepreneurial toward
the later part of the time span I examine. Alternatively, if fewer women are serving in Congress,
we might expect them to be more entrepreneurial in order to combat the negative effects of
tokenism. I do not observe this pattern. Women are not statistically significantly more
entrepreneurial than men until the 98th Congress. Again, women do not seem to be more
entrepreneurial when there are fewer of them, rather, they are entrepreneurial when there are more,
but not in a consistent way. For example, in the 101st Congress, there are 29 women serving, but
being female is not statistically significant in the model; however, in the 102nd Congress with 28
women, being female is statistically significant.
In Table 2.9, I display the coefficients for female Democrats, female Republicans, and male
Republicans, with male Democrats as the reference category. The full model, which can be found
in the Appendix (Table A2.9), uses the same independent variables as the models presented in the
previous analyses, except here, majority party and ideology are replaced by these gender-party
variables. As you can see, women no matter their party are more entrepreneurial than the typical
member, a male Democrat. Therefore, being a member of the majority party (Democrat) versus
minority party (Republican) does not make a difference for women. Congresswomen of both
parties are more entrepreneurial than the reference category, male Democrats.
To visually represent the difference between men and women, I present a predicted
probability graph in Figure 2.7. Here, the comparison made is between male and female Democrats
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and male and female Republicans. The average entrepreneurship score during this time period was
61 and the maximum was 494.5. Considering the standard deviation of 41.4 entrepreneurship
points, Democratic women are predicted to be between one-third and one-quarter of a standard
deviation more entrepreneurial than Democratic men and approximately three-quarters of a
standard deviation more entrepreneurial than Republican men. Female Republicans and male
Democrats are the closest groups considering they are about five predicted entrepreneurship points
apart, where the Democratic men slightly edge out the Republican women. Most important for
consideration is the fact that Republican women are between one-half and one-third of a standard
deviation more entrepreneurial than Republican men. Although the findings here differ slightly
from the OLS models, the graph indicates that over time, all members are more entrepreneurial
than male Republicans, but most importantly women out perform their male colleagues within
party groups.
The fact that I observe a strong relationship between being a woman and being more
entrepreneurial should only bolster the findings that women are more effective, despite being a
numerical minority, and despite being members (over time) of the minority party. Although one
can argue that these findings on entrepreneurship indicate a congresswoman's propensity to
participate more than her male colleagues, I argue that two verdicts are more important for the
current project: (1) the findings related to the two hearings examined earlier in the chapter further
the link between substantive and descriptive representation, and (2) the findings on women's
propensity to be more entrepreneurial than men indicates the importance of electing more women
to Congress. Both of these findings bolster the literature by showing us that women make a
substantial difference when elected to Congress. Not only are they able to affect real policy change
via entrepreneurship, but also when they sit in on hearings that directly relate to women's issues,
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they participate more in order to facilitate that bill's progression through the policy process. By
improving substantive representation as well as making Congress more productive, having women
present improves Congress as a democratic policymaking institution.
DISCUSSION
The main contribution of this chapter is to examine whether gender improves
representation while studying representational behavior that directly affects policy outcomes. By
analyzing committee-hearing transcripts, I show how gender strongly affects the behavior of
legislators. According to the results presented here, I believe we can reinforce the connection
between descriptive and substantive representation. In my investigation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act and the Commission on the Advancement of Women and Minorities in Science,
Engineering, and Technology Development Act, I found gender to be an important determinate of
behavior, rather than party. Additionally, chairs did not participate more than all other members
in all of the hearings. Instead, women outperformed chairs in three of the predicted probability
figures, and came very close in Figure 2.3. Despite their lack of resources, as compared to chairs,
women participated more, indicating their strong interest in bill passage. Again, gender
significantly affected participation, and thus effected representation.
Another important finding has to do with issue ownership. Family and women’s issues are
usually considered to be issues of particular concern for Democrats, but we are confronted with
evidence that tells a different story here, largely due to the high participation of female
Republicans. I would expect both female and male Democrats to participate during the FMLA and
SET commission hearings because Democrats own women’s issues. This is displayed in the
predicted probability figures, and Democrats do participate at higher levels than Republicans.
However, due to the participation of female Republicans, we might say that they are attempting to
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steal ownership of women’s issues due to their own gender. Issue ownership is complicated by its
relationship to salience.
I chose to investigate the differences between the salient FMLA and the less salient SET
commission throughout the chapter. By choosing both a salient and a less salient bill for
comparison, I attempted to distinguish grandstanding, traceable behavior (Arnold 1990) from
behavior where the member is truly interested in the policy content (Hall 1996). We might predict
that gender would have more of an effect in the SET commission hearings because the behavior is
less traceable and thus has less baring on reelection. However, I find that for both cases, the FMLA
and the SET commission, being female is positively and significantly related to more participation.
Thus, the concern for reelection is outweighed by interest in participating. Both the non-effect of
party and the non-effect of traceability are important as it emphasizes the link between descriptive
and substantive representation. Considering my results, American women may opt to vote for a
descriptive representative, whom we can assume will also provide substantive representation.
In the next chapter, I revisit the hearing forum. If women are more participatory than their
male counterparts, and women are more entrepreneurial, than I predict that we will observe that
having women present on a committee will spur that committee to conduct more oversight hearings
on women's issues.
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Chapter 2 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: FMLA Negative Binomial Models for Number of Testimonies, Number of
Words, and Number of Questions
Number Times
Testifying

Number of
Words

Number of
Questions

Congresswoman

2.49***
(0.60)

2.33**
(0.90)

1.84**
(0.73)

Party Identification

0.23
(0.43)

-0.19
(0.63)

0.35
(0.51)

African American

1.89**
(0.75)

1.33
(1.12)

2.24**
(0.92)

South

1.17*
(0.59)

0.78
(0.91)

0.69
(0.67)

Chair

1.02
(1.02)

1.02
(1.58)

1.90
(1.19)

Number of Terms

0.035
(0.05)

0.068
(0.08)

-0.086
(0.07)

Hearing 1

1.45*
(0.68)

1.33
(1.04)

1.02
(0.77)

Hearing 2

0.77
(0.67)

0.78
(1.00)

0.74
(0.81)

Hearing 3

1.30*
(0.71)

1.63
(1.10)

1.04
(0.80)

Hearing 4

-0.043
(0.83)

0.72
(1.22)

-0.35
(0.98)

Hearing 5

0.34
(0.71)

0.95
(1.08)

0.36
(0.84)

Hearing 6

-0.20
(0.85)

0.50
(1.18)

-0.74
(1.00)

Hearing 7

-0.81
(0.92)

-0.76
(1.38)

-0.44
(1.10)

Hearing 8

-0.023

0.15

-0.079
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(0.64)

(0.98)

(0.77)

Log Urban
Population

0.27
(0.64)

0.46
(0.93)

0.37
(0.65)

Log Median
Family Income

1.89*
(0.15)

1.89
(1.49)

2.22*
(1.25)

Log Black
Population

-0.13
(0.15)

-0.053
(0.22)

-0.21
(0.18)

Constant

-21.5*
(9.27)

-21.0
(14.50)

-25.2*
(11.65)

Log Alpha
Constant

1.84***
(0.12)

2.74***
(0.11)

2.10***
(0.15)

N
Pseudo R-squared

313
0.04

313
0.01

313
0.04

Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 2.2: Additional Negative Binomial Models of FMLA with Interaction Term
Number Times
Testifying

Number of
Words

Number of
Questions

Congresswoman

2.14*
(1.05)

2.24
(1.61)

1.36
(1.17)

Party Identification

0.36
(0.56)

0.21
(0.80)

0.25
(0.59)

Congresswoman X
Party Identification

-0.31
(1.42)

-0.68
(2.13)

-2.62
(1.65)

N
Pseudo R-squared

207
0.04

207
0.01

207
0.04

Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Full estimates are provided in Table A2.2 of the
Appendix.

Table 2.3: Additional Negative Binomial Models of FMLA with Interaction Dummy Terms
Number Times

Number of

Number of
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Testifying

Words

Questions

Female Democrat

1.83*
(0.99)

1.55
(1.42)

-1.26
(1.20)

Female Republican

1.78
(1.09)

2.03
(1.62)

1.11
(1.23)

Male Republican

-0.36
(0.56)

-0.21
(0.80)

-0.25
(0.59)

N
Pseudo R-squared

207
0.04

207
0.01

207
0.04

Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Full estimates are provided in Table A2.3 of the
Appendix.
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Figure 2.2a:
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Table 2.4: SET Commission Negative Binomial Models for Number of Testimonies,
Number of Words, and Number of Questions
Number Times
Testifying

Number of
Words

Number of
Questions

Congresswoman

3.63**
(1.45)

6.65*
(2.99)

3.62
(2.47)

Party Identification

0.41
(0.84)

0.58
(1.40)

2.18
(1.75)

African American

-20.4
(8.26)

-30.7
(13.30)

-25.0
(11.55)

South

-0.72
(1.19)

-3.49
(2.57)

-0.28
(2.17)

Chair

1.46
(3.25)

5.89
(6.63)

-22.5
(10.25)

Number of Terms

-0.12
(0.18)

-0.54
(0.42)

0.0021
(0.29)

Hearing 1

0.59
(1.69)

2.50
(3.18)

-3.84
(3.65)

Hearing 2

0.88
(1.97)

3.80
(3.65)

0.42
(3.90)

Log Urban
Population

-1.29
(1.03)

-2.79
(2.06)

-2.45
(1.87)

Log Median
Family Income

-1.73
(2.45)

-4.88
(4.35)

0.39
(5.01)

Log Black
Population

0.13
(0.40)

0.37
(0.76)

0.41
(0.73)

Constant

32.0
(23.40)

85.2*
(46.59)

19.8
(42.98)

Log Alpha
Constant

2.34***
(0.27)

3.47***
(0.23)

2.91***
(0.46)

N
Pseudo R-squared

134
0.07

134
0.02

134
0.11
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Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 2.5: Additional Negative Binomial Models of SET Commission with Interaction
Term
Number Times
Testifying

Number of
Words

Number of
Questions

Congresswoman

4.52**
(1.92)

7.62*
(3.57)

3.09
(3.14)

Party Identification

0.60
(0.87)

1.10
(1.61)

2.13
(1.76)

Congresswoman X
Party Identification

-1.63
(2.05)

-2.89
(3.93)

1.04
(4.13)

N
Pseudo R-squared

134
0.07

134
0.02

134
0.11

Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Full estimates are provided in Table A2.4 of the
Appendix.

Table 2.6: Additional Negative Binomial Models of SET Commission with Interaction
Dummy Terms
Number Times
Testifying

Number of
Words

Number of
Questions

Female Democrat

2.89*
(1.57)

4.72
(3.55)

4.12
(3.27)

Female Republican

3.92*
(2.06)

6.51*
(3.75)

0.96
(3.47)

Male Republican

-0.60
(0.87)

-1.10
(1.61)

-2.13
(1.76)

N
Pseudo R-squared

134
0.07

134
0.02

134
0.11

Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Full estimates are provided in Table A2.5 of the
Appendix.
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Figure 2.5:
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Table 2.7: OLS Models of Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House, 94th-103rd
Congresses
(1)
Congresswoman

12.1***
(2.53)

Majority Party
Member

15.7***
(1.66)

(2)
10.5***
(2.53)
4.14*
(2.36)

Congresswoman X
Majority Party Member
Distance from
Chamber Median

8.83*
(3.99)

Distance from
Majority Party Median

(3)

(4)

16.9***
(4.19)

12.8**
(4.18)

16.4***
(1.72)

4.49*
(2.41)

-7.45
(5.25)

-3.64
(5.23)

9.54**
(4.03)
-19.4***
(4.16)

-19.1***
(4.18)

Chair

18.1***
(2.96)

17.8***
(2.95)

17.9***
(2.96)

17.7***
(2.95)

Seniority

1.36***
(0.18)

1.38***
(0.18)

1.35***
(0.18)

1.38***
(0.18)

Constant

39.4***
(2.81)

56.3***
(3.43)

38.9***
(2.83)

56.0***
(3.45)

N
R-Squared
F-Statistic

4370
.1692
46.63***

4370
.1724
47.69***

4370
.1696
44.41***

4370
.1725
45.33***

NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The models also
incorporated independent variables measuring status in minority groups, status on prestigious, policy, and
distributive committees, dummy variables controlling for session, and so on. Full estimates are provided
in Tables A2.6 & A2.7 of the Appendix.

Table 2.8: Coefficients for Women in OLS Models of Legislative Entrepreneurship per
Congressional Session, 94th-103rd
Congress

Coefficient (Standard Error) for Congresswomen

94th

-1.03 (3.78)

95th

3.11 (5.55)
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96th

4.27 (7.67)

97th

3.20 (9.53)

98th

16.4* (8.44)

99th

19.8* (9.52)

100th

9.86 (8.98)

101st

11.1 (8.68)

102nd

24.8** (9.18)

103rd

12.6* (5.81)

NOTES: Each congressional session represents a separate OLS model. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Full estimates are provided in Table A2.8 Appendix.

Table 2.9: Comparing Legislative Entrepreneurship of Female Democrats and Republicans
Variable
Female Democrat

7.57**
(3.14)

Female Republican

13.4**
(4.38)

Male Republican

-1.46
(2.46)

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Full estimates are provided in
Table A2.9 Appendix.
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Figure 2.7:

Predicted Legislative Entrepreneurship Scores by
Party and Gender
Predicted LE Scores

100
80
60

75.47

85.33
70.72
54.5

40
20
0
Male Democrat Female Democrat Male Republican

Female
Republican

NOTE: The predicted values are based on typical male and female members.
The mean entrepreneurship score during this time period was 61; Min: 0;
Max: 494.5; Std. Dev.: 41.4
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Chapter 3:
How the Women of Congress Handle Oversight of Women’s Issues
The preceding chapter established that when women are elected, they represent women's
interests, as well as make a difference in the overall effectiveness and productivity of the
institution. In House hearings for the Family and Medical Leave Act and for the Commission on
the Advancement of Women and Minorities in Science, Engineering, and Technology
Development Act, women participated more overall than their male counterparts. The analysis
showed that women have been successful in attaining the goal that many of them express having:
representing women as a distinct constituency (i.e. Carroll 2002; Reingold 1992, 2000; Rosenthal
1998; Thomas 1994, 1997). Without women in Congress, issues related to family leave and women
in STEM may not have been introduced onto the policy agenda. In this chapter, I again turn to
hearings---this time oversight hearings related to women's issues. Do committees with more
women members hold more hearings related to women's issues?
How does a member's gender play a role in oversight of women's issues?
Women have not had many opportunities to hold positions of leadership27. The U.S. has
not elected a female President or Vice President, has not given the position of majority or minority
leader to a woman in the Senate, and has had only one female Speaker of the House. How else can
women be effective when they are serving in Congress if they do not have access to the highest
institutional leadership positions? I believe that women are better able to assert themselves within
the committee structure, as I found in the previous chapter, and more specifically for this chapter,
when committees are handling the oversight of women’s issues.

27

http://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/WIC/Historical-Data/Women-Elected-to-PartyLeadership/

59
The growth of women in Congress has increased steadily since the 1992 “Year of the
Woman,” when a record number of women were elected to the Senate. Increased party competition
coupled with ideological polarization has seen a difference in the number of women elected from
each party. To revisit Figure 1.1, it is clear that before 1992, female Democrats and Republicans
were elected at about the same rate. Since then, Democratic women have outpaced Republican
women in attaining congressional seats. Democrats prioritize the recruitment of women to run for
office, while Republican ideology tends to limit the involvement of women. As social
conservatives are a key group within the party, traditional gender roles tend to be emphasized, thus
limiting the pool of women from which to draw. Due to such a stark underrepresentation of
Republican women in recent years, as well as the general underrepresentation of women within
the House and Senate, it is difficult empirically to assess congresswomen in general, or to draw
meaningful conclusions about Republican women in particular. However, over an extended period
like the one presented in this chapter (1947-2008), and by examining committee membership
rather than the behavior of individual legislators, I will be able to observe women's additive
influence on oversight---an important step in the policymaking process that has been overlooked
by previous studies of women in Congress.
Past research shows that having women present in Congress does make a difference in the
legislative agenda (e.g., Swers 2002a; 2013), and that congresswomen use their committee
positions to advocate for the incorporation of women's interests into committee legislation
(Dodson 1998, 2002; Dodson et al.1995; Gertzog 1995; Norton 2002; Swers 2002b). Additionally,
there is much evidence that women use the committee positions they are dealt in order to effect
change and represent the needs of their female constituents, or simply of women in general. During
the 1990s, moderate Republican and Democratic women worked together to bridge the gap
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between their parties. During the welfare reform debate in 1994, "Republican women who held
seats on the committee of jurisdiction, the Ways and Means Committee, convinced their male
Republican colleagues to incorporate child-support enforcement and greater funding for childcare
in the bill" (Swers 2016b). In more current times, when issues do not fall neatly along partisan
lines, women in the Senate work together to compromise.
For example, Democratic and Republican women in the Senate have aggressively
pursued reforms to the military justice system to address the problem of sexual
assault in the military. Pentagon surveys indicate that the incidence of sexual assault
in the military increased 35 percent between 2010 and 2012. Moreover, only a small
percentage of victims file a report and very few perpetrators are prosecuted.
Incensed by the ongoing problem of sexual assault and the military’s inability to
address it, the women in the Senate sought to draw more attention to the issue and
began crafting policy solutions. Because seven women, two Republicans and five
Democrats, served on the Armed Services Committee, they were able to convince
the Committee chair to call a rare hearing with the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and all the uniformed chiefs of the armed services in order to confront each of them
about the issue and what could be done to improve the military’s response. The
female senators then worked together to craft reforms, several of which Congress
ultimately adopted, including changing the procedures used to prosecute sexual
assault, eliminating the ability of military commanders to overturn jury convictions,
and providing services and legal counsel to victims.28

However, only since the 1990s have enough women been elected, gaining party and institutional
seniority, and thus gaining committee leadership positions or prestigious committee membership.
Again, by instituting a longitudinal design, I hope to observe a general trend in women's influence.
Not only do women differentiate themselves from their male colleagues in their advocacy
for issues that directly affect women in the electorate, but also, they are more effective legislators,
where effectiveness is defined as “the advancement of a member’s agenda items through the
legislative process and into law” (Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2013; 327). It has been argued

28

Quoted from Swers 2016b.
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that women are more effective partially due to their deep advocacy for women’s issues, but also
for their unique consensus-building traits, such as being collaborative and consensual (e.g., DuerstLahti 2002a & 2002b; Kathlene 1995). Women are also effective due to their exceptional quality,
especially when we consider the tough electoral environments they have to endure (e.g., Jenkins
2007; Lawless and Pearson 2008; Milyo and Schosberg 2000; Sanbonmatsu 2006). Therefore, if
women are strong advocates for women’s issues, and if women are more effective and
entrepreneurial, even when they are underrepresented, and even when they are in the minority
party (e.g., Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2013), then I expect women to be a crucial force in
getting committees to hold oversight hearings considering issues that directly affect women.
This chapter examines whether the number of women on a committee affects the amount
of oversight conducted on women’s issues. I predict that the more women on a committee, the
more likely it is that that committee will hold oversight hearings considering women’s issues. By
investigating committee behavior, I am able to get closer to the policymaking process than
previous scholars who were concerned with congresswomen’s agenda setting behavior. If the
presence of female members on a committee affects the volume of oversight on women’s issues,
then electing women makes a clear difference in House deliberations as well as public policy.
How do congresswomen affect the oversight process?
From the brief discussion above, as well as from the findings of the previous chapter, it is
clear that electing women to Congress affects the policy that is made, but it also affects the male
dominated institution. When we consider the fact that electing women produces different voices
at the table and a different way of legislating, then it is important to consider the various activities
that both congresswomen and congressmen engage in. Although the total number of days spent on
hearings and meetings in the House have declined over time, the number of oversight days has
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increased (Aberbach 2002). Oversight is an important activity to research for a couple of reasons.
One, it is an activity that is proximate to the policymaking process: most laws are eventually
evaluated, whether proactively or reactively (police patrols versus fire alarms a la McCubbins and
Schwartz 1984). If members are going to engage in oversight, it is worth capitalizing on the
activity. This brings me to my second reason for investigating oversight: members can easily use
the activity to claim credit. In the same way, a member can point to creating legislation for
constituents, they can also point to keeping a watchful eye on public policy and the bureaucracy.
Therefore, oversight is an interesting area to research. It is an important activity to members
of Congress because it is a unique opportunity for legislators to participate in policy change outside
of legislative hearings. Oversight is also important to study because it more proximate to the
policymaking process than previous studies on women in Congress. However, why would we
expect women to engage in more oversight than men? I propose that women, due to their interest
in directly representing women, as well as their personal and gendered characteristics of being
generally more effective than men, will cause the committees they serve on to hold more oversight
hearings considering women’s issues: the more women serving on the committee, the more
oversight hearings held considering women’s issues.
When it comes to actively working on legislation in committees, women participate
differently than their male colleagues. At the state level, women in the Colorado legislature entered
the committee hearing debates later, spoke less often than their male colleagues did, and
interrupted witnesses less frequently than male legislators did (Kathlene 1994). The findings also
suggest that as the number of women serving in a legislative body increases, male members
become more verbally aggressive and controlling of hearings (Kathlene 1994). This obviously puts
women at a disadvantage in their goal of creating good public policy (e.g., Hall 1996).
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However, other findings at the state and national level show that female representatives are
able to actively advocate for female constituents by fighting to incorporate more women’s interests
into committee legislation (Dodson 1998, 2002; Dodson et al. 1995; Gertzog 1995; Norton 2002;
Swers 2001, 2002). Also, female committee chairs in state legislatures have reported a more
integrative leadership style than their male counterparts, by sharing power with others,
collaborating with other chairs, and by sharing strategic information with committee members
(Rosenthal 1997, 1998, 2000). Plus, women are less likely than men to say they care about
achieving powerful positions; rather, they want to move up the ladder, pull people together, build
issue coalitions, and develop creative approaches to solving policy problems (Rosenthal 1997).
This means than when we elect women, we get different results---a different type of legislator--than when we elect men.
Behavioral differences between men and women are explanatory on their own, but
considering other factors like the electoral environment women face, can be helpful, too. “Given
that women tend to face more electoral competitors (Lawless and Pearson 2008) and higher-quality
challengers (Milyo and Schosberg 2000), while receiving less support from party organizations
(Sanbonmatsu 2006), and needing to work harder to secure campaign funds (Jenkins 2007), it may
be the case that those female candidates who succeed in being elected are of exceptionally high
quality (and higher quality than the average male candidate)” (Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer
2013; 327). Therefore, because women are more collaborative, consensual, and highly qualified,
they are more effective and entrepreneurial, and I predict due to these characteristics they will spur
the committees they serve on to hold more oversight hearings on women’s issues.
Expectations
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If women hold characteristics that make them more entrepreneurial as well as more
effective when they are in the minority (and sometimes when they are in the majority) (e.g.,
Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2013), and minority party women are able to work on a more
encompassing set of women’s issues, including more feminist issues than just general welfare
issues (e.g., Swers 2002a), we know women have a good legislative strategy that accounts for
institutional norms. They know when and how to act in order to get the legislation they care
about passed. In short, their characteristics make them exemplary entrepreneurs. Taking into
consideration these shared characteristics as well as underrepresentation in a male dominated
institution, as well as their propensity to not care as much about power compared to men, I think
women will use the positions that are available to them in order to see their policy preferences
and general legislative goals met.
Women cooperate more, are better quality, and are more effective than their male
counterparts, so even though they are not in traditionally powerful leadership positions, they will
still be able to perform oversight on issues they care deeply about---issues that affect women
directly. This means that in the area of oversight on women’s issues, the more women on a
committee, the more likely that committee is to hold oversight hearings on women’s issues. I
believe I will observe these effects not only based on the previous literature and the previous
chapter's findings on entrepreneurship, but also due to the previous chapter's findings on hearings
considering the FMLA and SET commission. Women participated in these hearings more so than
their male counterparts, disregarding party and disregarding salience. Women worked to pass these
bills through committee with their participation. These findings not only bolster previous
interview-based literature where women expressed their duty to represent female constituents, but
also help me predict women's activity on oversight. If women are exemplary entrepreneurs,
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navigating a male dominated institution, as well as partisan politics, then I believe women will use
oversight hearings as yet another venue in which to represent the unique needs of female citizens.
Data and Methods
DEPENDENT

VARIABLES

29

. The main dependent variable of interest is the number of

oversight hearings considering women’s issues per committee per congressional session, during
the 80th -110th congresses. Therefore, the unit of analysis is the congressional session/ committee
pair. I employ the same coding criteria for oversight hearings as McGrath (2013) and MacDonald
and McGrath (2016). I used STATA syntax to identify key words30 in the hearings' description
variable within the dataset to code whether the hearings were oversight or not. The other dependent
variable, used for comparison purposes, is a count of legislative hearings considering women’s
issues per committee per congressional session. It was constructed from the “referral” variable in
the congressional hearings dataset, available from the Policy Agendas Project31. In an older version
of the codebook, the variable is defined as coding “whether the hearing was a legislative or nonlegislative hearing.” The older definition and current definition32 describe basically the same
concept, and the other variables in the dataset have been consistent over time, thus, I believe what
I am defining here as “legislative” hearings is valid. The time period that I use in this analysis is
simply due to the data available from the Policy Agendas Project on congressional hearings,
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Data sources, definitions, and descriptive statistics for Chapter 3 can be found in Table A3.1 of the
Appendix.
30
Examples: oversight, review, report, budget, bureau, department, president, etc.
31
"The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the
support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and were distributed
through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original
collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here."
32
In the most current version of the congressional hearings codebook, it is defined as: This column records
whether the hearing was a “referral hearing”: 0=No mention of a bill number or name, or hearings on draft
legislation (such as appropriations bills or defense and intelligence authorization bills).1=Mentions a bill
number or name (as in, "a hearing to consider S 2137, the...") consistent with language in Talbert et al.
(1995) and Baumgartner et al. (2000).
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although it is a satisfactory comprehensive time period: 1947-2008. Figure 3.1 charts a comparison
of the women's issue hearings, plotting the number of oversight and legislative hearings over time.
The general trend is that the number of legislative hearings has decreased, while the number of
oversight hearings has increased. This is part of the reason why I predict women will help spur
oversight of women's issues: as more women are elected to Congress and as more oversight occurs,
women will spur oversight of issues particularly related to the needs of women constituents.
Women will take advantage of the changing institutional norms to represent women.
In order to code the hearings as women’s issues, I coded the hearings' descriptions for
whether or not they covered women’s issues. I did this with key word coding33, utilizing the same
method as I did for the oversight dependent variable. I used STATA syntax to locate hearings with
the key words in the description variable provided in the dataset. In order to capture as many
hearings concerning women’s issues as possible, I included every term I could think of that is
explicitly, yet uniquely related to women and girls. I based the rest of my coding of women’s issues
on Swers (2002; 34-35), where she uses the websites of different women’s organizations34 to
determine what kinds of policy issues are of interest to those organizations, and thus would be
considered women’s issues. She includes issues listed by non-partisan groups, as well as liberal
and conservative groups. I included key terms based on the policy areas listed as major concerns
to those groups on their websites. Once all of the hearings were coded as women's issue hearings
or not, I was able to code them as oversight or legislative hearings, and finally sum the number of
women's issue oversight and women's issue legislative hearings per committee per congressional
session.

33
34

Key terms included: women, girls, mammography, pregnancy, abortion, etc.
See Appendix Table A4.2.
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES. The main independent variable of interest is the proportion of
women on each committee, during each session of Congress from the 80th through the 110th. I
included a time trend variable to control for the tendency of oversight to increase over time, where
the 80th Congress equals “0”, 81st Congress equals “1” … and110th Congress equals “30”. The
Democratic majority variable controls for the sessions in which the Democrats held a majority,
where the variable equals “1” when Democrats held a majority in the House, “0” when they did
not. The Democratic president variable controls for having a Democratic president and any effects
that such a president might have on the congressional-executive dynamic. This equal “1” when
there was a Democratic president, “0” when there was not. The public mood variable (Ellis and
Stimson 2012) places opinion on a liberal-conservative continuum, where more liberal mood is
coded with larger numbers and more conservative mood is coded with smaller numbers. Finally, I
included committee specific fixed effects. These dummy variables equal 1 if the committee is the
committee in question, 0 if it is not. Ways and Means was omitted as the reference category.
Findings
I present the results of the analysis in Table 3.135, where both models use OLS regression.
In model 1, the dependent variable is the count of women’s issue oversight hearings per committee
per congressional session. In this model, the more women on the committee, or the larger the
proportion of women on the committee, the more oversight that committee will engage in. The
coefficient for the proportion of women reaches the highest level of statistical significance,
indicating that we can expect this result to hold much more often than not. This means that my
predictions are supported: the presence of women is associated with the committees they serve on
engaging in more oversight of women’s issues. Not only this, but I observe that having more
35

Although there are many zero observations for the number of women in committees, the OLS and
Negative Binomial regression models produce the same results. I have chosen to present the OLS results.
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women on a committee makes the committee more likely to hold about 1 more oversight hearing
on women's issues than committees with fewer female members. Therefore, although the
magnitude of the coefficient is small, the overall finding bolsters the literature linking substantive
(policy that is produced) and descriptive (who makes the policy) representation. Also, we can
conclude that women, being consensus builders and high quality legislators, are not only effective
at getting bills through the legislative process, they are also effective at conducting oversight on
issues that are particularly important to women.
In model 2, the dependent variable is the number of legislative hearings considering
women’s issues per committee per congressional session. There is a negative coefficient for the
proportion of women on a committee, which implies that the more women on a committee, the
less legislative hearings that committee will hold. However, the coefficient for the proportion of
women does not reach statistical significance, so I cannot comment on any substantive
implications this has. The fact that the committees they are members of conduct more oversight
makes sense, then: women need to represent the needs of their female constituents, and if they
aren't able to spur productivity on legislative hearings, than they choose to initiate oversight
hearings. I think that considering the other findings I have previously discussed concerning women
as more effective and entrepreneurial legislators, coupled with the current findings, I believe we
can conclude that women are adaptable to the institutional constraints of their environment.
I included the specific committees as controls since certain committees may have the
propensity to be more productive than others. Also, Swers (2002) identifies certain committees as
women's issue committees: Education, Commerce, and Judiciary. This means that these
committees see legislation regarding women's issues more often than other committees. When we
examine the Committee on Education, it holds less oversight hearings on women's issues the more
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women are present, but more legislative hearings on women's issues. Both of these coefficients
reach statistical significance. However, Commerce and Judiciary do not hold similar trends.
Instead, both committees hold more legislative hearings the more women are present at a
statistically significant level. Although there is not a clear connection to be made between women's
membership on committees that are more likely to consider women's issues and oversight hearings,
there is a general connection between these types of committees and legislative hearings. This is a
positive finding: when more women get a seat on women's issue committees, they help spur those
committees to hold legislative hearings considering women's issues. Party leaders may place
women on those committees for this precise reason---having women present during the debate
over agenda items that can specifically affect women makes good public policy and good politics.
In Table 3.2 (full estimates provided in Table A3.2 of the Appendix), I present two
additional models to show that there is not much difference between using the proportion of
women variable and the number of women variable, other than the way the coefficient is
interpreted. Models 1 and 2 use the count of women’s issue oversight hearings as the dependent
variable and models 3 and 4 use the count of women’s issue legislative hearings. Consistent with
the results I have already discussed, you can see that the number and proportion of women on
committees holding oversight hearings on women’s issues have positive and statistically
significant coefficients. Both models clearly indicate that having more women present on a
committee leads to more oversight on women’s issues. Therefore, although women are
underrepresented in the House, and although they do not hold many party or institutional potions
of leadership, women are able to make an important impact in committees. These results bolster
the research that finds a connection between substantive and descriptive representation, where the
former enhances the latter.
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Conclusions
Considering the findings of the previous chapter, I believe we now have enough evidence
to suggest that women's behavior not only enhances substantive representation of women's issues
(thus benefitting the female citizenry), but also enhances the productivity within Congress. The
previous chapter's findings regarding entrepreneurship displays additional findings suggesting that
electing more women to Congress makes the institution more productive in fostering women’s
interests. Plus, by having women at the table, Congress is able to produce legislation like the
FMLA and SET commission, taking policies from the government agenda, getting them on the
floor for a vote, thus moving them to the decision agenda. The results from the current chapter and
the previous chapter show us that women are effective even though they do not hold as many
leadership positions as men, and are entrepreneurial even in their current state of
underrepresentation.
In light of the findings presented in this chapter, I conclude that women are able to attain
their goal of representing women: the descriptive representatives are able to substantively
represent their female constituents. Not only are congresswomen able to inspire their committees
to hold oversight hearings concerning women’s issues, but the more women who serve on the
committees, the more oversight hearings they hold. These findings lend legitimacy to previous
findings that women are more effective than men at achieving legislative goals. They are able to
substantially make a difference in the oversight process by taking the institutional hand they are
dealt and playing it to their advantage. Therefore, electing women to Congress is making a
difference, both in the policies that are produced and in shaking up the male dominated institutional
norms. Plus, Congress as a whole benefits from women being present, and so does our democracy:
the concerns of female citizens are heard at the same time the institution becomes more productive.
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Chapter 3 Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1:

Table 3.1: Comparison of OLS Models Considering the Number of Women's Issue
Hearings, Oversight versus Legislative, 80th – 110th Congress
http://swampland.time.com/2013/10/16/women-are-the-only-adults-left-in-washington/
Number Oversight
Hearings

Number Legislative
Hearings

Proportion
Women

1.10***
(0.26)

-0.050
(0.38)

Time

1.36***
(0.17)

-1.15***
(0.24)

Democrat
Majority

-5.43*
(2.68)

-0.87
(3.91)

Democrat
Presidency

0.95
(2.09)

-4.86
(3.05)

Agriculture

-14.4**
(5.16)

7.54
(7.51)

Appropriations

73.3***

-3.12

72
(5.17)

(7.54)

Armed Services

-4.28
(5.22)

19.8**
(7.61)

Banking

-9.58*
(5.27)

4.79
(7.68)

Budget

-21.1***
(5.98)

-18.3*
(8.72)

DC

-19.1***
(5.63)

-8.75
(8.20)

Education

-9.46*
(5.22)

17.2*
(7.61)

Government
Operations

19.2***
(5.20)

-3.32
(7.58)

Commerce

-0.55
(5.18)

34.5***
(7.55)

Foreign Affairs

3.58
(5.18)

5.24
(7.55)

House
Administration

-26.2***
(5.32)

-20.2**
(7.76)

Interior

-10.7*
(5.17)

53.9***
(7.53)

Judiciary

3.60
(5.18)

53.4***
(7.55)

Merchant
Marine

-13.1**
(5.61)

8.01
(8.18)

Post Office

-12.9*
(5.70)

6.37
(8.30)

Public Works

-7.14
(5.17)

-2.50
(7.54)

Science

-5.20
(5.41)

-2.72
(7.88)

Small
Business

-19.5***
(6.11)

-6.95
(8.90)

Veterans

-19.0***

-10.4
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Affairs

(5.20)

(7.57)

Public
Mood

-0.097
(0.23)

-0.80**
(0.34)

Constant

11.6
(16.92)

97.1***
(24.66)

N
R-Squared
F-Statistic

530
.6599
40.82***

530
.3923
13.58***

NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table 3.2: Comparison of Proportion of Women & Number of Women, Legislative and
Oversight Hearings, 80th – 110th Congresses
(1)
Proportion Women
on Committees

(2)

1.10***
(0.26)

Number of
Women

(3)

(4)

-0.050
(0.38)
4.87***
(0.57)

-0.88
(0.87)

Time

1.36***
(0.17)

0.92***
(0.16)

-1.15***
(0.24)

-1.01***
(0.25)

Democrat
Majority

-5.43*
(2.68)

-2.31
(2.58)

-0.87
(3.91)

-1.67
(3.95)

Democrat
Presidency

0.95
(2.09)

1.83
(1.99)

-4.86
(3.05)

-5.18*
(3.04)

Public Mood

-0.097
(0.23)

-0.13
(0.22)

-0.80**
(0.34)

-0.80**
(0.34)

Constant

11.6
(16.92)

16.4
(16.08)

97.1***
(24.66)

96.3***
(24.65)

N
R-squared
F-statistic

530
.6599
40.82***

530
.6929
47.49***

530
.3923
13.58***

530
.3935
13.65***

NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Models 1 & 2 use the
number of oversight hearings as the dependent variable; Models 3 & 4 use the number of legislative
hearings as the dependent variable. Full estimates are provided in Table A3.2 Appendix.
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Chapter 4:
Substantive Representation Revisited:
The Relationship of Gender to District Characteristics
The preceding chapter focused on oversight; the more congresswomen present on a
committee, the more oversight hearings regarding women's issues that committee held. This means
that not only are women spurring more oversight productivity, but also, they are able to fulfill their
desires to represent their female constituents' unique policy needs. In the chapter before last, I
found that congresswomen participate more than their male colleagues in hearings considering two
women's issue bills that were eventually passed into law. Plus, I found evidence showing that
women are more entrepreneurial than their male counterparts. These chapters show that women
boost overall activity in the House of Representatives, as well as boosting activity related to
women’s issues, and they choose to expend their resources focusing on women's issues. Taken
together, all of these findings help me build on the literature that links descriptive and substantive
representation. Women are actively working to fulfill the role they see themselves as having:
representing women, not just their own constituents, but also all women citizens. They recognize,
as political scientists do, that women are a minority in a male dominated institution. The role of
congresswomen is special: they must bring issues related to women's needs to the table. Simply
by being present, women change the policy agenda by making it more inclusive to female citizens
as well as make the congressional institution more productive.
In this chapter, I wish to revisit the literature focusing on agenda setting and position taking.
In the previous chapters, I have focused on committee participation and committee membership,
but here I want to shift the focus back to the individual legislator and their relationship with their
own constituents. When women in Congress act differently than their male counterparts, it is easy
to assume it is the personal characteristic of being a woman that makes congresswomen act
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differently than congressmen, especially when it comes to women's issues. In other words, being
a woman is considered a legitimate reason for explaining congresswomen's behavior on activities
where policy pertains directly to women---for example, congresswomen participating more than
men in hearings related to women's issues or the presence of congresswomen on committees
spurring more oversight hearings on women's issues. In the previous chapters I have argued that
descriptive (what a member looks like) and substantive (what a member does) representation are
linked, using the two examples in the previous sentence as my empirical cases. After controlling
for additional theoretically valid factors, being a woman remains an important (and statistically
significant) driving factor for both individual member participation and group actions.
When political scientists study the behavior of individual legislators using gender as an
independent variable in their theoretical and statistical models, they tend to control not just for
other personal characteristics, such as party, ideology, race, and seniority, but also for district
characteristics that may affect lawmakers’ behavior. Controlling for district characteristics
recognizes the role of reelection concerns in a member’s decision-making process. However, the
literature that focuses on women in Congress and state legislatures does not include district
characteristics that specifically relate to women. If members of Congress are influenced both by
their personal policy agendas (Arnold 1990; Fenno 1973; Hall 1996) and reelection concerns
(Mayhew 1974), then surely gender of the individual members and the makeup of their
constituencies play significant roles in determining bill introductions on women's issues.
Therefore, not only do I focus on the individual legislator's gender for this analysis, but I also focus
on the characteristics of women within their corresponding congressional districts. Perhaps
congresswomen who are elected from certain districts with particular female reelection
constituencies are more apt to introduce bills related to women's issues than are congresswomen
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and congressmen from other districts. However, I expect that voters’ perceptions of
congresswomen allow congresswomen to work on public policies related directly to women’s
needs and repay them with supportive votes, more so than congressmen. Therefore, my specific
research questions are: Is there more to Congresswomen representing women’s interests than them
being women themselves and general district characteristics? Specifically, do the demographic
factors of women in the district matter, and is the effect of gender conditioned by these female
demographic factors? I think congresswomen are strategic: they pay attention to the needs of
certain female constituencies in their district not only because women’s issues interest them, but
also because they rely on the voters who are affected by such policy to repay them at the ballot
box, and they can do a better job of this than their male counterparts. In the next couple of sections,
I will discuss how my research contributes to previous literature concerning women participating
in Congress.
Two Pieces to the Puzzle: Congresswomen and the District
CONGRESSWOMEN
Having women in Congress changes the gender dynamics of a male dominated institution,
as well as adds important ideas to the policy agenda. Not only do women differentiate themselves
from their male colleagues in their advocacy for issues that directly affect women in the electorate,
but also, they are more effective legislators, where effectiveness is defined as “the advancement
of a member’s agenda items through the legislative process and into law” (Volden, Wiseman, &
Wittmer 2013; 327). Past research also shows that having women present in Congress does make
a substantive difference in the legislative agenda (e.g., Swers 2002a; 2013). For example,
congresswomen use their committee positions to advocate for the incorporation of women's
interests into committee legislation (Dodson 1998, 2002; Dodson et al.1995; Gertzog 1995; Norton
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2002; Swers 2002a). When women in the House are able to pursue any issue that interests them
and their constituents, they choose to introduce legislation related to gender and family more than
their male colleagues (Swers 2002a). Similarly, in state legislatures, Bratton (2005) finds that
women sponsor more women’s interest legislation than their male counterparts, even when the
legislature contains very few women.
Gender also seems to make a difference in position-taking behaviors, such as roll call
voting and floor debate. When the policy directly concerns gender, like abortion (Tatolovich and
Schier 1993) or a set of women’s issues (Burrell 1994; Dolan 1997; Swers 1998), female
representatives tend to vote similarly, somewhat disregarding ideology and partisanship.
Furthermore, during floor debates, women exhibit a higher rate of participation than their male
counterparts on women’s issues (Cramer Walsh 2002; Swers 2001; Tamerius 1995), as well as
speaking with a distinctive voice on such issues (Cramer Walsh 2002; Dodson et al. 1995; Levy,
Tien, and Aved 2001; Swers 2001).
Why would women take on the responsibility of pursuing policy change in regards to
women's issues? Part of it has to do with representing female citizens. Women serving in both state
legislatures and Congress feel a responsibility to specifically represent women. They think of
women as a distinct constituency and express commitment to representing women, whether in their
district or not (Carroll 2002; Dodson et al. 1995; Foerstel and Foerstel 1996; Gertzog 1995). These
findings are exemplified in the behaviors listed above, but also (and most importantly for the
current purposes of this chapter) agenda setting behavior. At the state level, female representatives
prioritize women’s issues. They pursue feminist initiatives and legislation, as well as legislation
concerning issues of traditional importance to women, such as education, health, and welfare
(Berkman and O'Connor 1993; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Dolan and Ford 1995; Saint-Germain

78
1989; Thomas 1994). In Congress, women sponsor and cosponsor more feminist bills36 and bills
related to women’s traditional role as caregiver37 than men (Swers 2000, 2002; Tamerius 1995;
Vega and Firestone 1995; Wolbrecht 2002). Therefore, I expect congresswomen to continue to
introduce more bills of particular concern to women than their male counterparts.
Women may be interested in pursuing women's issues on their personal agendas due to the
fact that they themselves are women, have a personal connection to their gender identity, and they
have an interest in doing so simply because they can relate to those issues. They may also feel a
specific responsibility to represent women, since women are so underrepresented in Congress.
Taking both of these possibilities into account, I feel that because reelection is also a paramount
concern to all members, women can capitalize on their gender by purposefully representing the
unique needs of the women within their district. They can do this despite their party affiliation
because they are women. Men are at a disadvantage. In the next section, I will discuss why the
district can help us explain bill introduction behavior, and how this can further our understanding
of the link between descriptive and substantive representation.
THE DISTRICT
Certain kinds of districts are more likely to elect women. Palmer and Simon (2006) find
districts that elect Democratic women are more liberal than districts that elect Democratic men.
Therefore, I can expect to see evidence that both women and liberal members will introduce more
bills related to women's interests. Considering geography, non-Southern, urban, and small
Democratic districts are places where Democratic women can expect to be successful. There are
also some unique characteristics to the districts electing white Democratic women. These districts
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Examples: reproductive rights, protecting victims of domestic violence, increasing funding for women’s
health research, establishing gender equality programs in education, etc.
37
Examples: health care, education, poverty assistance

79
tend to be wealthier than the districts that elected men, have smaller blue-collar populations, and
a larger proportion of college graduates. As for Republican women, the districts electing them are
more moderate than those electing men. The districts tend to be smaller, outside the South, have
larger urban populations than the districts electing Republican men; however, for both Republican
men and women, their districts are not racially diverse. Districts electing women are definitely
unique in comparison to those electing men, "but it is important to keep in mind that core
Democratic districts electing a woman are still more Democratic and liberal than core Republican
districts electing a woman" (Palmer and Simon 2006; 198-199).
Because of the evidence found by Palmer and Simon coupled with the evidence presented
in the previous section regarding women’s propensity to work on women’s issues more so than
their male colleagues, I expect a few different things related to partisanship and gender. I expect
both female Democrats and female Republicans to be more responsive to female constituencies
because this results in votes from women, but also because congresswomen are more interested in
representing the needs of women via women’s issue legislation than their male counterparts. I
separate Democrats and Republicans in some of the models presented in the forthcoming analysis,
but also control for party in other models, so that I can tease out the differences between a liberal
responsiveness to women’s issues versus a congresswoman’s responsiveness to her female
constituency. In other words, it is important to tease out whether Democrats are providing their
liberal constituents with what they expect from the Democratic party platform, or if women within
both parties are extending the connection between descriptive and substantive representation to
bill introduction behavior.
If Democrats of both genders introduce more women’s issue legislation than their
Republican colleagues, then it’s a story about partisan issues and the Democrats’ ownership of
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women’s issues (i.e. Petrocik 1996). If just female Democrats introduce more legislation than
Democratic men and Republicans of both genders, then it’s a story connecting gender (their
wanting to represent women) and party (issue ownership). However, if as I expect, female
Democrats and female Republicans introduce more legislation, then it’s a story of gender and
district characteristics, and party falls away. As mentioned above, female legislators have
expressed a sense of responsibility to represent the interests of women and they are more likely
than men to view women as a distinct part of their constituencies (Carroll 2002; Dodson et al.
1995; Foerstel and Foerstel 1996; Gertzog 1995; Reingold 1992; Thomas 1994, 1997). Besides
Republican women seeking to represent the needs of women, it’s a good electoral strategy to
remain responsive to the unique female constituencies within their districts. Republican women
can get away with “poaching” issue ownership of women’s issues away from Democrats compared
to Republican men because they themselves are usually wives and mothers (Swers 2016A). They
have “expertise” on women’s issues by virtue of their gender roles and femininity. Furthermore,
we can expect women of both parties might have an advantage over men due to voters’ cognitive
shortcuts (Popkin 1991). Voters will understand why women would choose to focus on these
issues, but this would be harder for men, especially Republican men to do. In other words, I think
this is a deliberate campaign and representation strategy. Not only will members of Congress listen
to the concerns of their constituents, but I believe that because congresswomen express a specific
interest in representing women constituents, they will be more likely than men to pay attention to
their female constituents' wants and needs.
We know from Fenno that there are many different constituencies, so congresswomen
might have advantages building female constituencies relative to congressmen. In other words,
being a woman has an effect on their behavior because gender is an inherently identifying
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characteristic, but is it gender in conjunction with being in the right district that better predicts
their behavior? These are important questions to address since the literature is not currently
addressing them. By not recognizing them theoretically and evaluating them empirically we are
missing out in terms of our understanding of how and why women’s interests receive
representation in Congress. When female members go to Congress, they can choose to exploit their
connection to female voters, which conditions the effect of gender on their behavior. In other
words, congresswomen are able to introduce women's issue bills, which might be a true interest of
theirs, but it also appeases the women in their district who voted for them. It may even help win
over women who didn't vote for them, but who pay close attention to their 'sister' in office. In this
chapter, I will address these questions of gender interacting with characteristics of women in the
district by examining bill introductions concerning women's issues.
Is Gender Conditioned by District (or Reelection) Characteristics?
We know that partisanship plays a large role in member behavior, but we also know that
congresswomen act substantively different than congressmen, especially when it comes to
women’s issues. If this is the case, why can we expect Republican and Democratic women to
represent their female constituents in similar ways? When considering modeling the relationship
between members of Congress and their bill introductions, I want to capture personal motivations
as well as reelection motivations in order to fully specify the model. Thinking about the causal
story of gender and a member’s behavior and what previous authors have added to this area of
literature, I realized that no authors were adding characteristics about the female population of the
congressional districts to their models. Previous authors (Poggione 2004; Swers 2002a) took
district and thus reelection interests into account by controlling for average household income, the
percentage unemployed in the district, the percentage of district residents who earned a college
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degree, and urbanicity. These variables also helped control for the liberalness of the district. Yet,
they did not consider the possible relationship between particular groups of female reelection
constituencies and a member’s behavior. What if gender is conditioned by a district characteristic?
Or more importantly, what if gender is conditioned by a district characteristic specifically related
to the women of the district?
I expect women to consciously seek to represent the unique needs of women, so I expect
congresswomen to pay particular attention to the needs of the women in their district that are
affected by special policies. The categories of women I chose for the forthcoming analysis are at
the mercy of data availability, but I wanted to choose variables or groups of women based on that
group’s likelihood of benefitting from an agenda focused on women’s interests. We can expect
women in Congress to have an agenda that matches those groups’ concerns. For example, divorced
women are in need of economic policies to help single income families (alimony or child support),
housing policies, policies benefitting children and parent’s rights or custody rights, mental health
care, etc. Children in poverty require food, healthcare, and income assistance, as well as education
and housing. Lesbian couples seek protections of their civil rights and other policies for children
if they are parents, and female veterans require benefits related to their status as veterans. All four
of these groups require special and specific policy solutions to their unique problems as women
and are included in the analysis. The wealthy women are included because wealthy and educated
people respond that they care about women’s issues in public opinion surveys (Lewis-Beck et al
2008). This group may not need any special gender-based policy, but if they report that they care
about women’s issues, we can expect members of Congress to pay attention to those opinions, and
we already expect congresswomen to do a better job of this than men. By including these five
categories of district characteristics, I seek to ascertain whether district characteristics that signal
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how much constituents would benefit from policies beneficial to women’s interests condition the
influence of gender on congresswomen’s bill sponsorship behavior. Congresswomen may be more
responsive than congressmen in such districts not only because they may be personally more
interested in doing so, but because they will take advantage of voter expectations and seek an
electoral reward for their substantive representation.
DATA AND METHODS
Swers calls gender a “fundamental identity that affects the way senators look at policy
questions, the issues they prioritize, and the perspective they bring to develop solutions” (2013,
3). However, the fundamental identity is not enough to explain behavioral differences between
male and female members due to other factors like party identification. She goes on to argue that
senators develop political and electoral strategies based on public expectations regarding gender
roles and party reputations. If we take her findings into account along with the previous discussion
of reelection concerns, it is easy to see how important it is to account for the member’s gender and
the member’s district characteristics. Perhaps female legislators from both parties keep the women
of their district in mind for both personal interest, like Hall would expect, and for reelection
interests, like Fenno would expect. Plus, both Republican and Democratic women exhibit an
interest in working on and producing women’s issue legislation, not to mention they see women
as a specific group that needs deliberate representation.
I predict being female to have a positive relationship with bill sponsorship related to
women’s issues based on these previous findings. I also expect that some of the interactions I
include to condition gender. Therefore, I think this relationship between district characteristics and
bill introduction behavior may exist for female members because we should expect them to exploit
gender through their “linked fate” with female voters. Again, this is why it is important to
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recognize the role of partisanship. Congresswomen in general can be expected to introduce more
women’s issue legislation than their male colleagues, but if this trend holds when models are run
separating out the parties, and women introduce more legislation than men within their own
parties, then there is more than a connection between Democratic party issue ownership and action
on women’s issues. Rather, women seek to represent the special needs of women in their district
in hope of an electoral reward.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE38. This analysis focuses on the House of Representatives during the
109th – 113th congressional sessions (2005-2014), as those are the only sessions where the Census
has data available at the congressional district level, rather than county level. This is an interesting
time period, however. It is close in proximity to our current time period, which updates the current
state of the literature concerning bill sponsorship on women's issues, and it includes instances of
both unified and divided government39. In some of the models I limit the congressional sessions
to 111th to the 113th because there is missing data for some of the Census variables, which I will
discuss in the next section. The dependent variable in all models consists of a count of women's
issue bill introductions, as defined by Swers (2002, 36-38), per member per congressional session.
She uses the websites of different women’s organizations, liberal, conservative, and nonpartisan,
to determine what kinds of issues are of interest to those organizations, and thus would be
considered women’s issues40. In general, these are social welfare policies and policies related to
women’s traditional gendered role as caregivers and mothers. In order to code the hearings as
women’s issues, I coded the Policy Agendas Project subtopics for whether or not they covered
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Data sources, definitions, and descriptive statistics for Chapter 4 can be found in Table A4.1 of the
Appendix.
39
Here I'm only concerned with the House and the President; I'm not including the Senate in my use of
united or divided, since I am only studying House bill introductions. 109 & 111= united; 110, 112, & 113
= divided.
40
For a complete breakdown of Swers' coding schema, please refer to Appendix Table A4.2
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women’s issues as defined by the women's organizations provided by Swers. By coding the
subtopics for whether or not they are women’s interest topics, I was also able to code the
introductions for being women’s interest bills because the Congressional Bills Project dataset
includes each bill’s subtopic code. A second coder also coded the subtopics, testing the coding for
reliability. The inter-coder reliability test, presented in the Appendix (see Table A4.3), shows the
amount of agreement and indicates that I can reject the null hypothesis that the coding criteria does
not improve agreement beyond that which one would observe if both coders simply chose the
modal category (not a women’s issue). This finding supports the view that certain subtopics were
explicitly related to the women's issues highlighted by the women's organizations.
I use the Congressional Bills Project dataset (Adler & Wilkerson 2013)41 to gather the
universe of bill introductions limiting the data to the House. I will present estimates from negative
binomial maximum likelihood models, which are appropriate for count data that is overdispersed.
Many members have a zero observation for the dependent variable (introducing no women's issue
bills), so negative binomial regression is more appropriate than OLS regression.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES. Gender (1 = female, 0 = male) is one of the variables of main
interest. Party identification (1 = Republican, 0 = Democrat) is used in all the models presented in
this chapter because it is theoretically relevant to explaining member behavior. I also include a
measure of whether or not (1 = yes; 0 = no) the member was a part of the majority party42. I do
this because I am interested in whether a member's majority or minority status affects their
productivity. As we have seen in the previous chapters, women tend to be active whether they are
Democrats or Republicans, and in both positions of the majority and minority. I expect to see
similar results here. In Appendix Table A4.4, I present the results of models interacting gender
41
42

I thank E. Scott Adler and John Wilkerson for making this data publicly available.
Majority party: 109, 112, 113 Republican; 110 & 111 Democrat
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and partisanship as well as gender and majority party status in comparison to the base model
presented in column 1. This model is also the base model in column 1 of Table 4.1 discussed
below. The purpose of Table A4.4, as well as Table A4.5 in the Appendix is to show that these
interactions of partisanship and gender have no significantly different effect on the model’s results,
so they are not necessary to include in the models presented below. Also, there is basically no
difference between using party identification and ideology measures in the models. Ideology (first
dimension DW-NOMINATE scores) is included in the full models presented in Appendix Table
A4.6 to illustrate this.
Other independent variables of interest attempt to capture district characteristics and
possible reelection constituency characteristics previously left out of the models in previous
literature. My main contribution will be to investigate how important congressional reelection
constituencies within districts are to women in ways other than those constituencies’ party
identification or ideology. Again, my main research question asks whether groups of women or
girls of the district affect the way women in Congress choose to represent them via bill
sponsorship. In this chapter, I include the following: divorced women, wealthy women43, girls
under five living in poverty, lesbian couples, and female veterans. The logs of these variables are
used in the models.
I use congressional district level data from 109th through the 113th congressional sessions44.
These data are compiled from the American Communities Survey45. The main contribution here is
to use data that authors in this particular area of women and politics (considering substantive
representation) have not considered before in order to explain the connection between female
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I am defining wealthy as those women making over $100,000 in the current congressional session year.
Those sessions are the only data available sorted by sex and congressional district.
45
These data have been collected via the American FactFinder.
44
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members of the House and their female reelection constituencies. I expect women within
congressional districts to be an important influence on women in Congress of both parties. Because
congressional women, when interviewed (Carroll 2002), indicate a serious intent and responsibility
towards representing women, I do not think we can safely capture all of that influence with the
gender dummy variable. I think we need to include the district characteristics specifically related
to women in the district in order to fully specify the model to match up with our theoretical
expectations---that congresswomen pay attention to their female constituents. Plus, we are further
bolstering the link between descriptive and substantive representation. Women in Congress act
differently than men due to their policy interests, their reelection interests, and these are connected
via the interests of women within their congressional districts.
Therefore, I plan to: (1) use the five new Census variables denoting women’s interests in
the district to explain why the women in Congress may have an advantage over the men, and (2)
how these new variables about women may condition the effects of gender on bill introduction
behavior. The novelty of my work is found in updating the years studied, the additional variables
related to women in the district, and interaction terms.
CONTROL VARIABLES. Two other district characteristics are included to capture the makeup
of the district: the total Black population and the median household income. These variables are
used to determine whether the district leans toward a liberal ideology, and thus may be more likely
to elect a female or a Democrat (or both) (Palmer & Simon 2006). The logs of these variables are
used in the models. The log of the number of women serving in the House is included in order to
capture any effect this may have because as time goes on, more women serve, and the more women
who serve, the more women’s issue legislation we can expect to see introduced. I also included
dummy variables for the congressional sessions. However, there is basically no difference between
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the models that include fixed effects and those that do not, so I do not include them in the full
models presented here in the chapter. Two sessions also drop out due to collinearity. Those models
can be viewed in the Appendix (Table A4.6).
RESULTS
Similar to the results in the previous chapters, the women of the House are more productive
when it comes to women's issues than their male counterparts. As presented first in column 1 of
Table 4.1, they introduce more bills related to women's issues at a significance level of p<0.001.
This means that overall, women of both parties introduce more women's issue bills than their male
colleagues during the time period examined (January 2005-January 2015), even when controlling
for party identification, majority party membership, unified government, the number of women
serving, and traditional measurements of district characteristics, black population, and median
household income. Being a Democrat or being a member of the majority party, as well as having
more black constituents or a higher median household income motivates members of the House to
sponsor women's issue legislation. This trend holds when I run the model for Democrats only, as
presented in column 2. Democrats tend to own women's issues (Petrocik 1996), meaning that they
are perceived to be authentic authorities on this policy area, so again this result is not surprising.
When we consider the expressed interest in representing the needs of women by congresswomen,
coupled with their party’s ownership of women’s issues, it makes sense that female Democrats
will introduce more legislation than male Democrats. They are in a unique position to exploit voter
expectations as both women and Democrats by introducing women’s interest legislation and
reaping the electoral benefits.
However, in column 3 of Table 4.1, I present the model for Republicans only. Here, female
Republicans are introducing more women’s issue bills than Republican men at a statistically
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significant level. This indicates to me that the story is not just a connection between issue
ownership and congresswomen, but rather women in both parties institute the same, or at least a
similar representative strategy. By sponsoring more bills related to women’s issues than their male
colleagues, women in both parties are expressing their interest in representing the unique policy
needs of women. This allows them to introduce legislation they are interested in as women
themselves, but also to introduce legislation that benefits their constituents and be rewarded with
reelection. Again, I think they are able to do this better than the men in their party because their
strategy is to be rewarded by particular reelection constituencies.
Evidence of the connection between such female reelection constituencies is explored first
in Table 4.246. Each column adds in a different female constituency variable. Only the number of
wealthy women (column 2) and the number of lesbian households (column 4) have a positive and
statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. This indicates that these particular
types of female constituencies contribute to a member’s likelihood of introducing women’s issue
bills. Divorced women, girls in poverty under five, and female veterans do not, however. The
impact of gender and party identification hold across all models: being a woman and being a
Democrat leads to more women’s issue bill sponsorships, as does majority party membership,
more female members in the House, and a higher median household income within the district.
These results lead me to present the models in Table 4.3. What happens when all of the
female reelection constituency variables are included in the same model? In column 1, the effect
of being a congresswoman, being a Democrat, being a member of the majority party, having a
unified government, more congresswomen present, more wealthy women, and a higher median
household income hold. When I split apart Democrats and Republicans, the effects change. In
46

Note Table 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 must limit the congressional sessions to 111, 112, and 113 because not all of
the Census variables related to female constituencies are available in 109 and 110.
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column 2, among Democrats, women sponsor more legislation than men related to women’s issues
at the p<0.0l level. Also, the more lesbian households, the more bills introduced by female
Democrats. However, the statistically significant effect of wealthy women drops out. Now there is
a negative statistically significant relationship between the number of divorced women and bill
introductions. When considering these results in comparison to column 3, which only includes
Republicans, female Democrats seem to be driving the results observed in column 1. No variable
except median household income in the district has a positive and statistically significant
relationship with bill introductions for Republicans. Overall, partisanship and issue ownership by
Democrats seem to predict women’s behavior more so than district characteristics. However,
lesbian households and wealthy women may be important female reelection constituencies for
female Democrats.
To further explore the connection between the gender of a member and their possible
female reelection constituency, I ran models testing whether the female reelection constituency
variables condition the positive and significant effects of being a congresswoman. Each model
adds in a different statistical interaction of the gender of a member with a female reelection
variable. The interactions of gender and divorced women, gender and wealthy women, gender and
girls living in poverty, and gender and lesbian households all take away the positive and
statistically significant relationship between being a congresswoman and sponsoring more
women’s issue bills. Only in model 5 does the positive and statistically significant relationship
hold. These findings do not indicate that the relationship between gender and bill sponsorship
disappears. Rather, when I model the relationships in a conditional way, the relationship does not
appear as an interaction. Instead, the relationship is better modeled additively and not
conditionally.
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General trends that hold across all five models indicate that being a Democrat, a member
of the majority party, having united government, having more women serving in the House, and a
higher median household income within the district are strong indicators of a member’s women’s
interest bill introductions. These types of members sponsor more legislation, but the important
causal story of a conditional relationship between being a female member and female reelection
constituencies does not present itself. If we observed these interaction terms attaining statistical
significance while the congresswomen coefficients lost significance, then I could have concluded
that there was a conditional relationship between being a congresswoman and the female reelection
constituencies. However, a strong connection between Democrats and women’s issue bill
introductions, and in particular Democratic women and bill introductions are the key findings. The
causal story is somewhat complicated. I do not find evidence of a conditional relationship, but
importantly I do find that female Democrats are able to use their party’s issue ownership to
introduce legislation that we expect them to based on both partisanship and gender. I still believe
congresswomen want to represent the unique needs of women as well as reap the reelection
rewards from their possible female reelection constituencies. It seems that in certain circumstances
female Democrats are better able to do this than female Republicans, but in general women of both
parties are outperforming the men within their own party. This chapter presents further evidence
of a connection between descriptive and substantive representation via women’s issue bill
sponsorship.
DISCUSSION
Overall, it is clear that partisanship plays a crucial role in predicting member behavior. In
particular, all models show a strong relationship between being a Democrat and sponsoring more
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women’s issue legislation. The relationship between gender and women's issue bill introductions
is indeed affected by some district level characteristics, however.
This chapter, along with the findings in the previous chapters, present a preponderance of
evidence that gender matters in spurring congresswomen to act more than their male counterparts
when it comes to women's issue legislation and representing female constituents. I have found that
congresswomen participate more than congressmen in hearings related to women's issue
legislation. Plus, women are more entrepreneurial than men overall. These findings bolster
findings on effectiveness and are theoretically relevant: simply electing women to Congress
changes the dynamic of the institution. Having more women present makes the institution more
productive and brings unique voices to the table. Similarly, I found that female members of the
House spur more oversight related to women's issues simply by being present on committees: the
greater the female membership of a committee, the more oversight hearings the committee held
considering women's issues.
In the current chapter, I found that women in Congress overall are more willing to sponsor
women’s issue bills, but the findings are more consistent for female Democrats compared to female
Republicans. I believe that Democratic women are fulfilling their goal of creating good public
policy related to women, and that this helps them fulfill their other goal of reelection. Particular
constituencies, like wealthy women and lesbians help spur more action from female Democrats,
and thus may represent specific and important female reelection constituencies for those members.
Democratic congresswomen should pay close attention to those two groups in order to
substantively represent their policy needs and be rewarded with reelection. However, if
congresswomen in general are interested in the welfare of all women, including the five groups
investigated here, and policy dealing with women’s issues, then congresswomen, both Democrats
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and Republicans, would benefit from attempting to accommodate the wishes of all women. Of
course, partisanship of these women plays an important role, however districts that elect
Republican women are more moderate than those electing Republican men (Palmer & Simon
2006). Perhaps female Republicans can construct a political calculus that poaches women’s issues
from Democrats in order to capitalize on their own gender in relation to the women in their district.
We do not see evidence of this holding across all models presented here, but it may be a necessary
electoral strategy moving forward. In the next chapter, I will discuss the findings and limitations
of the previous chapters, as well as discuss potential extensions of the research and directions for
future research in the gender and politics discipline. The work presented in this dissertation has
built on the literature, but has also given me many ideas on how to further explore the connection
between descriptive and substantive representation.
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Chapter 4 Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: The Effect of Gender on Introducing Women’s Issue Bills, 109th – 113th Congress
(1)

(2)

(3)

Congresswomen

0.21***
(0.05)

0.23***
(0.06)

0.20**
(0.08)

Party Identification

-0.32***
(0.04)

Majority Party

0.11***
(0.04)

0.18***
(0.05)

0.061
(0.05)

United Government

0.070
(0.04)

0.032
(0.06)

0.11*
(0.06)

Log Number
Congresswomen

0.21
(0.41)

0.45
(0.59)

0.23
(0.57)

Log Black
Population

0.027*
(0.02)

0.020
(0.02)

0.027
(0.03)

Log Median
Household Income

0.58***
(0.07)

0.41***
(0.09)

0.83***
(0.11)

Constant

-5.77**
(1.94)

-4.85*
(2.73)

-8.80***
(2.79)

Log Alpha
Constant

-0.63***
(0.04)

-0.58***
(0.05)

-0.71***
(0.06)

N
Pseudo R-squared

2362
0.01

1175
0.01

1187
0.01

Note: Model 1 = all members; Model 2 = just Democrats; Model 3 = just Republicans. Variance exceeds
the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05,
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table 4.2: The Effect of Gender on Introducing Women’s Issue Bills Adding in Variables
Related to Women in the District, 111th-113th Congresses
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Congresswomen

0.17**
(0.06)

0.15**
(0.06)

0.17**
(0.06)

0.17**
(0.06)

0.17**
(0.06)

Party Identification

-0.32***

-0.31***

-0.33***

-0.33***

-0.32***

95
(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

Majority Party

0.087*
(0.05)

0.091*
(0.05)

0.091*
(0.05)

0.088*
(0.05)

0.088*
(0.05)

United Government

0.14**
(0.05)

0.16**
(0.06)

0.15**
(0.05)

0.15**
(0.05)

0.15**
(0.05)

Log Number
Congresswomen

1.07*
(0.61)

1.01*
(0.60)

1.04*
(0.60)

1.31*
(0.62)

1.05*
(0.60)

Log Black
Population

0.025
(0.02)

-0.0000015
(0.02)

0.019
(0.02)

0.024
(0.02)

0.023
(0.02)

Log Median
Household Income

0.47***
(0.09)

0.12
(0.18)

0.56***
(0.14)

0.47***
(0.09)

0.48***
(0.09)

Log Divorced
Women

-0.10
(0.12)

Log Wealthy
Women

0.14**
(0.06)

Log Girls Under
Five in Poverty

0.042
(0.06)

Log Lesbian
Households

0.075*
(0.04)

Log Women
Veterans

-0.043
(0.04)

Constant

-7.26**
(3.06)

-5.13*
(3.08)

-9.44**
(3.24)

-9.76***
(2.87)

-7.96**
(2.79)

Log Alpha
Constant

-0.70***
(0.05)

-0.71***
(0.05)

-0.70***
(0.05)

-0.70***
(0.05)

-0.70***
(0.05)

N
Pseudo R-squared

1400
0.01

1400
0.01

1400
0.01

1399
0.01

1400
0.01

Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table 4.3: Fully Specified Model of the Effect of Gender on Introducing Women’s Issue
Bills, 111th-113th Congresses

Congresswomen

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.14*

0.17**

0.067

96
(0.06)

(0.07)

(0.11)

0.26***
(0.08)

-0.068
(0.08)

Party Identification

-0.28***
(0.05)

Majority Party

0.092*
(0.05)

United Government

0.17**
(0.06)

Log Number
Congresswomen

1.42*
(0.63)

1.93*
(0.94)

1.29
(0.86)

Log Black
Population

0.0019
(0.02)

0.0072
(0.03)

-0.031
(0.04)

Log Median
Household Income

0.16
(0.23)

-0.0090
(0.30)

0.68*
(0.39)

Log Divorced
Women

-0.24
(0.16)

-0.39*
(0.22)

0.18
(0.26)

Log Wealthy
Women

0.13*
(0.07)

0.069
(0.09)

0.11
(0.12)

Log Girls Under
Five in Poverty

0.052
(0.06)

0.033
(0.09)

0.0012
(0.10)

Log Lesbian
Households

0.077*
(0.05)

0.12*
(0.06)

0.028
(0.07)

Log Women
Veterans

-0.0089
(0.05)

-0.072
(0.07)

0.12
(0.08)

Constant

-5.68
(4.10)

-3.62
(5.52)

-15.1*
(6.51)

Log Alpha
Constant

-0.71***
(0.05)

-0.72***
(0.07)

-0.76***
(0.08)

N
Pseudo R-squared

1399
0.02

700
0.01

699
0.01

Note: Model 1 = all members; Model 2 = just Democrats; Model 3 = just Republicans. Variance exceeds
the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05,
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 4.4: The Effect of Gender on Introducing Women’s Issue Bills Adding in Variables
Related to Women in the District and Interaction Terms, 111th-113th Congresses
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Congresswomen

1.53
(2.80)

-0.11
(0.65)

-0.93
(0.84)

-0.83
(0.64)

1.32*
(0.69)

Party Identification

-0.32***
(0.05)

-0.31***
(0.05)

-0.34***
(0.05)

-0.32***
(0.05)

-0.32***
(0.05)

Majority Party

0.087*
(0.05)

0.092*
(0.05)

0.090*
(0.05)

0.085*
(0.05)

0.092*
(0.05)

United Government

0.14**
(0.05)

0.16**
(0.06)

0.15**
(0.05)

0.15**
(0.05)

0.15**
(0.05)

Log Number
Congresswomen

1.08*
(0.61)

1.01*
(0.60)

1.03*
(0.60)

1.30*
(0.62)

1.09*
(0.60)

Log Black
Population

0.024
(0.02)

0.00061
(0.02)

0.017
(0.02)

0.022
(0.02)

0.021
(0.02)

Log Median
Household Income

0.47***
(0.09)

0.12
(0.18)

0.57***
(0.14)

0.46***
(0.09)

0.48***
(0.09)

Log Divorced
Women

-0.071
(0.14)

Congresswomen X
Divorced Women

-0.13
(0.27)

Log Wealthy
Women

0.13*
(0.06)

Congresswomen X
Wealthy Women

0.029
(0.07)

Log Girls Under
Five in Poverty

0.022
(0.07)

Congresswomen X
Girls Under 5 in Poverty

0.13
(0.10)

Log Lesbian
Households

0.047
(0.04)

Congresswomen X
Lesbian Households

0.16
(0.10)
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Log Women
Veterans

-0.0092
(0.04)

Congresswomen X
Women Veterans

-0.15*
(0.09)

Constant

-7.62**
(3.15)

-5.13*
(3.08)

-9.32**
(3.24)

-9.44***
(2.88)

-8.31**
(2.79)

Log Alpha
Constant

-0.70***
(0.05)

-0.71***
(0.05)

-0.70***
(0.05)

-0.71***
(0.05)

-0.71***
(0.05)

N
Pseudo R-squared

1400
0.01

1400
0.01

1400
0.01

1399
0.01

1400
0.01

Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Conclusion:
Are the women of Congress making a difference in the dynamics of the institution?
I began this dissertation by discussing the underrepresentation of women in government,
but Congress in particular. If it is assumed that political parity is a collective good for the
representation of all women in particular and for our society in general, without investigating the
link between descriptive and substantive representation, we make an empty promise to ourselves
regarding the importance of equality. The representation of women’s interests by women in
Congress cannot be assumed to improve as more women are elected. Rather, it should be
thoroughly investigated, and if congressmen and congresswomen are equally representing the
needs of female citizens, this should be pointed out. As other scholars have done before me, we
should be curious about the behavioral differences between men and women within the institution,
not just because it scrutinizes the implications of parity, but in particular because those differences
have implications for how the institution functions and for the representation of all citizens, but of
women in particular. The three empirical chapters have explored these implications and will be
further discussed in the current chapter.
Why can we expect women to behave differently than men, especially when it comes to
working on public policy that specifically concerns the needs of women? First, women serving in
both state legislatures and Congress feel a responsibility to specifically represent women (Carroll
2002; Reingold 1992, 2000; Rosenthal 1998; Thomas 1994, 1997). In interviews, female
legislators of both parties suggest that women are a unique subset of constituents that have unique
policy needs. Some female representatives cite the roles women have because of their gender, such
as being wives, mothers, or caregivers in general, as reasons why they need specific attention in
representation. Others cite their own societal gender roles as reasons why they are interested in
making public policy that helps other women. No matter the party ideology, race, ethnicity, tenure
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in office, or institutional position, women in the U.S. Congress spoke similarly of the responsibility
to represent American women (Carroll 2002). Overall, it is clear that because men and women
have different societally gendered expectations, women who are elected to office know that
representing the needs of their female constituents is important.
Evidence of this representation is seen in the different behaviors of male and female
legislators on activities such as the sponsorship and cosponsorship of legislation, roll call voting,
and floor speeches (e.g., Swers 2002a & 2013). When investigating similar behaviors, political
scientists have found that female representatives at the state level also prioritize women’s issues.
They pursue feminist initiatives and legislation, as well as legislation concerning issues of
traditional importance to women, such as education, health, and welfare (Berkman and O'Connor
1993; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Dolan and Ford 1995; Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1994).
Women representatives at the state level are also more likely to see their legislation that advances
women’s interests passed into law compared to men (Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1994). Other
findings at the state and national level show that female representatives are able to actively
advocate for female constituents by fighting to incorporate more women’s interests into committee
legislation (Dodson 1998, 2002; Dodson et al. 1995; Gertzog 1995; Norton 2002; Swers 2000,
2002). Also, female committee chairs in state legislatures have reported a more integrative
leadership style than their male counterparts, by sharing power with others, collaborating with
other chairs, and by sharing strategic information with committee members (Rosenthal 1997, 1998,
2000). Taken together, this brief sample of literature displays the important differences in behavior
from men and women at both the state and federal level of government. These findings indicate
that women elected to public office have a different representational style, and that when it comes
to women’s issues, women are better at representing the needs of female constituents (depending
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on the issue and time period) than their male colleagues. I have found further evidence that electing
more women to the U.S. House of Representatives has the potential to change the institution itself
due to the differences in behavior exhibited by congressmen and congresswomen. This connection
between descriptive and substantive representation implies that political parity is a worthy goal.
Electing more women to our political institutions has the potential to improve representation of
women’s interests.
Does electing women to Congress make a difference in the actions that occur on the policies
specifically related to women’s issues?
My dissertation investigates gender as a motivating factor for various participatory
behaviors of members of the U.S. House of Representatives. The first empirical chapter looks into
committee hearings considering women's issue bills, specifically the salient Family and Medical
Leave Act and the less salient Commission on the Advancement of Women and Minorities in
Science, Engineering, and Technology Development Act. These two laws, having successfully
made it through all of the stages of the policy process, show an interest of members of Congress
in representing needs that are specific (but not limited to) their female constituents. I was curious
to see whether congresswomen participated more than their male colleagues in the hearings
considering these two bills. I have found evidence that supports this research question. Women
speak out more, ask more questions of witnesses, and speak more (volume) than their male
counterparts. Often party was disregarded and being a woman held most of the explanatory power
in the statistical models. Even within party, women participated more than men. These findings
are important because investigating committee hearings and deliberations of the House is more
proximate to the policymaking process than previous research. By looking into the formulation
stage of the policy process, I am able to observe important representational behavior that affects
the functioning of our democracy. The findings of this chapter also further the connection made in
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previous research between descriptive and substantive representation. Congresswomen clearly
take a prominent role in representing women.
In the second empirical chapter, I again turn to committee hearings, this time considering
oversight of women's issues. Does the presence of women on committees lead to more oversight
of such issues? The evidence suggests that yes, the more women present on a committee, the more
oversight hearings that committee holds considering women's issues. Congresswomen are able to
spur oversight, an essential part of evaluating public policy. Again, this chapter focuses on
behavior that is proximate to the policy process. Considering the findings of these first two
empirical chapters, it is clear that electing women to Congress, specifically the House of
Representatives, changes deliberations in committee hearings and changes the attention paid to
women's issues, most noticeably by ushering women's issue legislation through the formulation
stage, as well as by checking up on the implementation of women's issue legislation during the
evaluation stage.
Finally, in the third empirical chapter, I turn to bill sponsorship, which can be considered
both agenda setting and position taking behavior. Here, I revisit past research that studies gender
as a motivating factor for introducing women's issue bills. Previous scholars have, in the past,
considered that gender plays an important role in predicting the type of legislators that will
introduce women's issue legislation, and have done the important groundwork in adding theoretical
importance to the role reelection can play in motivating behavior. Scholars have controlled for
reelection worries by including variables that describe a district, such as the number of constituents
who are non-white or the median household income. These are valid theoretical controls that allow
us to pinpoint what types of districts and therefore what types of legislators may or may not be
interested in introducing women's issue bills. Here, my theoretical contribution is to include
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measures available from the Census that detail the types of women living in the district. Perhaps
if members of Congress are influenced by both their personal interests and their reelection
interests, then we should consider the way gender can affect both of those pieces of the causal
puzzle. Therefore, I include measures in the analyses of the members' personal characteristics
(most importantly for the inquiry is gender) as well as include the previously mentioned district
characteristics, plus measures of the types of women in the district. There are mixed results, but
overall I am able to conclude that not only are congresswomen influenced by their gendered
identity of being a woman, but they are also tuned into certain populations of their female
constituents, which can help them win reelection. Most importantly, when looking within each
party, women sponsor more women’s issue legislation than their male colleagues. This means that
female Democrats introduce more bills than male Democrats and female Republicans introduce
more bills than male Republicans. Again, I find clear evidence that women represent women;
descriptive and substantive representation are linked.
In this dissertation, I have revisited and reimagined previous scholarship considering
women in Congress. In light of these findings, electing more women to Congress will clearly
influence the primary federal policymaking institution in our country. Evidence from this
dissertation shows that electing women to the House has made a difference in the type of legislation
that is introduced, in the kinds of deliberations that take place in committee hearings, and the
oversight that checks up on women's interest legislation and programs. Therefore, I believe my
dissertation has made a significant contribution to the subfields of both gender and politics and
legislative institutions. In the following section, I will revisit the main findings of each of the three
empirical chapters. I will also address the questions that have been raised throughout my
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dissertation inquiry and suggest ideas for how political science can address these questions going
forward.
Congresswomen as Unique Policymakers and Representatives
The first exploration in this dissertation for bolstering the connection between descriptive
and substantive representation comes from an inquiry into committee hearing deliberations on two
important women’s issue bills: The Family and Medical Leave Act and the Commission on the
Advancement of Women and Minorities in Science, Engineering, and Technology Development
Act. By examining committee hearing transcripts, I investigate behaviors that are more proximate
to the policymaking process than previous literature. I studied committee hearings to see whether
congresswomen present in those hearings outperformed their male colleagues---and overall, they
did. Women spoke out more, asked more questions, and spoke more in volume than their male
counterparts. These important findings held across party---female Democrats and female
Republicans were the most influential in these hearings, thus bolstering the conventional wisdom
that women will work more to influence women’s issue legislation than men when they are elected
to Congress.
Analyses considering committee proceedings of the FMLA found strong results. Across all
three models being a congresswoman was a positive and statistically significant indicator of
activity. Women spoke out more, asked more questions, and spoke more in volume than their male
colleagues. When considering party identification coupled with gender, female Democrats
continue to have a positive and statistically significant relationship with a higher frequency of
times speaking out in the hearings. These findings clearly indicate that women are the most active
in committee hearings considering the FMLA.
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To further this exploration, I included predicted probability analyses and corresponding
bar graphs in order to visualize the differences between men and women within and between
parties. In comparison to their male counterparts within their own party, Democratic women and
Republican women are clearly predicted to speak out more, ask more questions, and speak more
words. Even in comparison to chairs, women are impressive participants. Both Democratic and
Republican women are predicted to speak out more than the chairs. Plus, chairs are only predicted
to ask about one more question than Democratic women and about two more questions than
Republican women. This is impressive when considering that both Democratic and Republican
men are predicted to ask less than one question. Again, congresswomen are clearly predicted to
participate in hearings considering a women’s issue than are congressmen.
Turning to the SET commission hearings, I find similar results to the FMLA. Being a
congresswoman has a positive and statistically significant relationship with speaking out more and
with the volume of words spoken during these hearings. The relationship does not hold for the
number of questions, though the coefficient remains positive, which is the expected direction.
These findings provide further corroboration for the connection between descriptive and
substantive representation. It is evident that when considering women’s issues, whether they are
salient to voters like the FMLA, or less salient, like the SET commission, congresswomen seek to
represent the needs of their female constituents. It isn’t a case where women participate more when
their constituents are particularly aware of their participation. Rather, women are consistent in
their participation, plus their consideration of party seems somewhat secondary. I think this is
particularly compelling because I found evidence of female Republicans driving much of the
results on the SET commission. In the models where I included dichotomous variables, Republican
women speak out more and in volume than the reference category (male Democrats) at a
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statistically significant level. Furthermore, it’s not just a story of female Republicans because
female Democrats also speak out more than the reference category at a statistically significant
level, so women of both parties are participating more than male Democrats. These results, when
taken together with the results on the FMLA clearly bolster a link between descriptive and
substantive representation.
I again ran predicted probability analyses with bar graphs for visualization based off of the
SET commission findings. Again, women in both parties are predicted to speak out more than their
male party counterparts in each of the graphs for the three dependent variables. In other words, for
all three behaviors, female Democrats outperform male Democrats and female Republicans
outperform male Republicans. Only in the model for predicted number of questions asked do
Democratic men outperform Republican women. Overall, this chapter provides ample evidence of
a connection between descriptive and substantive representation. By electing more women to
Congress, more women will become integral committee members who participate more than their
male colleagues when considering women’s issues. We are faced with evidence that including
women in committee deliberations makes a clear impact on the proceedings which are most
important in the formulation phase of the policy process.
Before moving on to reviewing the results of chapter 3, it is worth briefly reviewing the
robustness check I included considering the propensity of congresswomen to participate more in
general than their male colleagues. The investigation proved than in fact, women are more
entrepreneurial than their male counterparts on all kinds of legislation, not just women’s issues.
This means that the criticism regarding women simply being more active still stands. However, I
believe this provides us with further evidence that electing more women to Congress will give us
a different kind of institution. Yes, women participate more than men in hearings considering
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women’s issues, but we expect this to happen if women are going to represent the needs of female
constituents better than their male counterparts can. Additionally, if women are more
entrepreneurial than men on all issues, the action of electing more women to Congress has the
potential to create a more productive environment, producing more active members and thus more
legislation. I think that it is very important not to essentialize findings such as these, so that we are
simply saying women are different than men. Rather, if female members are acting differently than
men, it is important to point this out in relation to the descriptive-substantive connection and the
calls for political parity. The findings in this chapter clearly show that women in both parties care
enough about both salient and less salient women’s issues to participate more than their male
colleagues. This bolsters the connection between descriptive and substantive representation
because women care enough about their female constituents to use their resources to participate in
committee hearings. Furthermore, because women are more entrepreneurial than men, and because
they are actively representing the needs of women, electing more women to office has the potential
to improve the deliberations within Congress, thus confirming the calls for political parity.
Findings in chapter 3 provide more evidence from the committee structure for the
connection between substantive and descriptive representation, this time in the evaluation stage of
the policy process. Again, I find evidence that congresswomen as members of committees have a
definitive influence on the actions taken by those committees. Here, the more female members
serving on a committee, the more oversight hearings considering women’s issues occurred over
the time period examined. Women do not consistently have access to the highest positions of party
leadership. Only recently has Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) been able to alternate between roles as Speaker
of the House and Minority Leader, and due to underrepresentation, women still chair many less
standing committees compared with men. It is understandable that I find evidence that women
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participate more in hearings related to women’s issues, that women are more entrepreneurial in
general than their male counterparts, and that the more women members a committee has, the more
oversight hearings that committee holds considering legislation and programs related to women’s
issues. Clearly, women must exercise their influence in other ways besides party and institutional
leadership. As the number of oversight hearings increased overtime, and even outpaced the number
of legislative hearings, the number of women in the House also grew. Women recognized the
importance of oversight in policymaking and took advantage in order to represent the needs of
their female constituents. Therefore, I believe that coupled with the evidence from chapter 2,
chapter 3 provides further evidence that women having a seat at the table makes a clear difference
within the House. This difference only helps the representation of women.
Turning to the results of chapter 4, I returned to a focus on the individual legislator as in
chapter 2, but moved away from the committee structure. When considering the motivations in
individual member behavior, it is important to consider both the extent to which gender motivates
behavior on its own, as a fundamental identity (i.e., Swers 2013), and in conjunction with
reelection and district motivations. Congresswomen, as all members, are concerned with
reelection, making good public policy, and institutional influence. I think that women care about
women’s issues because they consistently tell us that they do in interviews. Also, we see evidence
from both the federal and state level that shows us that women work more on these types of issues
than men. Taking these previous findings into account, I wanted to investigate how certain types
of women within the district could possibly contribute to a member’s propensity to introduce
women’s issue legislation. When I considered the findings of Palmer and Simon (2006) that
members from certain types of congressional districts would have a propensity to introduce more
women’s issue legislation that others, I also expected women and/or Democrats to sponsor more
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women’s issue bills. However, based on my assumptions and findings from previous chapters, I
felt like congresswomen may be more in tune to their female constituents, especially if they report
thinking about these women when they go to work in Congress.
My reasoning is that perhaps congresswomen who are elected from certain districts with
particular female reelection constituencies are more apt to introduce bills related to women's issues
than are congresswomen and congressmen from other districts. However, I expect that voters’
perceptions of congresswomen allow congresswomen to work on public policies related directly
to women’s needs and repay them with supportive votes, more so than congressmen. For example,
female Republicans would have a much easier time than male Republicans explaining their
involvement in working on women’s issue legislation, especially if it wasn’t explicitly feminist or
liberal leaning. After all, women all share common gender roles and societal expectations. Female
Republicans could draw on their role as wives, mothers, caregivers, or simply as women to explain
involvement in these types of policies benefitting women. Furthermore, I think congresswomen
are strategic: they pay attention to the needs of certain female constituencies in their district not
only because women’s issues interest them, but also because they rely on the voters who are
affected by such policy to repay them at the ballot box, and they can do a better job of this than
their male counterparts.
The findings from this chapter are mixed. In the preliminary analysis, I find strong
statistically significant positive relationships between being a congresswoman and introducing
more women’s issue bills. These results occur even though there is also a strong relationship
between being a Democrat and bill sponsorship. The important takeaway from this analysis is that
the results hold across both parties; both Democratic women and Republican women introduce
more women’s issue bills than their male counterparts. These results hold after I add in the
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variables regarding groups of women within congressional districts. Recall these variables are the
number of divorced women, wealthy women, girls living below the poverty line, lesbian
households, and female veterans living within the district. In each model where I add in one of
these variables, being a congresswoman still maintains a positive and statistically significant
relationship with sponsoring women’s issue bills. These first two analyses provide clear evidence
that women in both parties are acting in accordance with their policy goals and reelection goals.
Not only are women introducing more bills related to women’s issues, but there is evidence that
certain populations of women (wealthy women and lesbian households) spur members to introduce
women’s issue legislation.
Evidence of the connection between descriptive and substantive representation holds when
all five of the female constituency variables are added to the model. The positive and statistically
significant relationship between being a congresswoman and introducing women’s issue
legislation holds. These results are driven by Democratic women, however, when separating out
the models for Democrats alone and Republicans alone. Again, these results bolster the assertions
made by congresswomen that they seek to represent the needs of women citizens. However, now
it is just Democratic women driving the results. This indicates to me that I cannot definitely say
that the causal story includes all women. Rather, when the normal district characteristics of median
household income and Black population are included, both Democratic and Republican women
have equally strong relationships with introducing women’s issue legislation compared with men.
When I add in the theoretically driven female reelection constituency variables, I initially find
support for my predictions: that congresswomen take care to pay attention to these unique subsets
of women in order to represent their interests as well as reap the electoral rewards. However, when
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I add in all of the female reelection variables in one model, female Democrats are the ones
capitalizing on this relationship with their female constituents, not female Republicans.
Finally, when I investigate the conditional relationship between being a female member
and having different female reelection constituencies, only one model (female veterans) produces
a result where being a congresswoman maintains a positive and statistically significant relationship
with bill sponsorship. Again, the results from the conditional models do not detract from the overall
findings. The conditional models are not as explanatory of the relationship between gender and
sponsorship as the additive models. Congresswomen clearly introduce more women’s issue
legislation than their male colleagues in the 111th, 112th, and 113th sessions of Congress. These
differences sometimes hold when we compare men and women within the same party, as well.
Throughout all of the analyses presented in this chapter, median household income of the district
and partisanship of the member had a positive and very often statistically significant relationship
with women’s issue bill introductions. To me, this warrants further inquiry. As for partisanship,
being a Democrat consistently predicts bill introductions. This is expected because Democrats own
these types of issues compared with Republicans (Petrocik 1996). Although I find this connection,
there is still much evidence in this chapter to show that congresswomen of both parties seek to
represent the needs of women by introducing women’s issue bills. The change in Republican
women’s behavior as different control variables are added requires further exploration. Overall, I
believe this chapter provide a good preliminary investigation into the role that unique female
constituencies play in affecting the behavior of congresswomen. In the next section, I will delve
further into a discussion of the limitations of the analyses presented in this dissertation, as well as
highlighting the potential extensions of this research.
Limitations & Potential Extensions of the Research
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There are both chapter-specific limitations, as well as general limitations that I would like
to discuss before concluding with a discussion of future research. In chapter 2, I performed a
robustness check on my results. The thinking behind this was that because I observe
congresswomen participating more so that congressmen, perhaps women simply have the
propensity to participate more than men, in general. I chose to investigate this possibility by
analyzing the difference between men’s and women’s entrepreneurship. My results indicated that
women do indeed exhibit more behaviors related to entrepreneurship, and thus show higher scores
in entrepreneurship than their male colleagues, and at a statistically significant level. However,
these results do not put to bed the concerns that women are simply more active than men, in
general. In a future project, I would like to address this limitation of the results presented here in
the dissertation by either adding another case or adding multiple cases. I can envision this in two
ways.
The first way to add another robustness check is to analyze the committee hearing
transcripts of a bill from the same time period (1985-1998) that is considered a non-women’s issue
bill. This is, as discussed below, a tricky job. Topics that are broadly not related to women’s issues
include macroeconomics, agriculture, the environment, energy, transportation, banking and
finance, and defense. I used the women’s issue coding I did of the Policy Agendas Project topic
and subtopic codes, which was based on the women’s groups identified by Swers (2002a), to
identify those issue areas that were not coded as women’s issues. However, I can think of issues
within those broad issue areas that would directly affect women. Even though there is this
limitation, which not only plagues my work but the work by others who identify and use women’s
issues in their scholarship, it is possible to identify a bill that does not directly affect women in a
disproportionate way compared to men. Also, it is possible to find a bill that does not have specific
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implications for the advancements of women’s rights or equality. In this way, I can identify a bill
and use it as a control for the two women’s issue bills already investigated. I expect that when I
compare the testimony of congresswomen and congressmen, the differences in participation will
not hold for the non-women’s issue bill.
A second option would be to expand the number of cases used in the analysis. I have
analyzed women’s issue hearings in this dissertation and I think these data would provide an
expansion of the test I conducted in chapter 2. I can identify both women’s issue and non-women’s
issue hearings over time. Then, I can draw a random sample of those hearings, both a random
sample of women’s issues and a random sample of non-women’s issues, and analyze the
differences in those hearing deliberations. I could locate the hearing transcripts for those two
random samples of hearings and analyze the differences in members’ participation. I think that for
both of the options I have just described, I expect that in a situation where congresswomen would
not be queued to specifically represent the interests of their female constituents, considerations of
partisanship will win out. However, when an issue directly affects female constituents personally
or considers policy that will directly impact the concerns of women, congresswomen will
participate more than their male colleagues.
Returning to the limitations and criticism I, along with other gender and politics scholars,
face regarding the identification and coding of women’s issues, I realize that this coding is
complex. What issues aren’t women’s issues? I believe that I did as thorough a job as possible in
chapters 3 and 4 when I coded for women’s issues based on the previous coding schema of Swers
(2002a). She identified feminist, anti-feminist, and non-partisan groups to code women’s issue
policy areas based on the concerns of these groups. Recall in chapter 3, in order to code the
hearings as women’s issues, I coded the hearings' descriptions for whether or not they covered
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women’s issues. I did this with key word coding using STATA syntax to locate hearings with the
key words in the description variable provided in the dataset. In order to capture as much
legislation as possible, I included every term I could think of that is explicitly, yet uniquely related
to women and girls (such as, women, girls, mammography, pregnancy, abortion, etc.). I based the
rest of my coding terms on the policy areas identified by the women’s groups Swers previously
identified. Moving forward with this inquiry, I think that revisiting and possible replacing or
adding new groups is warranted. In chapter 4, I coded the topics and subtopics in the Policy
Agendas Project as either women’s issues or not so that I could similarly identify bills in the
Congressional Bills Project dataset, as both datasets use the same topic and subtopic codes.
For both chapters 3 and 4, the coding of women’s issues could be improved by adding more
specific codes for feminist, anti-feminist, and more general social welfare policies (i.e., Swers
2002a). I can code the hearings for these more specific identifying characteristics by adapting my
key word searches and I can code the bills by recoding the subtopic codes. This way, in both
analyses, I can disentangle the overlap of partisan and gendered concerns women may have.
Clearly pro-life Republican women are not going to act in a way that advances the pro-choice
and/or Democratic platform. Party polarization plays such a key role in member behavior in the
most recent sessions of Congress, so this coding of the dependent variable is probably most needed
for chapter 4 (considering bill sponsorship). Because sponsorship is a clear way to take a position,
it is important to consider the nuance of being a Democratic congresswoman and being a
Republican congresswoman, especially as behavior shifts as majority and minority party status
changes (i.e., Swers 2002a & 2013), and because party polarization has the potential to color a
women’s issue.
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Finally, for chapter 4 a concern has been raised to me about the findings reflecting the
vulnerability of a member, rather than a member’s gender. Perhaps members that pay special
attention to the female reelection constituency are not just female members, but rather members
who come from electorally vulnerable districts (i.e., Hickey 2014). Scores for the vulnerability of
members can easily be added into the analysis and used as a robustness check. The thinking is that
a vulnerable member that truly has to fight every two years for reelection because their district is
closely split between Democrats and Republicans may turn to the “woman vote” in order to win.
I think this is definitely worth addressing. Also, the finding regarding the number of wealthy
women in the district predicting women’s issue bill sponsorship is particularly concerning. It is
concerning because this positive relationship indicates class bias in representation. Well off
women in the district may benefit from having a woman represent them in Congress, but poor
women may not see the same representational benefits. This is concerning and should be addressed
moving forward.
In general, I have two more concerns for all three of the empirical chapters. My first
concern is intersectionality. I cannot compare the behaviors of Black, Latina, Asian, or mixed race
congresswomen to their white counterparts simply based on the number of women of color present
in Congress. I think that this is troubling in and of itself because it reflects the marginalization of
women of color in politics. There simply are not enough women of color to compare them in a
meaningful way to their white female colleagues. As more women of color are elected to Congress,
it will be easier to have more cases in our analyses so that we may begin to make generalizations
about the difference in behavior of white congresswomen and congresswomen of color. I also think
that we as scholars need to make more of an effort to increase the number of cases in our analyses
so that we can reach back in time to longitudinally address these intersectionality effects. For
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example, in the above discussion concerning the limitations and expansion of chapter 2, I proposed
using a sample of hearing transcripts to increase the N and to meaningfully compare women’s
issue hearings and non-women’s issue hearings. By doing so, it is possible that I may add
observations of congresswomen of color in order to assess the potential effects of intersectionality.
Moving forward, I believe all gender and politics scholars should consider the importance of
intersectionality because the experience of white women are not the experiences of Black women,
nor are those the experiences of Latinas, and so on.
My second and final concern is the time dimension. I do not directly test the implications
of increased party polarization over time. In chapter 2, the time period examined is 1985-1998,
before extreme party polarization. Chapter 4 takes place in 2005-2014, when extreme polarization
was apparent. Going forward, this is a major concern because the findings of chapter 2 are not
generalizable to our current time period. This can easily be updated with the options for
improvement I have discussed above. For chapter 4, I think that the more specific women’s issue
coding scheme can disentangle partisanship and gender in order to pinpoint the specific differences
between the type of women’s issue legislation female Democrats would sponsor and the type of
women’s issue legislation female Republicans would sponsor. Perhaps polarization plays such a
huge role that women behave no differently than their male counterparts and women’s issue
sponsorship belongs solely to Democrats. Again, these possibilities definitely warrant
investigation.
Future Research & Conclusions
Many ideas for avenues of future research presented themselves to me while working on
this dissertation. Substantive and descriptive representation are linked in my mind because in all
of the venues I tested, women behave differently than men in order to represent the unique needs
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of women. However, gender alone cannot be considered the definitive motivating factor in
spurring behavior of members of Congress. As evidenced by the empirical and statistical work in
chapters 2, 3, and 4 the intersectionality of many factors helps describe the behavior of individual
members of the House, namely: partisanship, majority/minority position, time and context,
committee membership, and finally district factors including median household income, the
number of wealthy women residing in a district, and the number of lesbian households in a district.
All of these factors should spur political scientists to explore the reasons why these factors play a
consistent role in affecting a member’s behavior, in conjunction with our solid knowledge of
reelection concerns, concerns for making good public policy, and concerns for institutional
positions of power.
One of the reasons I found listed in the previous literature for why we might expect
congresswomen to act differently than congressmen revolves around the idea of consensus
building traits (i.e., Volden & Wiseman 2009, 2014; Volden, Wiseman, & Wittmer 2013). These
traits are listed as a reason for why women are more effective, and effectiveness is part of the
reason why I think women are more entrepreneurial. However, I think I believe this because I hear
women in Congress, especially female Senators, talking about this publicly quite frequently. For
example, in 2013 media coverage gave much credit to female Senators for leading a bipartisan
charge to compromise and end a government shutdown47. Even in post-2016 election coverage,
news outlets were discussing the role of women in government. An article in the New York Times
quotes Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), “Women tend to be less partisan, more collaborative,
listen better, find common ground. Every time I’ve had a bill that’s important to me, I’ve had
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For example: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/15/us/senate-women-lead-in-effort-to-find-accord.html
and http://swampland.time.com/2013/10/16/women-are-the-only-adults-left-in-washington/
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strong Republican women helping me pass it.”48 Media coverage also tends to highlight examples
of comradery among congressional women. Do we have any empirical evidence that any of this
actually produces more consensus building and problem solving among congresswomen compared
to congressmen?
Lawless and Theriault (2016) find evidence that congresswomen value collegiality more
than congressmen. For example, women are more likely to participate in the Secret Santa gift
exchange and Seersucker Thursday than their male colleagues. However, when it comes to other
more substantive examples of consensus building and problem solving, the results show no
difference between men and women. The authors argue, “Members who are ‘problem solvers’
should be more inclined than those who are not to vote with colleagues across the aisle on
procedural votes, since doing so moves the legislative process along and generates a more efficient,
collaborative route to a final passage vote (regardless of the fact that those final passage votes are
likely to be highly partisan)” (2016, 9). Little evidence is found between men and women when
considering the procedural votes they cast. The authors also investigate amendment offering in the
Senate, making an argument that if a senator displays a consistent pattern in offering amendments,
they are a “problem creator” because they seek to stall the legislative process. If women are truly
more collegial than men, we should see less “problem creators” among women than we do among
men. There is no evidence of this theory either. Men and women act largely the same. So, while
women participate more than men in fun, collegial activities, when it comes to institutional
examples of consensus building and problem solving, women are no different than men. Kanthak
& Krause (2012) also investigate coordination, and show us that simply increasing the number of
women elected to legislatures does not does not directly lead to coordination, thus the diversity

48

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/upshot/women-actually-do-govern-differently.html?_r=0
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paradox. As more women are elected, we may actually observe less coordination among women.
Taking together the findings discussed above, there are troubling implications for the link between
descriptive and substantive representation as more women are elected to Congress.
These scholarly efforts begin to answer questions raised about collegiality and consensus
building, but I think we can do more to investigate the claims made by female senators like Kirsten
Gillibrand. First, we should look to committee hearings. As I discussed in chapter 4 and found
evidence for in chapter 3, there are examples where women in committee are able to spur
consideration of certain types of issues, often women’s issues that would not be considered if only
men were present. Is there a way to further analyze committee hearings in order to assess women’s
consensus building traits? It would likely need to include text-based analysis of hearing transcripts,
but I think it is worth the effort to examine if women really do exhibit more consensus building
traits than men, especially if we are going to predicate other theories (effectiveness,
entrepreneurship, etc.) on this idea. Another avenue is to ask female legislators about consensus
building to see if they truly have multiple examples of different ways they are able to build
consensus among themselves in comparison to men. The other troubling factor in this line of
scholarly inquiry is the idea of consensus building traits. What are those traits? Why do we expect
women to have them in comparison to men? Can we measure those traits? Can we expect certain
kinds of members to have them, besides women?
Secondly, is talking about consensus building just a different way to claim-credit and
advertise? It is easy enough to get the annual congressional women’s softball game covered by the
media, but lately women seem to highlight their collegiality and their work ethic whenever they
get the chance. As I mentioned above, women highlighted their role in a successful bipartisan
effort to end the government shutdown in 2013. Female Senators claimed credit for showing up
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when the men didn’t in the blizzard of January 2016.49 Plus, it is easy to advertise themselves by
taking pictures together often and capitalizing on their minority status, or tokenism. Women in the
Senate are especially covered with their semi-regular dinner meetings. Further inquiry into why
women would be interested in highlighting their collegiality, even if there is no empirical evidence
to back up its transference into legislative activities, is warranted in light of public opinion data.
The Pew Research Center finds that women respondents more than men believe that women in
elected office are better than men at working out compromises, being honest and ethical, working
to improve quality of life for Americans, standing up for beliefs despite political pressure, and
being persuasive50. Even if we don’t find empirical evidence to back up these activities and
attributes, congresswomen may simply highlight such characteristics in order to reap electoral
rewards from female constituents. They can play on those female voters’ perceptions of women in
government in order to seek reelection.
In a similar vein, we hear the "working twice as hard to be considered just as good" refrain
from activists seeking gender and racial equality. If we care about investigating the potential
affects gender parity will have on Congress as an institution, do we have evidence in the
entrepreneurship and effectiveness work that shows women are working harder? I think my results
indicate yes, but is this “twice as hard” reason why they are doing it? Similarly, and relating back
to the previous paragraph’s discussion, perhaps women are more collegial, or at least claim to be
more collegial than men due to underrepresentation. Of course, there is no way to test if this
behavior is due to women’s small numbers because we don’t have a situation of true parity in
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The Google search results make it clear, this was extensively covered by media:
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Congress with which to compare. If women exhibit just as much party polarization as men do as
evidenced by more recent scholarship on the more recent congressional sessions, then I tentatively
expect women to decrease in entrepreneurship as more women are elected to office. If we reach
parity, women will have significantly changed the institution and the way it functions. Will there
be a need for them to be any more collegial, cooperative, effective, or entrepreneurial than their
male colleagues anymore? Perhaps these behaviors will only stay if there truly is a gendered
difference in a member’s approach to representation and policymaking. Otherwise, women may
hold onto this rhetoric in order to capitalize on women voters’ perceptions.
My last suggestion for political science research is to consider the causal mechanism that
underpins my entire dissertation and the entire gender and politics subfield: why do we expect
women and men to behave differently? As I discussed above, we have many reasons to believe
that men and women behave differently based on previous findings. Some of these findings are
related to women’s behavior as candidates, as members of state legislatures, or as members of
Congress. We also look to public opinion and political behavior literature to draw on general trends
in women’s thinking or political participation at the mass level, rather than the elite level. However,
I’m not sure we are doing a good enough job at pinpointing the specific sociological and/or
psychological reasons why women behave differently than men. We certainly attempt to test for
these gendered differences, and we observe them. Many of us say that gender is an essential
characteristic and that is why it is important to investigate the role it may have in decision making,
representation, participation, campaigning, etc. The problem is that ideology or religiosity or
morality are also essential characteristics that help people identify themselves. These
characteristics define how people view themselves in the world. Even where a person lives or
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comes from and what kind of job they have helps construct a person’s self-perception. Why is
gender any different?
This is why concerns have been raised in social sciences of investigating the
intersectionality of these identifying characteristics. The group of “women” is so broad and
includes so many different types of women it seems short-sighted to make generalizations about
women versus men. But we do observe clear trends in our society, and specifically for the purpose
of this dissertation within Congress, even within parties, of women participating more than men
when it comes to working on women’s issues. Gender is something that colors all aspects of our
lives as humans. “Most people…voluntarily go along with their society’s prescriptions for those
of their gender status, because the norms and expectations get built into their sense of worth and
identity as [the way we] think, the way we see and hear and speak, the way we fantasy, and the
way we feel” (Lorber 1994). Yes, not all women are the same in America, and not all women in
Congress are the same. However, women are connected by gender as a process, as stratification,
and as structure (Lorber 1994). So, when political scientists argue that they expect to observe
differences in men and women due to fundamental gender characteristics, they are expecting
political participation and behavior to be colored by gender because all behavior---and arguably
all things in society---are colored by gender. Everyone “does gender” all day every day, so it is
important to study the differences between the men and women who serve us in government. As
political and social scientists, I think we need to figure out why gender is such a crucial determining
factor in behavior of individuals because our government is clearly effected by it.
In sum, my dissertation has considered one main question: does electing women to
Congress make a difference in the actions that occur on the policies specifically related to women’s
issues? Overall, I think the results displayed here answer this question with “yes.” In committee
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hearings considering the FMLA and the SET commission, women in both parties out performed
their male colleagues in the number of times speaking out, the volume of words spoken, and the
number of questions asked. When investigating the affect women have on the oversight of
women’s interest legislation and programs, I find that the more women present on a committee,
the more oversight hearings that committee will hold. Finally, congresswomen in both the
Democratic and Republican parties introduce more women’s interest legislation than their male
counterparts. However, only two out of five measures of female constituencies affect member’s
propensity to introduce women’s issue bills, and these measures do not condition behavior for
congresswomen. Not all of my hypotheses were confirmed, but overall I think my dissertation
research shows that electing women to Congress makes a clear difference in the functioning of the
institution. This allows us to make an argument for the connection between descriptive and
substantive representation because the differences in men and women were observed using cases
where members were working on women’s issues. This highlights congresswomen’s ability to
represent the unique needs of women better than their male colleagues. Therefore, these results
also legitimize arguments for political parity.
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Appendix
CHAPTER 2
Data sources:
• FMLA and SET commission analyses
o Committee Hearing Transcripts for FMLA and SET commission.
Available online from HathiTrust Digital Library. Call numbers found
with ProQuest Congressional.
o Congressional district characteristics. Datasets available online from E.
Scott Adler, University of Colorado, Boulder
o Member party identification & ideology. Available online from Lewis,
Poole, and Rosenthal’s voteview.com
o Member personal characteristics. Available online from the US House of
Representatives Archives
• LE analysis
o Entrepreneurship data is made publicly available from Gregory Wawro’s
website: http://www.columbia.edu/~gjw10/research.html. Accessed May
18, 2015
o Committee membership data from Stewart & Woon (2005):
http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html
o Chamber and party median of Nominate scores:
http://voteview.com/pmediant.htm
o African American: http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crspublish.cfm?pid=%270E%2C*PLW%3C%20P%20%20%0A
o Latino: http://history.house.gov/People/Search?filter=11
o Speaker of the House: http://history.house.gov/People/Office/Speakers/
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Table A2.1: Data Sources, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics
FMLA
Independent Variables

Description

Mean

Std. Dev.

Congresswomen

Equals “1” for woman, “0” for man

.10

.30

Party Identification

Equals “1” for Democrats, “0” for Republicans

.61

.49

African American

Equals “1” for African American, “0” for all others

.12

.33

South

Equals “1” if a member represents a district located
in the South, “0” for all others

.15

.35

Chair

Equals “1” if a member chairs the committee,
“0” for all others

.03

.18

Number of Terms

Number of terms an individual member has served

5

3.75

Hearing ID

Each hearing numbered 0 – 8, used to construct dummy
variables of hearings 1- 8, with a hearing left out as
reference category

4.14

2.62

Log Urban Population

Log of total number of people living in urban areas within
a member’s district

12.80

.40

Log Median Family Income

Log of median family income within a member’s district

9.95

.31

Log Black Population

Log of total number of African Americans within a
member’s district

10

1.69

SET commission
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Independent Variables

Description

Mean

Std. Dev.

Congresswomen

Equals “1” for woman, “0” for man

.16

.36

Party Identification

Equals “1” for Democrats, “0” for Republicans

.44

.50

African American

Equals “1” for African American, “0” for all others

.06

.24

South

Equals “1” if a member represents a district located
in the South, “0” for all others

.27

.44

Chair

Equals “1” if a member chairs the committee,
“0” for all others

.02

.15

Number of Terms

Number of terms an individual member has served

4

3.22

Hearing ID

Each hearing numbered 0 – 8, used to construct dummy
variables of hearings 1- 8, with a hearing left out as
reference category

1.03

.77

Log Urban Population

Log of total number of people living in urban areas within
a member’s district

12.73

.64

Log Median Family Income

Log of median family income within a member’s district

10.34

.39

Log Black Population

Log of total number of African Americans within a
member’s district

10.18

1.38

Independent Variables

Description

Mean

Std. Dev.

Congresswomen

Equals “1” for woman, “0” for man

.06

.23

Legislative Entrepreneurship
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Majority Party

Equals “1” for Democrats, “0” for Republicans

.61

.49

1st Dimension
DW-NOMINATE

Ideology Score, Pool & Rosenthal (2007)

-.06

.35

2nd Dimension
DW-NOMINATE

Ideology Score, Pool & Rosenthal (2007)

-.00

.46

Distance from
Chamber Median

Constructed from Chamber Median,
Pool & Rosenthal (2007)

.30

.19

Distance from
Majority Party Median

Constructed from Majority Party Median,
Pool & Rosenthal (2007)

.33

.27

African American

Equals “1” for African American, “0” for all others

.05

.22

Latino

Equals “1” for Latino/a, “0” for all others

.02

.15

Speaker

Equals “1” for Speaker of the House, “0” for all others

.00

.05

Chair

Equals “1” if a member is a chair of a committee,
“0” for all others

.05

.22

Ranking Member

Equals “1” if a member is a ranking member of a committee,
“0” for all others

.05

.22

Seniority

Number of Terms Served by a member

4.23

4.03

Prestigious Committee

Equals “1” if Appropriations, Budget, Rules, Ways & Means,
“0” for all others; Stewart & Woon (2005)

.26

.44
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Table A2.2: Full Model FMLA with Gender Interactions: Interaction Term
Number Times
Testifying

Number of
Words

Number of
Questions

Congresswoman

2.14*
(1.05)

2.24
(1.61)

1.36
(1.17)

Party Identification

0.36
(0.56)

0.21
(0.80)

0.25
(0.59)

Congresswoman X
Party Identification

-0.31
(1.42)

-0.68
(2.13)

-2.62
(1.65)

African American

2.21**
(0.94)

1.55
(1.35)

2.68*
(1.16)

South

1.31*
(0.69)

1.03
(1.07)

0.60
(0.74)

Chair

1.53
(1.23)

1.57
(1.86)

2.23*
(1.34)

Number of Terms

-0.028
(0.07)

-0.014
(0.11)

-0.13
(0.09)

Hearing 1

-0.51
(0.74)

-1.02
(1.11)

-0.55
(0.86)

Hearing 2

1.08
(0.66)

0.50
(0.99)

0.59
(0.76)

Hearing 3

0.52
(0.67)

0.025
(1.00)

0.49
(0.77)

Hearing 4

1.20*
(0.67)

0.99
(1.04)

1.01
(0.77)

Hearing 5

-0.081
(0.85)

0.081
(1.27)

-0.32
(0.97)

Hearing 6

0
(.)

0
(.)

0
(.)

Hearing 7

0
(.)

0
(.)

0
(.)

Hearing 8

0
(.)

0
(.)

0
(.)

Log Urban

0.38

0.79

0.26
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Population

(0.85)

(1.27)

(0.87)

Log Median
Family Income

2.64*
(1.34)

2.53
(2.01)

3.33*
(1.65)

Log Black
Population

-0.082
(0.20)

-0.021
(0.30)

-0.11
(0.21)

Constant

-30.4**
(12.12)

-30.9*
(17.89)

-35.2**
(14.64)

1.88***
(0.15)

2.73***
(0.13)

2.04***
(0.19)

207
0.04

207
0.01

207
0.04

Log Alpha
Constant
N
Pseudo R-squared

Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard
errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table A2.3: Full Model FMLA with Gender Interactions: Dummy Interactions
Number Times
Testifying

Number of
Words

Number of
Questions

Female Democrat

1.83*
(0.99)

1.55
(1.42)

-1.26
(1.20)

Female Republican

1.78
(1.09)

2.03
(1.62)

1.11
(1.23)

Male Republican

-0.36
(0.56)

-0.21
(0.80)

-0.25
(0.59)

African American

2.21**
(0.94)

1.55
(1.35)

2.68*
(1.16)

South

1.31*
(0.69)

1.03
(1.07)

0.60
(0.74)

Chair

1.53
(1.23)

1.57
(1.86)

2.23*
(1.34)

Number of Terms

-0.028
(0.07)

-0.014
(0.11)

-0.13
(0.09)

Hearing 1

-0.51
(0.74)

-1.02
(1.11)

-0.55
(0.86)
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Hearing 2

1.08
(0.66)

0.50
(0.99)

0.59
(0.76)

Hearing 3

0.52
(0.67)

0.025
(1.00)

0.49
(0.77)

Hearing 4

1.20*
(0.67)

0.99
(1.04)

1.01
(0.77)

Hearing 5

-0.081
(0.85)

0.081
(1.27)

-0.32
(0.97)

Hearing 6

0
(.)

0
(.)

0
(.)

Hearing 7

0
(.)

0
(.)

0
(.)

Hearing 8

0
(.)

0
(.)

0
(.)

Log Urban
Population

0.38
(0.85)

0.79
(1.27)

0.26
(0.87)

Log Median
Family Income

2.64*
(1.34)

2.53
(2.01)

3.33*
(1.65)

Log Black
Population

-0.082
(0.20)

-0.021
(0.30)

-0.11
(0.21)

Constant

-30.1**
(11.97)

-30.7*
(17.71)

-35.0**
(14.51)

1.88***
(0.15)

2.73***
(0.13)

2.04***
(0.19)

207
0.04

207
0.01

207
0.04

Log Alpha
Constant
N
Pseudo R-squared

Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate.
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table A2.4: Full Model SET Commission with Gender Interactions: Interaction
Term

Congresswoman

Number Times
Testifying

Number of
Words

Number of
Questions

4.52**

7.62*

3.09
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(1.92)

(3.57)

(3.14)

Party Identification

0.60
(0.87)

1.10
(1.61)

2.13
(1.76)

Congresswoman X
Party Identification

-1.63
(2.05)

-2.89
(3.93)

1.04
(4.13)

African American

-19.1
(25.41)

-24.9
(33.19)

-23.6
(24.68)

South

-0.88
(1.24)

-4.20
(2.75)

-0.23
(2.15)

Chair

0.94
(3.20)

3.39
(7.35)

-21.3
(82.75)

Number of Terms

-0.089
(0.18)

-0.38
(0.46)

-0.016
(0.30)

Hearing 1

1.22
(1.88)

3.67
(3.63)

-4.44
(4.42)

Hearing 2

1.29
(2.04)

4.51
(3.90)

-0.0056
(4.19)

Log Urban
Population

-1.33
(1.03)

-3.23
(2.14)

-2.48
(1.87)

Log Median
Family Income

-2.37
(2.60)

-5.90
(4.66)

0.99
(5.43)

Log Black
Population

0.12
(0.39)

0.51
(0.73)

0.40
(0.73)

Constant

38.7
(25.14)

98.7*
(51.36)

14.5
(47.05)

2.33***
(0.27)

3.46***
(0.23)

2.92***
(0.46)

134
0.07

134
0.02

134
0.11

Log Alpha
Constant
N
Pseudo R-squared

Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard
errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table A2.5: Full Model SET Commission with Gender Interactions: Dummy
Interactions
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Number Times
Testifying

Number of
Words

Number of
Questions

Female Democrat

2.89*
(1.57)

4.72
(3.55)

4.12
(3.27)

Female Republican

3.92*
(2.06)

6.51*
(3.75)

0.96
(3.47)

Male Republican

-0.60
(0.87)

-1.10
(1.61)

-2.13
(1.76)

African American

-19.2
(26.42)

-24.7
(31.53)

-25.0
(49.88)

South

-0.88
(1.24)

-4.20
(2.75)

-0.23
(2.15)

Chair

0.94
(3.20)

3.39
(7.35)

-22.5
(15.52)

Number of Terms

-0.089
(0.18)

-0.38
(0.46)

-0.016
(0.30)

Hearing 1

1.22
(1.88)

3.67
(3.63)

-4.44
(4.42)

Hearing 2

1.29
(2.04)

4.51
(3.90)

-0.0056
(4.19)

Log Urban
Population

-1.33
(1.03)

-3.23
(2.14)

-2.48
(1.87)

Log Median
Family Income

-2.37
(2.60)

-5.90
(4.66)

0.99
(5.43)

Log Black
Population

0.12
(0.39)

0.51
(0.73)

0.40
(0.73)

Constant

39.3
(25.04)

99.8*
(51.57)

16.6
(46.69)

2.33***
(0.27)

3.46***
(0.23)

2.92***
(0.46)

134
0.07

134
0.02

134
0.11

Log Alpha
Constant
N
Pseudo R-squared

Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard
errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table A2.6: Full OLS Models of Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House,
94th-103rd Congresses
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

10.5***
(2.53)

8.56***
(2.51)

8.32***
(2.51)

1st Dimension
DW-NOMINATE

-28.7***
(2.29)

-26.4***
(4.29)

2nd Dimension
DW-NOMINATE

-7.06***
(1.36)

-7.89***
(1.36)

Congresswoman
Majority Party
Member

Distance from
Chamber Median

12.1***
(2.53)
15.7***
(1.66)

4.14*
(2.36)

8.83*
(3.99)

Distance from
Majority Party
Median

8.15*
(3.97)
-19.4***
(4.16)

African
American

1.15
(2.90)

Latino

-3.22
(3.96)

Speaker

6.14*
(2.78)

0.62
(5.32)
-9.71***
(3.09)

-7.38*
(3.32)

-2.43
(3.93)

-6.12
(3.96)

-5.04
(3.97)

-20.1
(21.85)

-24.7
(21.83)

-27.0
(21.58)

-26.3
(21.59)

Chair

18.1***
(2.96)

17.8***
(2.95)

18.4***
(2.93)

18.7***
(2.93)

Ranking

-4.45
(2.91)

-6.61*
(2.90)

-7.12**
(2.81)

-7.50**
(2.81)

Seniority

1.36***
(0.18)

1.38***
(0.18)

1.32***
(0.18)

1.35***
(0.18)

Prestigious
Committee

7.23***
(1.35)

6.63***
(1.36)

6.99***
(1.34)

7.06***
(1.34)

-17.4***
(2.57)

-18.6***
(2.57)

-18.5***
(2.54)

-18.7***
(2.54)

94th
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95th

-20.0***
(2.58)

-21.2***
(2.57)

-21.0***
(2.54)

-21.2***
(2.54)

96th

-5.81*
(2.57)

-6.83**
(2.57)

-6.67**
(2.54)

-6.86**
(2.54)

97th

5.79*
(2.57)

4.83*
(2.57)

4.84*
(2.54)

4.61*
(2.54)

98th

9.30***
(2.57)

8.50***
(2.56)

8.63***
(2.53)

8.47***
(2.54)

99th

4.12
(2.56)

3.41
(2.56)

3.40
(2.53)

3.29
(2.53)

100th

8.03***
(2.56)

7.28**
(2.56)

7.33**
(2.53)

7.19**
(2.53)

101st

11.6***
(2.56)

11.0***
(2.56)

11.0***
(2.53)

10.8***
(2.53)

102nd

14.9***
(2.57)

14.5***
(2.56)

14.4***
(2.53)

14.3***
(2.53)

Constant

39.4***
(2.81)

56.3***
(3.43)

49.0***
(2.31)

51.3***
(2.73)

N
R-sq
F-Statistic

4370
.1692
46.63***

4370
.1724
47.69***

4370
.1905
51.16***

4370
.1897
50.90***

NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table A2.7: Full OLS Models, Including Interaction Terms, of Legislative
Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House, 94th-103rd Congresses
(1)

(2)

Congresswoman

16.9***
(4.19)

12.8**
(4.18)

Majority
Party

16.4***
(1.72)

4.49*
(2.41)

Congresswoman X
Majority Party Member

-7.45
(5.25)

-3.64
(5.23)

Distance from

9.54**
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Chamber Median

(4.03)

Distance from
Majority Party Median

-19.1***
(4.18)

African American

1.19
(2.90)

6.22*
(2.78)

Latino

-3.47
(3.96)

-2.53
(3.94)

Speaker

-20.0
(21.85)

-24.7
(21.83)

Chair

17.9***
(2.96)

17.7***
(2.95)

Ranking Member

-4.11
(2.92)

-6.44*
(2.91)

Seniority

1.35***
(0.18)

1.38***
(0.18)

Prestigious
Committee

7.22***
(1.35)

6.63***
(1.36)

94th Congress

-17.5***
(2.57)

-18.7***
(2.57)

95th Congress

-20.0***
(2.58)

-21.3***
(2.57)

96th Congress

-5.87*
(2.57)

-6.86**
(2.57)

97th Congress

5.72*
(2.58)

4.79*
(2.57)

98th Congress

9.21***
(2.57)

8.45***
(2.56)

99th Congress

4.02
(2.56)

3.35
(2.56)

100th Congress

7.93***
(2.56)

7.23**
(2.56)

101st Congress

11.5***
(2.56)

10.9***
(2.56)
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102nd Congress

14.9***
(2.57)

14.5***
(2.56)

Constant

38.9***
(2.83)

56.0***
(3.45)

N
R-sq
F-Statistic

4370
.1696
44.41***

4370
.1725
45.33***

NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A2.8: Legislative Entrepreneurship per Congressional Session, 94th – 103rd
94th

95th

96th

97th

98th

99th

100th

101st

102nd

103rd

Congresswoman

-1.03
(3.78)

3.11
(5.55)

4.27
(7.67)

3.20
(9.53)

16.4*
(8.44)

19.8*
(9.52)

9.86
(8.98)

11.1
(8.68)

24.8**
(9.18)

12.6*
(5.81)

Majority Party
Member

1.72
(2.87)

-7.67*
(3.96)

5.23
(5.33)

-6.82
(7.65)

-12.3
(7.61)

3.51
(10.12)

2.22
(9.26)

-0.36
(9.78)

27.8**
(10.96)

16.7*
(9.50)

Distance from
Chamber Median

35.2***
64.7*** 45.9** 13.8
(8.90)
(12.61)
(15.39) (16.14)

59.8***
(18.76)

37.7*
(20.44)

31.3
83.8***
(20.12) (22.06)

37.4
(24.16)

17.8
(20.52)

Distance from
Majority Party
Median

-30.4*** -68.8*** -53.4*** -43.9** -107.4*** -40.0*
(8.40)
(12.22)
(14.97) (16.80) (19.11)
(22.28)

-51.3**
(21.43)

-79.3*** -4.65
(24.25) (27.06)

7.82
(23.20)

African American

6.02
(4.35)

11.0*
(6.39)

-17.6*
(8.23)

-4.06
(10.92)

-2.43
(11.43)

15.0
(10.08)

-0.97
(10.27)

-15.5
(10.50)

-3.54
(7.09)

Latino

-9.29
(7.06)

-19.8*
(9.21)

-14.7
(12.37)

-5.70
-21.1*
(15.73) (12.43)

-10.5
(13.71)

19.4
(12.87)

11.8
(13.40)

-20.1
(14.45)

-1.73
(9.21)

Speaker

0
(.)

0
(.)

0
(.)

0
(.)

0
(.)

0
(.)

72.9*
(43.29)

-69.3
(48.60)

-90.2**
(37.06)

Chair

-2.45
(3.72)

3.75
(5.59)

12.8*
(7.49)

19.0*
17.0*
(10.45) (9.86)

33.5**
(11.19)

21.0*
(10.00)

25.9**
(11 .04)

11.2
(11.66)

16.9*
(9.04)

Ranking Member

-3.01
(3.72)

-8.61
(5.35)

0.75
(7.21)

-8.48
(10.29)

-11.1
(11.31)

-12.7
(10.07)

- 0.20
(10.47)

-7.11
(11.76)

-7.25
(8.59)

6.20
(9.74)

0
(.)

-1.58
(9.63)
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Seniority

0.13
(0.22)

0.14
(0.33)

0.75
(0.48)

1.36*
(0.66)

1.07*
(0.63)

1.29*
(0.69)

0.96
(0.62)

2.04**
(0.68)

2.81*** 2.24***
(0.69)
(0.52)

Prestigious
Committee

0.25
(2.57)

4.79
(3.92)

3.70
(4.97)

8.67
(7.00)

-1.95
(6.65)

6.71
(7.63)

21.4***
(6.72)

-5.50
(7.38)

11.2
(7.50)

Distributive
Committee

-0.92
(1.94)

1.78
(2.94)

2.78
(3.87)

-0.29
(5.46)

-7.19
(5.10)

-6.74
(6.05)

1.80
(5.43)

-1.83
(5.67)

-2.11
(6.19)

-8.56*
(4.74)

Policy
Committee

-0.76
(1.91)

4.96*
(2.79)

4.51
(3.65)

9.34*
(5.04)

-0.93
(4.63)

-0.52
(5.35)

2.29
(4.81)

-3.59
(5.20)

-2.23
(5.40)

-0.16
(4.13)

Constant

42.3***
(4.06)

43.2*** 47.1*** 68.2*** 93.5*** 59.3***
(5.81)
(7.78) (10.65) (10.29) (13.69)

34.4*
(14.84)

36.4**
(11.90)

N
R-squared
F-Statistic

438
.0929
3.63***

437
439
435
437
437
439
437
.1374
.1506
.1024
.2143
.1418
.1826
.1750
5.63*** 6.29*** 4.01*** 9.64*** 5.84*** 7.93*** 6.90***

437
.1668
6.52***

434
.1602
6.16***

60.9*** 66.0***
(12.54) (13.49)

NOTES: Each column presents the full OLS model per congressional session. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

1.75
(5.68)
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Table A2.9: Full OLS Models, Including Dummy Interaction Terms, of Legislative
Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House, 94th-103rd Congresses
Female Democrat

7.57**
(3.14)

Female Republican

13.4**
(4.38)

Male Republican

-1.46
(2.46)

Distance From
Chamber Median

43.4***
(5.76)

Distance From
Party Median

-50.5***
(5.99)

African American

-1.09
(2.90)

Latino

-6.20
(3.94)

Speaker

-29.9
(21.70)

Chair

16.0***
(2.94)

Ranking
Member

-4.83*
(2.90)

Seniority

1.26***
(0.18)

Prestigious
Committee

5.33**
(1.96)

Distributive
Committee

-2.37
(1.54)

Policy
Committee

1.59
(1.41)

94th Congress

-18.4***
(2.55)

95th Congress

-21.0***
(2.56)
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96th Congress

-6.52**
(2.55)

97th Congress

5.37*
(2.55)

98th Congress

8.53***
(2.55)

99th Congress

3.34
(2.54)

100th Congress

7.35**
(2.54)

101st Congress

11.1***
(2.54)

102nd Congress

14.7***
(2.54)

Constant

58.4***
(2.89)

N
R-squared
F-Statistic

4370
.1857
43.09***

NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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CHAPTER 3
Data Sources:
• Congressional Hearings Data, Policy Agendas Project, Accessed 3/22/2016:
http://www.policyagendas.org/page/datasets-codebooks#congressional_hearings
• Information on other variables concerning Congress:
o http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/
o http://history.house.gov/Institution/Presidents-Coinciding/PresidentsCoinciding/
o http://history.house.gov/Institution/Session-Dates/80-89/
• Public Mood, Extended from Christopher Ellis and James A. Stimson, Ideology in
America, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012.:
http://stimson.web.unc.edu/data/
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Table A3.1: Data Sources, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics
Independent Variables

Description

Mean

Std. Dev.

Number of Women

Total # of women on each committee
during each congressional session

1.76

2.32

Proportion of Women

The proportion of women on each
committee during each congressional
session

4.10

4.95

Time

Trend variable, where 80th Congress
equals “0”, 81st Congress equals “1”…
110th Congress equals “30”

14.89

8.75

Democratic Majority

Equals “1” when Democrats held a majority
in the House, “0” when they did not

.76

.43

Democratic President

Equals “1” when there was a Democratic
president, “0” when there was not

.44

.50

Public Mood

Time series measure of public support for
government programs on the liberalconservative continuum

64.19

3.95
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Table A3.2: Full OLS Models Comparing Proportion of Women & Number of
Women
(1)
Proportion Women
on Committees

(2)

1.10***
(0.26)

Number of
Women

(3)
-0.050
(0.38)

4.87***
(0.57)

Time

1.36***
(0.17)

Democrat
Majority

-5.43*
(2.68)

Democrat
Presidency

(4)

0.92***
(0.16)

-0.88
(0.87)
-1.15***
(0.24)

-1.01***
(0.25)

-2.31
(2.58)

-0.87
(3.91)

-1.67
(3.95)

0.95
(2.09)

1.83
(1.99)

-4.86
(3.05)

-5.18*
(3.04)

Agriculture

-14.4**
(5.16)

-15.0**
(4.90)

7.54
(7.51)

7.61
(7.51)

Appropriations

73.3***
(5.17)

67.9***
(4.97)

-3.12
(7.54)

-1.90
(7.62)

Armed Services

-4.28
(5.22)

-11.0*
(5.04)

19.8**
(7.61)

21.5**
(7.72)

Banking

-9.58*
(5.27)

-17.9***
(5.12)

4.79
(7.68)

6.92
(7.85)

Budget

-21.1***
(5.98)

-22.2***
(5.65)

-18.3*
(8.72)

-17.6*
(8.66)

DC

-19.1***
(5.63)

-18.2***
(5.30)

-8.75
(8.20)

-8.45
(8.12)

Education

-9.46*
(5.22)

-13.5**
(4.98)

17.2*
(7.61)

18.4**
(7.63)

Government
Operations

19.2***
(5.20)

15.8***
(4.95)

-3.32
(7.58)

-2.33
(7.59)

Commerce

-0.55
(5.18)

-4.73
(4.95)

34.5***
(7.55)

35.6***
(7.59)

Foreign Affairs

3.58
(5.18)

0.32
(4.94)

5.24
(7.55)

6.14
(7.57)
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House
Administration

-26.2***
(5.32)

-22.2***
(4.99)

-20.2**
(7.76)

-20.4**
(7.65)

Interior

-10.7*
(5.17)

-13.1**
(4.92)

53.9***
(7.53)

54.5***
(7.54)

Judiciary

3.60
(5.18)

2.37
(4.91)

53.4***
(7.55)

53.9***
(7.53)

Merchant
Marine

-13.1**
(5.61)

-16.0**
(5.33)

8.01
(8.18)

8.92
(8.17)

Post Office

-12.9*
(5.70)

-14.1**
(5.34)

6.37
(8.30)

7.28
(8.19)

Public Works

-7.14
(5.17)

-13.1**
(4.98)

-2.50
(7.54)

-1.16
(7.64)

Science

-5.20
(5.41)

-9.51*
(5.16)

-2.72
(7.88)

-1.55
(7.92)

Small
Business

-19.5***
(6.11)

-21.7***
(5.78)

-6.95
(8.90)

-6.00
(8.86)

Veterans
Affairs

-19.0***
(5.20)

-19.5***
(4.91)

-10.4
(7.57)

-9.94
(7.53)

Public
Mood

-0.097
(0.23)

-0.13
(0.22)

-0.80**
(0.34)

-0.80**
(0.34)

Constant

11.6
(16.92)

16.4
(16.08)

97.1***
(24.66)

96.3***
(24.65)

N
R-squared
F-statistic

530
.6599
40.82***

530
.6929
47.49***

530
.3923
13.58***

530
.3935
13.65***

NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Models 1 & 2 use
the number of oversight hearings as the dependent variable; Models 3 & 4 use the number of
legislative hearings as the dependent variable.
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CHAPTER 4
Data sources:
• E. Scott Adler and John Wilkerson, Congressional Bills Project: (93rd-114th
congresses), NSF 00880066 and 00880061. The views expressed are those of the
authors and not the National Science Foundation. Accessed 8/1/16.
• U.S. Census, American Communities Survey, via American FactFinder (109-113
congresses). Accessed several times, final data download 10/8/16.
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Table A4.1: Data Sources, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics
Independent Variables

Description

Mean

Std. Dev.

Congresswomen

Equals “1” for woman, “0” for man

.17

.38

Party Identification

Equals “1” for Republicans, “0” for Democrats

.50

.50

1st Dimension
DW-NOMINATE

Ideology Score, Pool & Rosenthal (2007)

.14

.53

Majority Party

Equals “1” if member of majority party, “0” if not

.56

.50

United Government

Equals “1” if House and President of same party, “0” if not

.40

.49

Log Number
Congresswomen

Log of number of congresswomen within a session

4.30

.05

Log Black Population

Log of African American population within member’s district

10.8

1.12

Log Median Household
Income

Log of median household income within member’s district

10.84

.25

Log Divorced Women

Log of number of divorced women within member’s district

10.44

.20

Log Wealthy Women

Log of number of wealthy women within member’s district

8.43

.81

Log Girls Under Five
in Poverty

Log of number of girls under 5 within member’s district

8.44

.56

Log Lesbian Households

Log of number of lesbian households within member’s district

6.40

.57

Log Women Veterans

Log of number of women veterans within member’s district

8.03

.60
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Table A4.2: Coding Women's Issue Bills According to Policy Agendas Project Subtopic
Codes & Swers' (2002) Definition
The following information was taken from the websites of these women's organizations, which Swers
specifically refers to in the Appendix of her 2002 book, The Difference Women Make:
1.
Liberal groups: the American Association of University Women and the National Organization
for Women.
•

AAUW: http://www.aauw.org/what-we-do/public-policy/aauw-issues/

Civil rights: “AAUW advocates for equality, individual rights, and social justice for a diverse
society.”(Affirmative action, Federal judicial nominations, Hate crimes prevention, Lesbian,
Gay, bisexual, and transgender issues, Reproductive rights)
Education: “AAUW supports a strong system of public education that promotes gender fairness,
equity, and diversity.” (Career and technical education, Charter schools, Disabilities, Education
and training in welfare/TANF, Higher education, No Child Left Behind Act, School vouchers,
Single-sex education, STEM education)
Economic Security: “AAUW advocates for all women to achieve economic self-sufficiency.” (Work-life
Balance, Pay equity, Retirement security, Health care, Social Security privatization)
Title IX: “AAUW supports vigorous enforcement of Title IX and all other civil rights laws pertaining to
education.” (Title IX, Equity in school athletics, Sexual harassment, Single-sex education)
•

NOW: http://www.now.org/issues/

Top Priority Issues: Abortion rights/reproductive issues, violence against women, constitutional equality,
Promoting diversity and ending racism, lesbian rights, and economic justice.
Other issues: Affirmative Action, Disability Rights, Family/Family Law, Fighting the Right, Global
Feminism, Health, Immigration, Judicial Nominations, Legislation, Marriage Equality, Media Activism,
Mothers/Caregivers Economic Rights, Working for Peace, Social Security, Supreme Court, Title
IX/Education, Welfare, Women-Friendly Workplace, Women in the Military, Young Feminist Programs
2.

Conservative groups: Concerned Women for America and Eagle Forum.
•

CWFA: http://www.cwfa.org/coreissues.asp

Core issues: Sanctity of life, religious liberty, family (traditional marriage), pornography, education
(parents’ rights), and national sovereignty (CWA believes that neither the United Nations nor any other
international organization should have authority over the United States in any area. We also believe the
United States has the right and duty to protect and secure our national borders. We believe in budget
restraint which embodies responsible spending, small government and a budget in which the U.S.
government spends within its means and ceases to steal from future generations.)
•

Eagle Forum: http://www.eagleforum.org/topics/

CONSTITUTION: 2nd Amendment, Con Con/Article V, DC/HI/PR Statehood, Equal Rights
Amendment, Electoral College, Executive Orders, Keep an Elected Congress
COURTS/JUDGES: Amicus Briefs, Court Watch, Judges, Marriage, Pledge of Allegiance, Property
Rights, Schlafly Book — Supremacists, Ten Commandments
EDUCATION: Common Core
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ENGLISH LANGUAGE
FAMILY / FATHERS / FEMINISM: Domestic Violence/VAWA, Equal Rights Amendment, Fathers,
Feminism, Feminist Fantasies, The Flipside of Feminism, Marriage, Parents' Rights, Title IX, Women's
Treaty (CEDAW)
Globalism vs Sovereignty: Global Governance, Global Warming, Law of the Sea, North American Union,
Panama Canal, Rights of the Child, United Nations, Women's Treaty (CEDAW)
HEALTH/LIFE ISSUES: Health Care Reform, Eagle Forum Opposes Personhood Amendment, Vaccines
IMMIGRATION/BORDERS: Amnesty/Guest-Worker, Border Security & Immigration, Mexican Trucks,
North American Union, Terrorism
JOBS/ECONOMY/TRADE: Amnesty/Guest-Worker, FTAA & CAFTA, Jobs/Economy, North American
Union, Patent Rights
PRIVACY/DATABASES: Privacy/Databases, Medical Privacy, National ID, Nosy Surveys & Data
Collection, Social Security #s
3.
The Congressional Caucus for Women’s Issues (later reconfigured as Women’s Policy, Inc.) is a
bipartisan, but liberal-leaning congressional caucus.
http://www.womenspolicy.org/site/PageServer
Mission Statement: Women's Policy, Inc. (WPI) champions the interests of women throughout the
country on the most significant social, economic, and health issues across the public policy spectrum.
WPI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization whose sole focus is to help ensure that the most informed
decisions on key women's issues are made by policymakers at the federal, state, and local levels.
Audiences include elected officials, regulators, women's groups, labor groups, academia, the business
community, the media, and the general public. WPI achieves and shares its rare quality of insight into
relevant issues by researching and producing the best available information in the form of compelling and
unbiased legislative analyses, issue summaries, impact assessments, and educational briefings. This
ensures that policy decisions affecting women and their families have the benefit of input from the most
objective sources possible.
The Caucus’ Accomplishments:
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
The Child Support Enforcement Act
The Retirement Equity Act
The Civil Rights Restoration Act
The Women's Business Ownership Act
The Breast and Cervical Cancer Mortality Prevention Act
The Mammography Quality Standards Act
The Family and Medical Leave Act
The Violence Against Women Act
The Commission on the Advancement of Women and Minorities in Science, Engineering, and
Technology Development Act
Reauthorization of the Mammography Quality Standards Act
Contraceptive Coverage for Federal Employees

Table A4.3: Reliability of Women’s Issue Subtopic Coding
% Expected Agreement
% Agreement
Kappa
58.88
83.19
.59*
____________________________________________________
*=p<.001
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Table A4.4: The Effects of Gender & Party Identification Interaction on Women's Issue
Bill Introductions, 109-113th Congress
(1)

(2)

(3)

Congresswomen

0.21***
(0.05)

0.22***
(0.06)

0.22***
(0.07)

Party Identification

-0.32***
(0.04)

-0.32***
(0.04)

-0.32***
(0.04)

Majority Party

0.11***
(0.04)

0.11***
(0.04)

0.11**
(0.04)

Congresswomen X
Party Identification

-0.023
(0.10)

Congresswomen X
Majority Party

-0.0037
(0.09)

United Government

0.070
(0.04)

0.070
(0.04)

0.071
(0.04)

Log Number
Congresswomen

0.21
(0.41)

0.20
(0.41)

0.21
(0.41)

Log Black
Population

0.027*
(0.02)

0.027*
(0.02)

0.027*
(0.02)

Log Median
Household Income

0.58***
(0.07)

0.58***
(0.07)

0.58***
(0.07)

Constant

-5.77**
(1.94)

-5.75**
(1.94)

-5.77**
(1.94)

-0.63***
(0.04)

-0.63***
(0.04)

-0.63***
(0.04)

2362
0.01

2362
0.01

2362
0.01

Log Alpha
Constant
N
Pseudo R-squared

Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table A4.5: Further Effects of Gender & Party Identification on Women's Issue Bill
Introductions with Gender and Party Dummy Interactions, 109-113th Congress
Female Democrats

0.54***
(0.06)
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Female Republicans

0.20**
(0.08)

Male Democrats

0.32***
(0.04)

Majority Party

0.11***
(0.04)

United Government

0.070
(0.04)

Log Number
Congresswomen

0.20
(0.41)

Log Black
Population

0.027*
(0.02)

Log Median
Household Income

0.58***
(0.07)

Constant

-6.07***
(1.94)

Log Alpha
Constant

-0.63***
(0.04)

N
Pseudo R-squared

2362
0.01

Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table A4.6: Women's Issue Bill Introductions with and without Congressional Session
Fixed Effects, 109-113th Congress
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Congresswomen

0.21***
(0.05)

0.21***
(0.05)

0.20***
(0.05)

0.20***
(0.05)

Party Identification

-0.32***
(0.04)

-0.31***
(0.04)
-0.33***
(0.03)

-0.32***
(0.03)

0.12***
(0.04)

0.12***
(0.04)

1st Dimension
DW-NOMINATE
Majority Party

0.11***
(0.04)

0.11**
(0.04)
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United Government

0.070*
(0.04)

0.15**
(0.06)

0.067
(0.04)

0.14**
(0.06)

Log Number
Congresswomen

0.21
(0.41)

1.00
(0.62)

0.24
(0.41)

0.95
(0.62)

Log Black
Population

0.027*
(0.02)

0.027*
(0.02)

0.024
(0.02)

0.023
(0.02)

Log Median
Household Income

0.58***
(0.07)

0.57***
(0.07)

0.58***
(0.07)

0.57***
(0.07)

109th Congress

0.034
(0.07)

0.020
(0.07)

110th Congress

0.13*
(0.06)

0.13*
(0.06)

111th Congress

0
(.)

0
(.)

112th Congress

0
(.)

0
(.)

Constant

-5.09***
(0.91)

-5.78***
(1.01)

-5.18***
(0.91)

-5.79***
(1.01)

Log Alpha
Constant

-0.63***
(0.04)

-0.64***
(0.04)

-0.64***
(0.04)

-0.65***
(0.04)

N
Pseudo R-squared

2362
0.01

2362
0.01

2362
0.02

2362
0.02

Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

